This report, prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor by the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia (AHRCA), provides an overview of key developments affecting freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Uzbekistan from June 2025 to May 2026.
During the reporting period, the human rights environment in Uzbekistan was characterised by a continuing suppression of fundamental freedoms, marked by heightened state control, restrictive legal reforms, and pervasive digital repression.
- Freedom of Assembly and the Karakalpakstan Aftermath: Complete impunity continues to surround the violent suppression of the July 2022 Nukus protests. Karakalpakstani residents blacklisted by security forces face systemic discrimination, including restricted access to employment and severe, arbitrary passport denials. Imprisoned human rights defender Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov was subjected to severe torture, hazardous forced labour, and isolation before being handed an additional five-year sentence in May 2026 through expedited, flawed proceedings that denied him an effective defence. Simultaneously, Tashkent continues to pursue aggressively the extradition of exiled Karakalpak activists from neighbouring countries.
- Freedom of Association: New legislative amendments signed into law in August 2025 have significantly broadened reporting obligations, expanded regulatory control over foreign funding, and restricted the scope of foreign NGO staff. Independent human rights groups continue to face arbitrary registration rejections, effectively blocking their access to legal operation and funding.
- Freedom of Expression and Digital Repression: Media freedoms remain heavily suppressed under new legislative initiatives targeting online insults and prohibiting public photography. Independent voices face harsh retaliation, including wrongful imprisonment, forced psychiatric detention, and the harassment of elderly relatives. A prominent new risk is the weaponisation of digital platform mechanisms, where fraudulent copyright complaints are used to remove critical channels and content arbitrarily—including those of Radio Ozodlik, AHRCA, and the "Tashkent-SNOS" group. Concurrently, law enforcement has begun de facto criminalising online engagement, systematically monitoring, summoning, and threatening ordinary citizens who merely "like" or comment on human rights posts.
International developments
On 24th October 2025, the EU and Uzbekistan signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) which aims to elevate EU–Uzbekistan relations to a new strategic level, expanding cooperation in trade, political and economic relations, energy, transport, security, environmental protection and other areas. This development follows a notable increase in EU–Uzbekistan trade and investment in recent years, with Uzbekistan benefiting from preferential access to the EU market under the EU’s GSP+ scheme since 2021. IPHR, AHRCA, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights issued a joint statement urging the EU to ensure that human rights are placed at the heart of this deepened partnership, and that economic and geopolitical interests do not take precedence over human rights concerns. They stressed that “it is imperative that the EU and its members link the ratification and full implementation of the EPCA to tangible measures by the Uzbekistani authorities to halt further deterioration and ensure genuine improvements in human rights protection in the country.”
Freedom of peaceful assembly
Aftermath of the July 2022 Karakalpakstan events
1st July 2025 marked the third anniversary of the violent suppression of protests in the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, when authorities put down mass protests in the capital of Karakalpakstan, Nukus, against proposed constitutional amendments that would have deprived Karakalpakstan of its constitutionally protected status. The Uzbekistani authorities have yet to ensure an independent investigation into the July 2022 events and adequate accountability for the deaths and serious injuries resulting from the use of unjustified force by Uzbekistani security forces against largely peaceful demonstrators. Using force—including lethal means—to disperse the protests, security forces reportedly killed almost two dozen people and injured more than 270 (see CIVICUS Monitor entry from October 2022). Some of the reported injuries were severe, caused by explosive devices deployed by security forces that detonated in close proximity to protesters.
Human rights defenders report that the protests and their violent suppression resulted in restrictions on the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons living in Karakalpakstan.
For Karakalpakstani people, the possibility of travelling outside Uzbekistan has become more difficult. Obtaining documents for temporary travel abroad, including international passports, has become extremely complicated. According to available information, since 2022 more than twenty cases have already been recorded in which applications by residents of Karakalpakstan for international passports were rejected — either without explanation or with reference to outstanding debts for loans.
Such practices raise concerns about compliance with Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees everyone the right to leave any country, including their own. In accordance with the interpretation of the UN Human Rights Committee (General Comment No. 27), any restrictions on this right must be provided by law, be necessary and proportionate, and must not be applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily. The use of loan debts as grounds for refusing issuance of a passport does not meet these criteria.
After the protests, persons on the authorities’ so-called “blacklists” — for participation in or alleged involvement in those events — have been subjected to systemic discrimination. They face difficulties in obtaining employment, as well as restricted access to social support, including in cases affecting persons with disabilities. Such practice is contrary to Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, which enshrine the principle of non-discrimination and equality before the law, as well as Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which guarantees the right to social security. In addition, restrictions on access to medical assistance may violate Article 12 of the CESCR which provides for the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
In the absence of stable sources of income, many are forced to resort to taking out loans, using employed relatives or trusted persons as guarantors. The funds obtained are used to cover basic needs and ensure a minimum standard of existence. Subsequently, the existence of loan debt is used by the authorities of Uzbekistan as an additional ground for restricting the right to obtain an international passport or to travel abroad for work, thereby reinforcing a vicious cycle of socio-economic vulnerability and legal restrictions.
