Europe and Central Asia

In a year of elections, many people voted in Europe and Central Asia, and the far right gained ground in European Union (EU) countries, including Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia, with negative civic space impacts across and beyond the bloc.

The European Commission continued with its ‘Defence of Democracy’ package against foreign interference, aimed at countering Russia’s support for nationalists and populists ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, despite civil society criticism that it could inspire similar laws against foreign interference that could be used to restrict civil society. Europe also continued to shift politically rightwards and away from respect for human rights on migration, stepping up the militarisation of borders and striking agreements with repressive states to detain migrants abroad. Despite most EU countries retaining open or narrowed civic space ratings, threats persist, with rights violations reported even in high-rated states.

Ratings overview

With two upgrades and two downgrades, the overall balance of ratings in Europe and Central Asia remains unchanged. Of 54 countries, civic space is rated as open in 19, narrowed in 19, obstructed in seven, repressed in three and closed in six.

Slovenia is now rated as open, having been downgraded to narrowed in 2020 due to a decline in civic space under former Prime Minister Janez Janša. The Freedom Movement coalition, in power since 2022, has increased dialogue with civil society, introduced new mechanisms for consultation and used civil society input to reform the public broadcaster RTV Slovenia. In September 2023, the government implemented an amnesty for people fined under COVID-19 restrictions, including protesters. While this represents a shift from the previous government’s openly hostile approach, CSOs still face funding challenges, including cancelled tenders and limited support for work on environmental and migration issues, alongside discreditation campaigns by politically linked media.

Poland also improved its civic space rating, moving from obstructed to narrowed. December 2023 brought a change in government after eight years of rule by the nationalist Law and Justice party. The new administration immediately took steps to resolve longstanding issues, launching initiatives to reverse much-criticised policies that reduced judicial independence and, although these moves have yet to come to fruition, to recognise same-sex partnerships and liberalise draconian abortion laws. Efforts to improve government-civil society relations included the formation of a commission to investigate the previous government’s abuse of spyware against critics, including activists, and an advisory body to help shape the agenda of the country’s upcoming EU Council presidency. However, concerns remain, particularly about the government’s use of heavy-handed tactics to ‘depoliticise’ the public broadcaster, and a new migration strategy that suspends the right to asylum.

The Netherlands’ rating slipped from open to narrowed following increasing repression of protest rights. Authorities have continued to disrupt peaceful environmental protests, using water cannon and arresting activists by the hundreds and thousands, with over 9,000 activists detained during motorway blockades in late 2023. In January 2024, police admitted that many environmental protesters charged with participating in an airport blockade in 2022 had been misidentified due to the controversial use of facial recognition technology. In 2024, police responded with excessive force to peaceful student encampments in solidarity with Palestinians, using pepper spray, police batons, police dogs and bulldozers against protesters. Police detained 169 protesters during the eviction of one encampment at the University of Amsterdam.

Georgia has been downgraded from narrowed to obstructed after its April 2024 adoption of a controversial law requiring CSOs receiving international funding to register as ‘pursuing the interests of a foreign power’. The reintroduction of the law in 2024 after it had previously been withdrawn in 2023 triggered a resumption of mass protests that were suppressed with excessive force. Despite likely heavy fines for noncompliance, CSOs have committed to refusing to register. Opponents of the law, including CSO leaders and political activists, have faced a campaign of intimidation, including threatening phone calls from international numbers, defamatory posters and physical assaults. Ahead of the general election in October, the government passed a package of 19 anti-LGBTQI+ laws banning gender reassignment and hormone therapy, media representation of and education about same-sex relationships and any public assemblies related to LGBTQI+ issues, further restricting civic space.

