Africa

Rating Overview

Civic space conditions in Africa South of the Sahara remain highly restrictive: 44 out of 50 countries and territories are rated as obstructed, repressed or closed, and over 80 per cent of people live in countries where civic space is repressed or closed. Civic space is open only in the island states of Cabo Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe, while Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles have narrowed civic space.

Madagascar’s civic space rating has been downgraded from obstructed to repressed. Security forces regularly deploy excessive force and arbitrarily arrest protesters, and protests are regularly banned. Sustained youth-led anti-government protests erupted on 25 September 2025, initially over chronic electricity and water shortages, leading to the military seizing power in October 2025. In response to the protests, security forces used rubber bullets, stun grenades and teargas, and arrested, beat and threatened protesters. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that at least 22 people were killed and over 100 injured in the first few days of protests and ensuing violence, with some killed by security forces. Protests against the Toliare mining project also saw the arrest and prosecution of activists and protesters. In recent years, restrictive laws such as the cybercrimes law have been used against environmental HRDs, social media users and whistleblowers.

Liberia’s civic space rating has been downgraded from narrowed to obstructed. This reflects attacks on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. Political party supporters and security forces have abducted, threatened and physically assaulted journalists. For example, ruling party youth members assaulted journalist Nyantee Togba, while Alex Seryea Yormie was abducted and tortured for broadcasting a government directive. Peaceful protests have been met with violence. A public protest in December 2024 escalated when law enforcement officers used teargas and allegedly live ammunition, leading to injuries and arrests. These incidents, including the temporary closure of a community radio station on the orders of a local official, point to a deteriorating environment where state and non-state actors increasingly restrict fundamental freedoms.

More positively, Gabon’s civic space rating has been upgraded from repressed to obstructed, reflecting improvements after the 2023 military coup that ended decades of repression by the former ruling Bongo family. Conditions for journalists have improved, allowing exiled reporters to return, and the transitional government maintained the timeline for presidential and legislative elections in 2025, which CSOs were able to monitor. A new bill aims to modernise the legal framework for CSOs. However, significant restrictions persist. The new electoral code barred opposition figures from running for president, and the law on political parties sets high membership thresholds, excluding smaller movements. The election enabled the leader of the coup to retain power. Journalists face summonses from security forces, and protests continue to be frequently banned or dispersed.

A surge in state repression of protests was observed in Southern Africa, with authorities violently cracking down on protests and intensifying pressure on dissenting voices. In Mozambique, authorities met post-election demonstrations with a lethal response, resulting in hundreds of deaths and more than 4,200 arrests. In Angola, security forces violently suppressed protests against fuel price hikes, using excessive force, including live ammunition, tear gas and batons, leading to 30 fatalities and over 1,500 detained in the protests and the violence that ensued. Use of excessive force against protesters was also evident in South Africa, where a community leader, Vusi Banda, the chairperson of the Mondlo Township Civic Space Organisation, was assassinated after leading a service delivery protest.. Malawi witnessed state complicity in violence ahead of the 2025 general elections as masked assailants attacked peaceful protesters demanding electoral reform while security forces stood by. The region also saw judicial harassment of activists and journalists as a result of critical reporting and social media posts, including in Lesotho and Zambia.

CIVIC SPACE RESTRICTIONS

Detention of journalists and attacks on journalists

The detention of journalists was documented in at least 33 countries and territories in Africa South of the Sahara, with attacks on journalists in at least 16 countries. The detention of journalists was the top violation in Central, East and Horn and West Africa. Journalists were detained in at least 11 West African countries, nine in Southern Africa, seven in East and Horn of Africa and six in Central Africa. In countries including the DRC, Somalia and Somaliland, authorities continued to arrest journalists as a tactic to intimidate and silence them

Despite government promises to decriminalise press offences in DRC, journalists face arrests under criminal provisions. For example, Glody Ndaya of L’Association Congolaise des Femmes Journalistes de la Presse Écrite (ACOFEPE) was arrested on 4 August 2025 for alleged defamation and taken to Makala Central Prison without summons. In M23-occupied areas of eastern DRC, journalists face abductions and intimidation. In February 2025, Congo River Alliance and M23 armed coalition forces in Goma abducted journalist Tuver Wundi, and in May they abducted Jérémie Wakahasha Bahati, both for critical reporting. On 5 August 2025, in Bukavu, South Kivu province, assailants abducted and killed journalist Fiston Wilondja Mukamba, former staff member of the Media monitoring Centre - a self regulation programme of the National Union of the Press of Congo (UNPC).

Authorities across Africa South of the Sahara have increasingly used cybercrime laws and other restrictive legislation to prosecute journalists and online critics. In Niger on 30 October 2025, authorities arrested six journalists and charged them with ‘complicity in distributing documents likely to disturb public order’, believed to be related to the circulation of a press briefing invitation, subsequently shared online by critics of new mandatory levies introduced by the military junta. In Kenya, police arrested blogger and teacher Albert Ojwang in June 2025 for a social media post allegedly spreading false information about a senior police official. He died in police custody the following day under suspicious circumstances, with an autopsy later revealing injuries consistent with blunt force trauma, sparking widespread protests.