An unpublished survey of residents of Karakalpakstan conducted by activists was limited in scope but its results indicate worrying trends, including that benefits foreseen for people living in the ecological disaster zone of the Aral Sea area are not observed in practice. In addition, access to medical assistance remains extremely limited: even persons who have no possibility of employment are effectively deprived of the necessary support for treatment.
Persons designated by the security services as “potentially disloyal”, in addition to restrictions on socio-economic rights, are regularly subjected to politically motivated pressure, including threats and surveillance. Between December 2025–January 2026, human rights defender Elena Urlaeva visited Karakalpakstan and reported that her movement around Nukus and surrounding districts was accompanied by surveillance and threats of detention, which raises concern in the context of the guarantees of liberty and personal security set out in Article 9 of the ICCPR.
The situation of Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov — lawyer, journalist, and human rights defender imprisoned in retaliation for his peaceful involvement in the 2022 Karakalpakstan protests — remains deeply alarming. Already serving a 16-year prison sentence on politically motivated charges, he was sentenced on 1 May 2026 to an additional five years’ imprisonment by the Navoi City Court for allegedly “disrupting the work of a penal institution.” The court also designated him an “especially dangerous repeat offender” and ordered his transfer to a stricter prison colony, raising fears of further isolation and pressure.
Tazhimuratov has reportedly been repeatedly subjected to beatings, verbal abuse, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment by prison staff during his detention in Prison Colony No. 11 in Navoi Region.
In a video statement published on 8th February 2026, his sister, Maria Tazhimuratova, described harsh detention conditions and ongoing physical and psychological abuse over the course of his imprisonment. According to her, his health has seriously deteriorated: he has experienced difficulties eating, severe weakness, and significant weight loss of approximately 25 kilograms since his arrest. In what appears to constitute punitive labour, he has reportedly been forced to work in hazardous conditions at a lime-processing facility without adequate protective equipment, further endangering his health. Concerns have also been raised regarding the lack of adequate medical care. Maria Tazhimuratova appealed to the authorities to ensure humane treatment, stating: “We dream of only one thing — that he survives.”
Following this appeal, AHRCA, IPHR and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee issued a joint statement on 10th February 2026 expressing concern about Tazhimuratov’s treatment and calling on the Uzbekistani authorities to safeguard his health and safety.
International human rights experts have repeatedly raised concerns about his case. In November 2024, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention unlawful and called for his immediate release. On 26th January 2026, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders Mary Lawlor also called for his release and urged prompt and impartial investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
In mid-February 2026, Tazhimuratov’s family reported that new criminal charges had been initiated against him under Article 220 of the Criminal Code, relating to alleged disruption of prison operations. The charges reportedly stemmed from an incident in which he refused to comply with a prison guard’s order to walk with his head lowered, leading to a verbal altercation during which he allegedly struck the guard. His family believes the incident was deliberately provoked to justify opening a new criminal case against him.
Earlier, in November 2025, Tazhimuratov was reportedly placed in isolation in a punishment cell and subjected to torture after throwing a boot at a prison official who publicly insulted him as an “enemy of the people.” According to his lawyer, he was forced into a stress position, beaten, stripped naked, doused with cold water mixed with lime, and held in a freezing cell, losing consciousness after further beatings.
Serious fair trial concerns surrounded the proceedings in the new case. It was only on 9th April 2026 that relatives were informed that the third court hearing in this case would take place on 10th April at 09:00 in Navoi, near Colony No. 11, where Tazhimuratov is serving his sentence. At the same time, neither the family members nor Tazhimuratov’s lawyers were notified of the two previous sessions. According to available information, the authorities claimed they were unable to contact them and, on this basis, appointed a state lawyer who had not previously participated in the case. The political prisoner's brother, Rinat Tazhimuratov, urgently departed from Karaozek for Navoi, travelling about 650 kilometres. Despite arriving at the courthouse ten minutes before the hearing began, he was not allowed into the courtroom. Furthermore, court officials refused to inform Tazhimuratov of his brother’s arrival. Rinat Tazhimuratov reported that as a basis for refusing him entry to the courtroom, he was told he must first apply to the court to confirm his identity. However, such a requirement is not provided for by procedural norms, especially since the court is formally open. After the session ended, the state-appointed lawyer reported that all defence motions had been rejected and witnesses had not been questioned. According to him, the hearing was conducted in an expedited manner. He learned only from the website of the Supreme Court that the next hearing was scheduled for the morning of 17th April. Meanwhile, the state lawyer stated that the court is not obliged to notify relatives of the date of the next hearing, which raises serious concerns regarding the violation of Tazhimuratov’s right to an effective defence. On 1st May 2026, the Navoi court sentenced Tazhimuratov to an additional five years in prison. Human rights defenders warned that the verdict not only extends his imprisonment, but also creates a legal basis for transferring him to harsher detention conditions amounting to near-total isolation. Uzbekistani authorities continue to deny allegations of torture and other violations in his case.
There are also concerns about the well-being of imprisoned Karakalpak activist Zhumasapar Dadebaev, who is known for his criticism of the Uzbekistani authorities. According to an NGO report, the activist's father alleged in September 2025 that his son has been subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse in detention and that he required hospitalisation in this context. The father filed a complaint with the Ombudsperson, but it is unclear whether this office has addressed the complaint. Dadebaev was unlawfully transferred from Turkey to Uzbekistan in January 2022 and later sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for peacefully expressing support for Karakalpakstan’s independence on social media. He has been serving his sentence in Colony KIN-1 in Bukhara region.