Repressive laws continue to spread across Europe and Central Asia

In 2024, the concerning trend of ‘foreign agents’ and anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, pioneered by Russia, continued to sweep across several European and Central Asian countries. Beyond Georgia, several states have advanced or enacted laws that undermine fundamental freedoms in the name of national sovereignty and what are characterised as traditional values. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, draft laws on ‘foreign agents’ have been accompanied by laws targeting so-called ‘LGBTQI+ propaganda’. Hungary has tightened its already repressive framework to further stigmatise LGBTQI+ people by banning the sale of items seen as promoting deviations from assigned gender or homosexuality near schools, childcare facilities and religious institutions.

Kyrgyzstan’s civic space assessment shifted from obstructed to repressed due to an escalating crackdown on civil society and media, emphasised by the introduction of repressive draft laws. Despite strong objections from the international community and civil society, as of November 2023, parliament was in the process of adopting a law on NGOs with provisions similar to those in Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ legislation. Another draft law currently under consideration provides for excessive state regulation of media and online platforms, raising concerns it could be used to target critics. The number of politically motivated criminal prosecutions has increased, further shrinking the space for critical expression. In one notable case in October 2022, Kyrgyzstani authorities arrested almost 30 journalists, bloggers, HRDs and public figures who had spoken out against a land swap with Uzbekistan over the Kempir-Abad water reservoir. A year later, some of the defendants in the case are still in pretrial detention and the trial is taking place behind closed doors.

‘Foreign agent’ laws

Global conflicts and political instability in Europe and Central Asia have led to a proliferation of ‘foreign agent’ and ‘foreign influence’ laws, ostensibly to protect national sovereignty, but often with far-reaching implications for civil society activity.

March 2023 saw thousands flooding the streets of Georgia to denounce a restrictive draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’. The law mandated CSOs that receive over 20 per cent of their income from foreign sources to register as foreign agents, with heavy fines for non-compliance. When the law was put on the parliamentary agenda on 7 March 2023, over 10,000 protesters in Tbilisi voiced their opposition, resulting in clashes with security forces, which used teargas and water cannon. In response to the protests, the government withdrew the law from parliament pending further public debate.

On 23 March 2023, the government of the RS in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a draft law to establish a special register for CSOs supported from abroad. These organisations are to be designated as ‘agents of foreign influence’ and will be subject to stricter control and a vague ban on ‘political activities’, making advocacy a punishable offence. Parliament passed the first reading of the draft in September 2023.

In Kyrgyzstan, a ‘foreign agent’-style draft law was submitted to parliament in May 2023. It would require CSOs that receive international funding and that engage in broadly defined ‘political activities’ to register as ‘foreign representatives’, with the risk of suspension of their activities for up to six months without a court decision as the penalty for non-compliance. Those that do register would be subjected to burdensome reporting obligations and unannounced inspections. In October 2023, the draft law passed its first reading. In neighbouring Kazakhstan, the government introduced a public record of foreign-funded CSOs in a move clearly aimed at stigmatising such groups.

In May 2023, the EU presented its ‘Defence of Democracy’ package, which included a directive on ‘foreign interference’ that raised concerns among civil society across Europe. The proposed directive would require CSOs to disclose funding from sources outside the EU and subject them to strict registration and reporting restrictions. Over 200 European CSOs signed a letter opposing the proposal, arguing that it undermines the EU’s credibility in opposing the use of similar measures to stifle civil society within or outside its borders. In July 2023, the European Commission responded with assurances that a thorough impact assessment would be undertaken before any such legislation was implemented.

Russia continues to stifle civil society activities through its notorious ‘foreign agent’ legislation, designating international CSOs Transparency International and the World Wide Fund for Nature as ‘undesirable’, and their Russian branches as ‘foreign agents’. In neighbouring Belarus, as of May 2023, over 800 organisations were undergoing forced liquidation, as part of the campaign announced in 2021 by President Aleksandr Lukashenko as a ‘mopping-up operation’ against ‘bandits and foreign agents’.

Forced to repeal its repressive NGO Transparency Act in 2021 following an EU court ruling, Hungary also renewed its offensive against ‘foreign agents’ in December 2023 by establishing an Office for the Defence of Sovereignty, with wide-ranging investigative powers to defend the country against what it calls ‘undue political influence’ from abroad. The office soon began targeting CSOs and critical media: independent investigative outlet Átlátszó and Transparency International Hungary reported receiving formal notices of investigation in June 2024.