In December 2024 in Mozambique, police shot and killed blogger and musician, Albino Sibia while he livestreamed a post-election protest. In Ghana, supporters of the New Patriotic Party assaulted JoyNews reporter Latif Iddrisu in May 2025 for covering the detention of a regional party chair. Journalists were also attacked or detained in countries including Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Authorities also arrested HRDs in connection with protests and strikes. In Kenya in June 2025, following protests over the killing of Albert Ojwang, police arrested three HRDs – Mark Amiani, Francis Mwangi and John Mulingwa Nzau – charging them with incitement to violence, despite civil society groups refuting the claims. In the Central African Republic, seven civil society activists were arrested in June 2025 during a vigil to commemorate students who died in a tragic explosion and to call for accountability.

HRDs have also been arrested for criticising authorities. In Mauritania, HRD Ahmed Ould Samba was sentenced to a year in prison in May 2025 for a Facebook post in which he accused the president of implementing ‘racist and corrupt’ policies. In Togo, activist and poet Honoré Sitsopé Sokpor was arrested in January 2025 and charged with ‘undermining the internal security of the state’ after publishing a poem online that condemned governmental oppression.

Lawyers have also been targeted. In the Republic of the Congo, lawyer Bob Kaben Massouka was arrested in July 2025, allegedly for supporting a group of young activists who were planning a peaceful protest against deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. He was charged with attempting to breach state security and criminal conspiracy. In Uganda, security officers assaulted and arrested human rights lawyer Eron Kiiza on 7 January 2025 as he tried to access a military courtroom where he was representing opposition leader Kizza Besigye. In Algeria, human rights lawyer Mounir Gharbi was sentenced in absentia to three years in prison on 16 February 2025, for ‘publicly displaying publications likely to harm the national interest’ after he posted Facebook comments.

Kenya’s crackdown on youth-led protests commemorating the 2024 demonstrations against tax hikes, caused at least 65 deaths and injured over 600 people, and led to the arrest of more than 1,500 people between June and July 2025, with some facing terrorism charges. During one protest on 17 June 2025, at least one bystander was killed and 25 others hospitalised after police used live ammunition. Similarly, in Madagascar, security forces responded with disproportionate and lethal force. Following clashes on 9 October 2025, police arrested and referred for prosecution at least 28 protesters. Angola’s protests in July 2025 over fuel subsidy cuts were met with a violent police response. The crackdown on a three-day strike that escalated into larger protests saw police using excessive force, including live ammunition, tear gas and batons. At least 30 people were killed and 277 injured in the protests and violence, with over 1,500 people detained and hundreds facing summary trials. In The Gambia, during a peaceful protest against high internet data tariffs in August 2025, law enforcement officers arrested around 23 young protesters, including rapper Ali Cham, alias Killa Ace, and journalist Yusuf Taylor.

Protests by environmental activists and students also led to arrests and detentions. In Uganda, authorities arrested 15 environmental activists in November 2024 for protesting against the destruction of the Lwera wetland.In February 2025, another 11 environmentalists from the Students Against EACOP group were arrested during a protest at the EU mission and charged with ‘common nuisance’. In South Africa in February 2025, 15 students from the University of the Free State were arrested during protests over registration and funding issues.

Central and West Africa are significant hotspots for this form of state-sponsored attack on dissent. The case of Burkinabe activist Alain Christophe Traoré, known as Alino Faso, offers one grim example. Arrested in Côte d’Ivoire on charges of ‘intelligence with agents of a foreign state’, he was later found dead by hanging in detention under highly suspicious circumstances. Such charges are often used to delegitimise and persecute exiled critics. Côte d’Ivoire was the site of another cross-border operation when Ivorian police arrested Beninese journalist Comlan Hugues Sossoukpè, who was living in exile, and promptly extradited him to Benin to face terrorism charges for his critical reporting. This incident highlights how governments exploit diplomatic ties to target activists and journalists who have fled persecution. It followed a similar case in Benin in which another Beninese critic, digital activist Steve Amoussou, was abducted from exile in Lomé, Togo in August 2024 and sentenced to two years in prison for ‘politically motivated insult’ and ‘spreading false information’ linked to a Facebook page critical of the government.

In Sudan, the government has extended its crackdown on dissent beyond its borders, targeting anti-war figures and political opponents living abroad. A significant instance of this transnational repression occurred in April 2024, when the acting Attorney General filed serious criminal charges against the former civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other leaders of the Taqaddum political coalition, many of whom are not in Sudan. The charges included grave accusations such as crimes against humanity, ‘inciting war against the state’ and undermining constitutional order, with some carrying the death penalty. This legal persecution of prominent figures in exile is a clear strategy to silence opposition and those advocating for an end to the conflict from outside Sudan. Other journalists, lawyers and WHRDs outside Sudan have reported receiving threats, indicating a broader campaign to intimidate the Sudanese diaspora.

*Covering countries south of the Sahara.