Uzbekistani authorities request forcible return of Karakalpakstanis to stand trial in Uzbekistan
In June 2025, Karakalpak activist Rinat Utambetov's sentence was upheld on appeal. As reported in a previous CIVICUS Monitor Update, in April 2025 Utambetov was sentenced by Nukus City Court to two years and three months in prison after being found guilty on charges relating to undermining the constitutional order and disseminating materials deemed a threat to public security. He was extradited from Kazakhstan after being detained in April 2024. Some activist sources claim the case stems from a 2022 post in a private Telegram group and that he was not involved in opposition activities, but this could not be independently verified.
According to Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR), an IPHR partner, on 3rd February 2026 Karakalpak activist Rasul Zhumaniyazov relocated to a safe country. He had been arrested in Astana in March 2024 at the request of Uzbek security authorities, who were seeking his extradition. Prior to his arrest, he had reportedly received offers from Tashkent to return “voluntarily’’ to Uzbekistan. Zhumaniyazov was reportedly targeted for sharing information about the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, He spent a year in pre-trial detention before being released, but was not granted refugee status in Kazakhstan.
On 6th November 2025, Aqylbek Muratbai, a human rights defender from Karakalpakstan and long-time resident in Kazakhstan, was reported by independent NGO sources as having safely relocated to a third country. Muratbai faced years of persecution for his peaceful advocacy on behalf of the Karakalpak people, including documenting human rights violations after the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan. Following these events, Uzbekistani authorities brought politically motivated charges against him, accusing him of “extremism” and “inciting unrest” and sought his extradition from Kazakhstan.
He was arrested in Almaty on 15th February 2024 at Uzbekistan’s request and spent a year in pre-trial detention before his release in February 2025. Despite clear risks of persecution, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court rejected his asylum appeal in September 2025. Requests for humanitarian visas from several EU states were also denied, leaving him stranded due to an expired passport. His eventual departure brought an end to a prolonged period of legal uncertainty and risk, allowing him to continue his human rights work in safety.
Freedom of Association
In Uzbekistan, a state funding system for civil society organisations is under development, with primary support structures under the Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan, as well as contributions from commercial entities and private individuals. However, access to such state support remains highly selective and support is provided only for select thematic areas. Projects providing legal assistance in areas criticised by independent observers seldom receive support. Initiatives concerning freedom of expression, freedom of association, the protection of the rights of human rights defenders and independent journalists, victims of torture, politically motivated persecution, or violations during forced evictions rarely receive state support.
Restrictions on NGO activities
Foreign Funding
NGO activities continue to be restricted, and access to funding remains excessively difficult in Uzbekistan.
In February 2025, as reported in the previous CIVICUS Monitor update, a pro-government commentator proposed the adoption of a “foreign agent” law, saying it was needed to “control foreign financial flows” and “safeguard information sovereignty.” While no policymaker has formally initiated such legislation to date, this suggestion heightened concerns about potential new restrictions. CSOs in the country already face severe obstacles to accessing foreign funding. They must obtain Ministry of Justice approval for all foreign grants exceeding USD 2,800—a cumbersome process often leading to refusals or significant delays. They are also subject to a heavy reporting burden. In addition, many independent CSOs, especially human rights groups, are unable to access foreign funding due to difficulties with obtaining state registration – a prerequisite for receiving grants. For example, human rights defender and former political prisoner Agzam Turgunov’s application to register a new NGO called Human Rights House has been rejected over a dozen times due to alleged technical mistakes (see for example CIVICUS Monitor Update from July 2023).
Legal amendments to nine laws
On 21st August 2025, the President signed into law amendments to nine laws governing non-governmental non-commercial organisations (NNOs), including the Laws on NNOs, Public Foundations, Charity, Social Partnership, Public Control, Guarantees of NNO Activity, State Dues, the Tax Code, and the Code of Administrative Responsibility (CoAR). The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) analysed that the new legislation introduces a “mix of reforms, with some easing restrictions, while others add new obligations.” At the same time, the law broadens reporting obligations, particularly regarding the receipt of foreign funding by NNOs. It also introduces new regulations on the collection of charitable donations, modifies the registration process for public foundations, and revises the framework for state financial support to NNOs:
Positive changes include:
- Reduced administrative fines for some violations by NNOs. However, although reduced, fines for NNO-related violations remain significantly higher than for comparable business offences. Furthermore, a number of offences still remain that conflict with international obligations under Article 22 of the ICCPR, including penalties for participation in unregistered associations, requirements for the mandatory notification of events, and for obtaining government consent before receiving foreign funds.
- The exemption of inactive public foundations from mandatory annual audits.
- Clearer procedures for government review of public control (citizen oversight) documents.
- Introduction of administrative liability for officials who unlawfully interfere in NNO activities or fail to review public control documents.