Kyrgyzstan's president signed off on a contentious law on ‘foreign representatives’ in April 2024. The law imposes stigmatising registration requirements and invasive state oversight for CSOs that receive international funding for vaguely defined ‘political’ work. Severe penalties can be applied for non-compliance, including suspension or closure, and some organisations have already dissolved or restricted their activities, fearing repercussions.

The law sets a concerning precedent for other countries in Central Asia, where CSOs with international funding already face heightened scrutiny and stigmatisation. Kazakhstan began publicly listing such organisations last year, in a move clearly aimed at discrediting them. In Uzbekistan in September 2020, parliament approved amendments to laws to allow authorities to ban foreign citizens from the country as ‘undesirable’ for vaguely defined actions including ‘demeaning the honour, dignity, or historical legacy of the Uzbek people’.

In Slovakia, amendments to core laws governing the activities of CSOs passed their first reading in April 2024. CSOs receiving over €5,000 annually (approx. US$5,300) from foreign sources would be required to declare themselves ‘foreign-funded organisations’, and the Ministry of the Interior would have the power to dissolve CSOs that fail to meet reporting requirements. Additionally, a proposed amendment introduced by the far-right Slovak National Party in September 2024 would prohibit ‘propaganda’ of ‘nontraditional sexual orientations’ in schools under the guise of protecting children.

An even more restrictive law is under consideration in Bulgaria. A bill was submitted to parliament in September 2024 that would see individuals or organisations receiving more than €500 a year (approx. US$530) from abroad being designated as ‘foreign agents’. In addition to being listed in a public registry, they would be required to indicate this status on emails, publications and social media posts. The draft law further prohibits ‘foreign agents’ from engaging in activities in schools, kindergartens and universities, along with other institutions. Although two prior proposals from the far-right Revival party failed, there is concern that this attempt may succeed, as a law banning the promotion of LGBTQI+ ‘ideas and views’ in schools proposed by the same party was passed with considerable support in August 2024.

Meanwhile, Russia continued intensifying restrictions. In November 2023, its Supreme Court deemed what it called the ‘international public movement of LGBTQI+ people’ an extremist organisation. In July, the repressive law on ‘undesirable organisations’ was further tightened, expanding its scope to intergovernmental bodies such as the Council of Europe and the International Criminal Court. Another proposed law would mandate deportation of foreigners who participate in unauthorised protests or collaborate with undesirable organisations.

In Turkey, the government revived its ‘agents of influence’ bill, threatening prison sentences of three to seven years for anyone who commits a crime against the security or political interests of the state, ‘in line with the strategic interests or instructions of a foreign state or organisation’. The law was approved by parliament’s justice committee at the end of October.

Top violations

In Europe and Central Asia, the most common civic freedom violations documented in the past year were the detention of protesters and journalists, the prevention and disruption of protests and excessive use of force.

Freedom of expression continued to be the most frequently violated right in Europe and Central Asia. In Europe, violations related to peaceful assembly were particularly prevalent, with the most common protests focusing on conflict, particularly Palestinian solidarity protests, and protests on environmental and labour issues. In Central Asia, where protests are rare due to the risk of persecution associated with public expressions of discontent, violations of freedom of association were more frequent.

Protesters detained

The detention of protesters was documented in at least 21 countries of the region.

Mass arrests of environmental activists engaged in peaceful civil disobedience continued in Europe. In December 2023, police in Belgium arrested over 500 protesters who had attempted to occupy Antwerp airport to protest against private jets. In Austria in November 2023, police arrested 57 Letzte Generation (Last Generation) activists following strategic roadblocks on motorways around Vienna. The country’s political leadership vilified the protesters, with Chancellor Karl Nehammer posting on social media that the activists ‘poison the societal climate’. In November 2023, a dozen police officers entered the University of Lisbon in Portugal and detained two students while they were giving a lecture on civil disobedience and climate action, along with a third activist who was filming the lecture. Similar actions against climate activists occurred in other European countries, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK.