Key new obligations and restrictions which raise concerns:
- Requirement to publish information about foreign funding: NNOs must publish on their website, in the media, or through a government portal, quarterly information on the use of funds and property received from foreign sources. This creates an additional strain on resources, since NNOs are already required to meet burdensome reporting requirements, as well as risks to personal data and confidentiality, and potential harassment.
- Obligation to report foreign funding for non-NNO entities and individuals: Legal entities (excluding NNOs and some others) and individuals engaged in research, public opinion polling, or information dissemination for non-commercial purposes must report foreign funding to tax authorities. Civil society actors fear this could restrict unregistered groups, as many operate under other legal forms to carry out their civil society activities.
- New administrative offences related to charity: Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences introduced new offences related to charity, introducing fines for violations of procedures for collecting donations and exceeding limits for administrative expenses.
- New grounds for denial of registration: Registration may be denied if founders or board members are listed in terrorism/extremism databases or have certain prior convictions.
- Restrictions on foreign staff of NNOs: Foreigners and stateless persons employed by NNOs are prohibited from engaging in certain NNO activities, mirroring already existing restrictions in place for the employees of foreign and international organisations. The scope is unclear, particularly regarding what constitutes activities which are “not in compliance with statutory goals.”
- Ban on use of foreign funds in elections: NNOs may not use foreign funding to attempt to “influence” elections or “support” the pre-election campaigns of political parties. The lack of definition creates uncertainty and the risk of legislation being open to political manipulation.
Other changes include regulation of the receipt of charitable assistance and collecting funds from the public, as well as an overhaul of the state financial support mechanism. Public funds under local councils supporting civil society institutions were abolished, and procedures for state grants and subsidies revised.
Overall, while the amendments introduce some accountability measures and reduced fines, they significantly expand reporting obligations, regulatory control over foreign funding, and state discretion, raising concerns about potential restrictions on freedom of association and the operating environment for civil society.
Individual cases of concern
In August 2025, imprisoned human rights defender Dildora Khakimova—who is serving a six-year sentence widely regarded as unjust—was diagnosed by doctors as requiring chemotherapy and surgery. On 4th September 2026, her lawyer filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking her release on health grounds. Khakimova and her colleague Nargiza Keldiyorova, who is serving a six-and-a-half-year sentence, were wrongfully convicted in 2024 on dubious extortion charges widely believed to have been brought in retaliation for their human rights work.
Freedom of Expression
Uzbekistani authorities continue to suppress media freedoms, including by introducing new restrictive legislation, shutting down information platforms and prosecuting journalists and bloggers—often on charges of publishing insulting, defamatory, or “false” information.
New restrictive legislation
Uzbekistani human rights experts note that a draft Information Code may lead to further restrictions on the activities of mass media, as it provides broad grounds for restricting content, as well as for suspending or terminating the work of media outlets. According to available information, the revised draft law was expected to be submitted to parliament by the end of 2025. However, to date the code has not been adopted and, as noted by our experts, the timeframe for its consideration remains uncertain.
Other problematic legal initiatives include a 2024 law allowing authorities to designate foreign citizens as “undesirable” and bar them from entering the country if they are deemed to undermine state sovereignty or discredit the state. This law could potentially be used against foreign journalists, bloggers, and others exercising their freedom of expression to speak out on issues which are sensitive to the authorities, although this has not happened so far.
In October 2025, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) voiced serious concern over a bill approved by the Lower House of Uzbekistan’s parliament. The draft legislation would prohibit photographing or filming individuals in public without their consent. The organisation stressed that the law, if enacted, could significantly hamper journalists’ work in a country already marked by extensive censorship and surveillance.
The draft law provides for several exceptions — in particular, for filming at public events or gatherings — but fails to clarify how these exemptions would be implemented, leaving room for broad and potentially arbitrary interpretation by the authorities. In practice, such vague provisions could severely hinder the sharing of images captured in public spaces, preventing the reporting of matters clearly in the public interest, such as corruption or abuses of power by state officials. Moreover, the fact that the final version of the adopted text has not been made public fuels concerns about the true extent of the measure. The timeline for its second reading in the Upper House, as well as for its eventual promulgation, remains uncertain.
On 3rd February 2026, the Legislative Chamber of parliament adopted in the first reading a draft law introducing administrative liability for online insults, obscene language, and other conduct deemed to violate public order. The bill was initiated by deputies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (UzLiDeP). Under the draft, the use of vaguely defined offences of “obscene expression”, “insulting” or “indecent expressions” on the internet and telecommunications networks, as well as “other actions that violate public order,” would be punishable by fines of up to five million Uzbekistani Som (approximately 350 EUR) or up to 10 days of administrative detention. These provisions would be included in a new article (183-1) of the Code of Administrative Responsibility. The authors of the bill argue that the initiative is aimed at addressing the growing spread of “offensive and aggressive behaviour” on social media, particularly among young people.
The draft also foresees liability for distributing or promoting materials that encourage participation in armed conflicts abroad, as well as for sharing content that glorifies offences committed by the individual themselves.
Individual cases of concern
Individual cases of concern, entailing restrictions on freedom of speech, during the reporting period include:
On 24th April 2026, the birthday of lawyer, blogger, and human rights activist Shohida Salomova, IPHR, AHRCA and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC) called for her immediate and unconditional release from forced psychiatric detention. Her case raises serious concerns about the abuse of psychiatric measures to silence dissent, violations of fair trial guarantees, and risks to her health. The three organisations urged the Uzbekistani authorities to end her arbitrary detention, ensure access to independent medical care, and uphold their international human rights obligations. As previously reported by CIVICUS Monitor, on 18th December 2022, Salomova posted a social media comment about a senior official. Later that day, her home was searched, she was detained, and criminal proceedings were opened against her for defamation and insult under Articles 139, 140 and 244.1 of the Criminal Code. According to available information, officials also attempted to pressure her into self-incrimination during initial interrogations.
On 22nd December 2022, Salomova was forcibly committed to a psychiatric facility. Since January 2024, she has been held in the Republican Psychiatric Hospital in Tashkent under constant supervision. Her detention has been repeatedly extended without independent medical review or effective judicial oversight, leaving her effectively deprived of justice for more than three years.
On 27th May 2025, administrative charges were brought against Uzbekistani civil society activist Gulnoz Mamarasulova, head of the Uzbekistan branch of Association Central Asia, following a complaint by the Ministry of Justice. She was accused under Article 239(6) of the Administrative Code of “knowingly providing false information,” reportedly in connection with procedural issues related to NGO activities, including event notifications and foreign participation. A court hearing took place on 10th June 2025 without her knowledge, as she had not received a summons. She was therefore unable to attend or present a defence. More than a month later, she learned that she had been found guilty and fined. Human rights experts view the case as part of increasing administrative pressure on independent civil society actors in Uzbekistan, raising concerns about due process violations and the broader chilling effect on human rights work and civic engagement.
In August 2025, according to media reports, Nurafshan City Court sentenced 26-year-old Tiktoker and blogger with a controversial reporting style, Valery Dyugai (‘Abdulloh’), to three years and one month in prison for insulting the President of Uzbekistan (Part 3 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code) and inciting interethnic hatred (Part 2 of Article 156 of the Criminal Code). According to official information from the press service of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) of Tashkent Region, Dyugai was arrested in Abu Dhabi and subsequently extradited to Uzbekistan on 25th March 2025. According to the investigation, in October-November 2024, while in South Korea, Dyugay published several videos insulting the citizens of Uzbekistan, saying that he regretted being born there and would not return. Security forces published a video in which Dyugay appears visibly distressed and apologising for his statements. In the recording, he claims that his remarks were made for publicity purposes, with the aim of attracting attention and increasing his popularity on social media. The detention of Valery Dyugay occurred when he had already received numerous threats of violence and amidst a global online harassment campaign. Since then, he has been held in isolation.
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On 12th March 2026, the press service of the internal affairs bodies reported the detention of blogger Sirojiddin Adilov in the Samarkand region. According to the authorities, the detention was carried out based on a complaint from a resident of the Pastdargom district, who claims that in August 2024 he approached Adilov with a request for help in settling a financial dispute.
According to the official version, Adilov, without having the appropriate authority, received funds from the applicant and promised to resolve the issue in his favour. The applicant claims that the promise was not fulfilled and that the blogger's actions misled him.
In connection with this, a criminal case was initiated against Adilov under Part 3 of Article 168 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan ("Fraud"), as well as under Article 211 via Article 28 of the Criminal Code ("Complicity in bribery"). At the same time, it is reported that the blogger was initially charged only under the article related to bribery, but the official report was later amended.
Adilov is the creator of the YouTube channel "Sirojiddin Media," which has an audience of over 900,000 subscribers. He also actively maintains social media pages, including approximately 50,000 followers on Facebook and more than 30,000 on Instagram.
Meanwhile, Adilov’s colleagues and supporters link his prosecution to his criticism of high-ranking officials. According to them, the allegations against him appeared after he began raising sensitive social and political issues, through which he gained widespread fame and public trust.
On 30th March 2026, Payaryk District Court in the Samarkand region sentenced 17-year-old blogger and school student Ilgor Bakhtiyorov to 18 months of restricted freedom on charges of insult and extortion, raising serious concerns about proportionality and the treatment of a minor within the justice system.
The case stemmed from a dispute over a restaurant advertising contest in which Bakhtiyorov’s video reportedly received the highest number of views, but the promised prize was awarded to another participant. After he criticised the owners on Instagram, criminal proceedings were initiated against him.
During the investigation, Bakhtiyorov was arrested at school in front of classmates and spent seven days in pre-trial detention together with adults accused of serious crimes, reportedly placing his safety and well-being at risk. Under international human rights standards, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, detention of children should be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period, while minors must be separated from adults in detention.
Despite his age, lack of prior convictions, and the fact that he was preparing for state exams, the court imposed sweeping restrictions, including a ban on internet use, limits on movement, and deductions from future wages. The sentence appears disproportionate and risks undermining his right to education, freedom of expression, and prospects for rehabilitation.
On 15th April 2026, Roxana Rakhmanova published a video appeal on Facebook to the leadership of Uzbekistan, in which she alleged legal violations in the case of her husband, Valijon Rakhmanov, a former counter intelligence officer in Uzbekistan who was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment after being found guilty of treason (see IPHR’s EU briefing paper). In the appeal, she also described the obstacles faced by her and her husband’s lawyers, who lost their legal licences after attempting to seek a review of the verdict.