Ill-treatment of protesters in detention was reported in several countries. During the 2024 Olympics in France, eight female football players were detained by over 20 police officers while attending a ‘Marathon for All’ event with signs advocating for the right to wear the hijab in sports. They were unveiled, stripped and searched while in police custody. In Italy, a detained Extinction Rebellion activist described being subjected to degrading police treatment following a civil disobedience action she did not directly participate in. After being arrested, photographed and fingerprinted, she said she was forced to undress and bend over in an unhygienic toilet at Bologna police headquarters.

Protests disrupted with excessive force

Protests were disrupted in at least 19 countries, and police used excessive force against protesters in at least 18 countries.

In France in June, observers reported disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against protesters at an environmental protest against the construction of the A69 motorway, including the use of particularly dangerous weapons such as stun grenades. Medical teams evacuated 10 people, with three hospitalised.

In February 2024, police violence was reported at Palestinian solidarity protests by students in Florence and Pisa, Italy. Footage of the events shared on social media shows fully armoured officers beating young protesters, some of them allegedly middle school students, with batons. Palestinian solidarity protests in Germany were confronted with particular police brutality. Videos on social media show numerous cases of officers pushing, punching and choking non-resisting protesters. In one case, a protester was injured to the point of losing consciousness and reportedly not given any medical assistance for 20 minutes.

In Georgia, in response to the mass protests against the ‘foreign agents’ law, police responded with rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon. Numerous videos show police using excessive force against protesters and there are credible allegations of severe ill-treatment of protesters in detention.

Labour protests have also faced harsh repression. In Istanbul, Turkey on 1 May 2024, police used teargas and rubber bullets against May Day protesters, detaining over 200 people amid heavy security measures.

The most brutal use of force by security forces in 2024 was observed in New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Pacific Ocean. In response to riots in May sparked by planned constitutional changes opposed by independence advocates, French authorities declared a state of emergency, imposed internet restrictions and deployed the military. Reports indicate that at least 11 Indigenous Kanaks, including protesters, were killed, 169 injured and over 2,000 detained. Some protest leaders were deported to mainland France, with 500 cases of enforced disappearance also reported.

Protests prevented

Prevention of protests was among the top violations recorded in the region, documented in at least 17 countries.

In Azerbaijan, officials twice denied opposition requests for a rally to express solidarity with political prisoners and demand fairer elections, on the grounds that the proposed locations were unsuitable. Authorities claimed that the stadium protesters might have used was being repaired and traffic was too heavy in city squares. In Russia, authorities banned protests by soldiers’ wives with similarly unconvincing justifications. In November 2023, the mayor of Novosibirsk claimed one such planned protest violated the ‘principle of legality’, without providing any further information. In Chelyabinsk, the rejection was justified by the fact that the registration for the event was submitted electronically, rather than on paper.

Authorities in Kazakhstan continued to routinely reject requests to hold peaceful assemblies and detain and penalise peaceful protesters. Independent feminist activists reported that authorities in the capital, Almaty, repeatedly rejected their requests to hold a peaceful rally on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2024, on the grounds that they could ‘jeopardise public order’, while allowing a rally calling for a ‘worthy life’ for women organised the day before by an activist close to the ruling party.

Palestinian solidarity protests also faced bans and obstruction in countries including Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary and Latvia.

Journalists detained

The detention of journalists, including citizen journalists and bloggers, was documented in at least 14 countries.

In multiple countries, including France, Germany, Italy and Spain, journalists have been detained while covering protests and documenting police use of force. In Bulgaria, journalists covering unrest in the capital, Sofia, during a Euro 2024 football qualifier game faced violence and obstruction. Police assaulted at least seven journalists and briefly detained Darik Radio’s Nikolay Ganchev, even after he identified himself with a press card, before releasing him when police confirmed his accreditation.