The appeal received more than 30,000 views on Facebook. Other posts by Rakhmanova, in which she highlights various forms of pressure allegedly exerted against her, have generated significant public attention in Uzbekistan and, according to available information, have drawn increased scrutiny from the authorities.
Rakhmanova has reportedly received threats on multiple occasions. On 11th April 2026, during a visit to prison Colony No. 22, where her husband is being held, she sought to obtain a date for a family visit but was refused without explanation. Her persistence reportedly provoked an aggressive response: according to her account, she was physically assaulted by a staff member, who reproached her for her public criticism.
As a result, she reportedly sustained multiple bruises, including in the area of a recent post-operative abdominal surgical wound, significantly increasing the risk of harm to her health. If confirmed, such treatment could amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohibited under Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The alleged use of violence in response to criticism may also constitute retaliation for exercising the right to freedom of expression protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Over the past year, Rakhmanova’s property has reportedly been seized in connection with loan obligations incurred by her husband prior to his arrest. She now faces the possible loss of her only home, where she lives with two minor children. After losing her job, she has reportedly been unable to secure employment for the past two years and alleges that pressure has been placed on employers to dismiss her after hiring.
Since early April 2026, Rakhmanova has also reportedly received notifications from Facebook that posts containing criticism have been removed, raising concerns that her account may be blocked entirely.
Closure of social media accounts
From 20th January 2026 onwards, more than 15 social media accounts were reportedly closed and over 100 posts removed for containing criticism of Saida Mirziyoyeva and presidential policies. The measures followed the first public interview of Saida Mirziyoyeva — daughter of the president and Head of the Presidential Administration since 23rd June 2025 — in which she stated that she “serves her father.” Human rights defenders noted that these developments may be viewed as part of a campaign to block social media accounts of dissidents and suppress criticism and public debate. The remark sparked widespread online debate, with some interpreting it as reflecting the personalised nature of power and the prominent role of the president’s family in state governance. The ensuing discussion raised broader questions about accountability, potential conflicts of interest, and the institutional independence of public office.
Abuse of copyright complaint mechanisms and arbitrary blocking of a journalist’s account: On 30th March 2026, the Facebook page of Uzbek journalist Ulugbek Khaydarov (pen name Ulugbek Ashur), was blocked. Khaydarov, currently based in Canada, founded the YouTube channel “Negativ,” which features his original reporting and has over 825,000 subscribers.
According to available information, the block followed a copyright infringement complaint allegedly filed by the state news agency UzA. However, it later emerged that the complaint had been submitted from the email account of journalist Alexey Volosevich (founder and editor of “Asiaterra”) without his knowledge or consent. Volosevich has publicly stated that his identity was misused to file a false claim.
This case raises serious concerns about the potential abuse of copyright enforcement tools to suppress independent journalism and restrict freedom of expression. The use of false or misleading claims to trigger content removal may indicate bad-faith or coordinated efforts to silence critical voices.
Moreover, under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), platforms are required to prevent misuse of notice-and-action mechanisms. Submitting knowingly unfounded or fraudulent complaints constitutes an abuse of the system.
The blocking of Khaydarov’s account on the basis of a potentially false complaint highlights systemic vulnerabilities in platform governance and underscores the need for stronger safeguards—such as rigorous complaint verification, due process for users, and robust appeals mechanisms.
Among the blocked Facebook accounts was the page Comandant Alisher, belonging to former diplomat and blogger Alisher Taksanov. His account was blocked on 23rd February 2026 after he posted a critical comment regarding an interview given by Saida Mirziyoyeva, the eldest daughter of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. As of now, the account has not been restored. Taksanov subsequently attempted to continue his blogging activities by creating two new accounts. However, both were also blocked. Before the blocks were imposed, all posts relating to Saida Mirziyoyeva, as well as his comments on public speeches and certain decisions of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, were reportedly removed. Taksanov’s publications consistently attracted tens of thousands of views, indicating substantial public interest in his content. He has a broad audience and, for more than thirty years, has remained an influential public voice, regularly raising sensitive and socially significant issues.
According to media reports, on 18th February 2026, a popular blogger announced that he had deleted his two Instagram and Facebook accounts, where he regularly posted content addressing social problems and issues affecting citizens in Uzbekistan. He explained that his platforms focused on drawing attention to everyday challenges faced by ordinary people. According to him, he had previously observed coordinated mass complaints and suspected bot activity targeting local public pages, which he believed were directed at his accounts. He suggested that the blocking of his pages was linked to dissatisfaction with the topics he raised, noting that media and blog publications often lead to official investigations or personnel changes and bring public attention to unresolved issues.
Deletion of Radio Ozodlik’s Instagram account: On the night of 16th–17th February 2026, the Instagram account of Radio Ozodlik, which had around two million followers, was removed without prior notice and without an effective opportunity to appeal or restore the account. The removal was made on the basis of complaints of copyright infringement filed, according to the available information, by three alleged complainants who, using the same email address in each case, claimed to represent various media companies. Despite clear indications of possible abuse of the copyright protection procedure, Instagram’s administration accepted the (alleged fake) complaints and blocked the account. As a result, Radio Ozodlik was accused of violating copyrights for content to which it itself holds the rights. At the time of writing, the appeal process is ongoing.
However, existing mechanisms on Instagram for challenging such decisions remain limited and insufficiently transparent. According to available information, the account was only restored by Instagram following the intervention of international digital security experts on 17th March 2026. The case raises additional concerns about the inadequacy of platform safeguards against the abuse of copyright enforcement procedures.
According to media reports, the Facebook group “Tashkent-SNOS” which focused on illegal evictions in Uzbekistan’s capital, was deleted on 16th February 2026 without prior notice from the platform’s administration. The group’s administrator, Farida Sharifullina, stated that she later received an email from Facebook indicating that a user identified as “AB Spotify” had submitted a copyright infringement complaint. The notification did not specify which content allegedly violated Spotify’s rights. Facebook advised her to contact Spotify directly and request that the complaint be withdrawn. Around the same time, there was also an attempt to hack Sharifullina’s account, although Facebook reportedly prevented the breach. The deleted group had approximately 32,000 subscribers and was one of the largest Uzbek-language communities on Facebook. It had been active since April 2017, when the authorities began large-scale demolitions of private homes for redevelopment projects, often providing compensation significantly below market value. Sharifullina believes the removal of the group may be linked to its vocal opposition to the Sea Breeze Uzbekistan project promoted by President Mirziyoyev. The highly controversial project foresees the development of the coastal zone of the Charvak Reservoir, which supplies drinking water to Tashkent, into a high-end resort complex.
On 27th February 2026, the group was restored after numerous attempts to appeal the platform’s decision. Human rights experts state that the attempted deletion of the “Tashkent-SNOS” Facebook group illustrates a broader trend of pressure on the online space, where independent civic initiatives and platforms for public discussion remain vulnerable, both to administrative pressure and to the misuse of content moderation mechanisms on digital platforms.
According to human rights defenders’ information, on 7th February 2026, an independent journalist’s YouTube channel was removed after it received three copyright complaints, which he maintains were issued wrongfully. Reportedly, he originally recorded a video in 2023 and kept the original file on his phone. He uploaded the authentic version to his YouTube channel in January 2026. He states that a third party subsequently copied the video and re-posted it on Facebook and Telegram under their own name. The video was reportedly displayed on Facebook with an earlier publication date of 2022. According to the journalist, the same pages—or individuals associated with them—later filed copyright complaints against his YouTube upload. He contends that YouTube’s automated system accepted these claims without a thorough contextual review. As a result, after accumulating three copyright complaints, his channel was permanently taken down for alleged infringement of copyright.
According to media reports, on 31st January 2026 the Instagram accounts of several media platforms and civil society activists in Uzbekistan were taken down by the US-based company Meta. In each case, the accounts were reportedly disabled on the grounds of alleged violations of community rules. Among those affected were pages of eco-activist Mutabar Khushvaktova (Urikguli) and her project Yashil uyim, as well as the publications Hook Report and Sarpa Media. The accounts were reportedly restored at a later stage.
On 23rd January 2026, the Association “Human Rights in Central Asia” (AHRCA) reported that its official YouTube channel, AHRCA.ORG, had been removed after three copyright infringement notices. The videos in question contained journalistic and human rights material, including interviews, public statements, and analysis on issues of public interest. AHRCA maintained that the content was non-commercial and aimed solely at informing the public about serious human rights violations in Central Asia. Notably, the complaints were filed by private individuals and little-known accounts, and at least two of the named complainants later stated that they had not submitted any claims, raising concerns about fraudulent use of the system.
The case highlights structural weaknesses in YouTube’s application of the DMCA “three-strike” rule, under which channels may be removed automatically without assessing context, public interest value, or potential bad faith. AHRCA argued that this creates a significant risk of abuse, particularly against independent journalism and human rights reporting. The removal of the channel resulted in the temporary loss of an important information platform, including unique archival materials about human rights abuses. The organisation responded through legal channels, including filing counter-notifications and engaging with international freedom of expression bodies.
AHRCA noted that the channel’s removal occurred shortly after heightened public attention surrounding a late-December 2025 investigative programme about political dynamics in Uzbekistan. While refraining from definitive conclusions, the organisation characterised the incident as a form of transnational digital pressure, in which private legal mechanisms are misused to impose disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information of public interest.
Further incidents reinforced these concerns. In March 2026, the Facebook account of AHRCA president Nadezhda Atayeva was blocked after dozens of posts related to political prisoners and torture were removed, and four associated pages containing archival content dating back to 2006 were deleted. Shortly afterward, in April, her Telegram account was hacked and used to send fraudulent messages requesting money from hundreds of contacts before being deleted. The use of Uzbek currency in the scam suggested a possible regional link. A formal complaint was subsequently filed with French police, where AHRCA is based, underscoring the cross-border dimension of the pressure faced by the organisation and its leadership.
Overly broad interpretation of legislation on state symbols as a new risk for freedom of expression in Uzbekistan
People have increasingly faced liability or pressure in connection with the use of state symbols. Such cases are often linked to the use of the national flag in public spaces and online.