In Azerbaijan, host of the COP29 climate summit, the state cracked down on the country’s few remaining independent media from the end of 2023 onwards. In November 2023, authorities arrested Ulvi Hasanli, director of Abzas Media, an outlet known for its investigations into high-level corruption. Law enforcement officers raided Hasanli’s home and the headquarters of Abzas Media and claimed to have found €40,000 (approx. US$42,000), leading to a charge of smuggling, an offence that can bring up to eight years in prison. Within days, at least five more journalists were arrested on similar flimsy charges. In June, human rights groups estimated that there were over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including 23 journalists, the highest number in decades.

In Kyrgyzstan, 11 journalists from Temirov Live were detained following a raid on their homes and the group’s office, and charged with calling for riots due to their investigative work on corruption. This formed part of a growing crackdown on independent media and journalists. Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Temirov Live’s director, reported experiencing abuse in detention, but prosecutors dismissed her claims as fabricated. In October 2020, journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Tazhikbek kyzy received prison sentences, while two others were handed probational sentences. Seven defendants were acquitted.

Across Central Asia, civil society activists, bloggers, HRDs and journalists critical of authorities faced surveillance, threats and arrests. Many were prosecuted under vague criminal provisions, such as those related to disseminating ‘false’ or slanderous information, inciting hatred and alleged extremism. Others were charged with fabricated offences such as extortion or fraud.

In 2024, several dozen people were charged and imprisoned in Central Asian countries for exercising their right to freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms.

In Tajikistan, author Abdukhalil Kholiqzoda was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment in February 2024 for inciting hatred after publishing his memoir, which the authorities allege insulted state officials. At least seven journalists in Tajikistan are currently serving prison sentences of between seven and 20 years, all of them convicted since late 2022. In Kazakhstan, journalist and blogger Duman Mukhamedkarim was sentenced to seven years on extremism-related charges in August 2024 following a closed trial. In Uzbekistan, three men were sentenced to long prison terms for allegedly ‘insulting the president’ on Telegram and other platforms, despite experts finding that their statements did not contain incitement to unconstitutional acts or insults to the president. Persecution also extended across borders. Turkmenistan’s government continued to seek the forcible return of outspoken activists based in Turkey, with several having been sent back since 2023.

Country of concern: Serbia

In 2024, mass protests erupted in Serbia against a planned lithium mine. The project, which was put on hold in 2022 after public outcry, resumed in July 2024. That same month, the EU signed a strategic partnership with Serbia for raw materials, battery production and electric vehicles, with the mine expected to cover up to 90 percent of Europe’s demand for lithium, used in electrical vehicle batteries.

According to civil society reports, dozens of activists were arrested in 17 cities in August for allegedly ‘calling for a violent overthrow of the constitutional order’, based on their social media posts or participation in protests. While most detentions were brief, civil society groups criticised the use of detention as an intimidation tactic. Activists and critics have also been confronted with anonymous threats, checks and prolonged detentions at border crossings.

Of particular concern are the persistent narratives that portray resistance to the mining project as a foreign-backed plot to destabilise Serbia. In a coordinated smear campaign fuelled by high-ranking officials, civil society has been accused of plotting a violent ‘colour revolution’ to take power with the support of the EU and the USA, even though both have publicly backed the project.

This claim, allegedly supported by intelligence provided by Chinese and Russian authorities, has been widely publicised. The pro-government Informer, one of Serbia’s largest outlets, aired multiple prime-time programmes claiming to expose alleged foreign financing of a coup. The programmes revealed sensitive information, likely provided by state agencies, including donors, specific financial transactions and details of employees of a CSO accused of leading the plot, including their salaries and photos.

On 1 November 2024, the collapse of a newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad, which killed 14 people, sparked fresh protests. Authorities responded with increased repression, including excessive force and arrests by plainclothes officers who refused to identify themselves, raising serious concerns about protesters’ rights and safety.

Environmental defenders