In most instances, these cases involve the civic use of state symbols in the context of cultural events, public debates, or the expression of personal views, rather than actions intended to desecrate national symbols. Uzbek legislation permits the use of the national flag provided that it is treated with respect, including in public places and during various public events (Article 5 of the Law “On the State Flag of the Republic of Uzbekistan”). The law also allows the use of images of the flag to indicate affiliation with Uzbekistan (Article 5¹ of the same law).
However, in practice, the provisions governing state symbols are often interpreted broadly. Human rights defenders have expressed concern that such practices may create additional risks for freedom of expression.
In January 2026, a Tashkent court imposed an administrative penalty on a 21-year-old resident of the Fergana region for allegedly violating legislation on state symbols following her participation in the international beauty pageant Miss Earth 2025, held in October 2025 in Manila, Philippines. According to a decision issued on 19th January 2026 by the Mirabad District Criminal Court, the contestant was found guilty of violation of legislation on state symbols (Article 203¹(1) of the Code of Administrative Responsibility) and fined 824,000 Uzbek soums (approx. 60 EUR). The charges were related to the costume she wore during the competition, which incorporated elements inspired by the national flag and the coat of arms of Uzbekistan. A photograph of the contestant wearing the costume was later posted on her social media page. While Article 5² of the Law “On the State Flag of the Republic of Uzbekistan” prohibits the use of the flag in a degrading or disrespectful manner, including using it as clothing, the contestant maintained that her outfit represented a designer interpretation of the national colours rather than the use of the flag itself. She argued that the costume did not contain key elements of the national flag—specifically the crescent and the twelve stars—elements which constitute mandatory components of the official flag design under the law. Despite these arguments, the court concluded that she had committed an administrative offence.
Another incident in February 2026 illustrates how the broad interpretation of legislation on state symbols can contribute to pressure on individuals expressing political views. A social media user published a post containing a poster with the national flag of Uzbekistan alongside the message “Uzbekistan stands with Ukraine.” Within two days the publication attracted more than 90,000 views and generated extensive public discussion. In the comments section, some users accused the author of unlawfully using the national flag and referred to the Law “On the State Flag of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” While no administrative proceedings or sanctions were reported, the reaction to the post demonstrated how the law is often interpreted in a restrictive manner in public discourse, contributing to a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
Pressure on social media users for engagement with human rights defenders
A growing practice in Uzbekistan relates to de facto criminalisation of contact with independent human rights defenders and critics of the authorities. According to available information, law enforcement agencies systematically monitor users’ activity on social media and summon citizens for so-called “preventive conversations” or visit them at home if they interact with posts by human rights defenders—including through likes, comments, or reposts. In some cases, individuals are explicitly warned of possible administrative or criminal liability should they continue such activity.
These actions indicate a pattern of pressure on social media users for peacefully expressing their views or engaging with critical content, which risks constituting disproportionate interference with the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association.
This pattern also contributes to an atmosphere of intimidation and self-censorship, in which even minimal online engagement with critical content may be perceived as carrying the risk of harassment or prosecution.
On 19th February 2026, in the city of Fergana, where human rights defender Aziz Yusupov is registered as residing, a law enforcement officer visited his place of residence. The officer introduced himself as Murod. According to the defender’s mother, the officer stated that her son had placed a “like” on a post published on the personal Facebook page of human rights defender Nadezhda Atayeva that contained criticism of Saida Mirziyoyeva. The law enforcement officer warned that if he continued to support publications which, according to the officer, “damage the reputation of the president and members of his family,” Aziz Yusupov could face criminal proceedings. According to available information, the human rights defender himself was not at home at the time of the visit by law enforcement officials.
Ongoing pressure on relatives of journalists and human rights defenders
State pressure continues against relatives of activists and journalists as a means of intimidation. Such practices are reported to be used to discourage public criticism and human rights work by targeting family members who remain in the country, as the following case demonstrates.
Between August and November 2025, 86-year old Viktoriya Shashkova—the mother of journalist and human rights defender Pavel Kravets—was visited three times by officers of the Uzbek special services. According to her, the officers threatened to bring her in forcibly for an “official conversation” if she refused to cooperate. After one of these visits, her health reportedly deteriorated sharply: her blood pressure increased, and she experienced limb spasms and nausea. Despite her age, she continues to face systematic pressure. According to available information, between 2016 and 2025 officers from various law enforcement agencies have visited her more than ten times, demanding that she establish contact with her son, Pavel Kravets, who has lived outside Uzbekistan since 2016 after suffering from politically motivated persecution. According to relatives, Pavel Kravets has deliberately refrained from making public statements out of concern that doing so could lead to increased pressure on his mother. However, security service officers have continued their visits and threats, which have been a source of stress for Shashkova and had a detrimental effect on her health, leading to dizziness and episodes of loss of consciousness. As a result, she rarely leaves her apartment and avoids contact with strangers. At the end of 2025, Pavel Kravets was able to invite his mother to France on a short-term guest visa for three months in order to provide care and allow her to undergo a course of rehabilitation. However, in February 2026 information emerged that during her absence from Uzbekistan, security service officers continued to show interest in Viktoriya Shashkova and were collecting information about her through neighbours. These circumstances raise serious concerns that pressure on her may intensify if she returns to Uzbekistan.