UN experts warn of ‘’chilling’’ impact as assault on media, journalists and activists intensifies

This update covers the protection of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Kyrgyzstan from May to October 2025. It has been prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.

During a sweeping security operation in May 2025, eight contributors to the independent Kloop platform were arbitrarily detained and questioned without access to lawyers. While most were later released, video operators Aleksander Aleksandrov and Joomart Duulatov remained in custody on charges of publicly calling for riots – under a vaguely worded Criminal Code provision frequently used against critics. Together with two accountants facing similar charges, they were convicted in September 2025 despite the absence of any credible evidence of wrongdoing. Aleksandrov and Duulatov each received five-year prison sentences, while the accountants were given three-year probationary terms. IPHR and other NGOs condemned the verdicts as politically motivated retaliation against Kloop and warned of their stifling impact on independent journalism – a view echoed by the UN human rights office.

In another blow to media freedom, a local court ordered the closure of the April TV channel in July 2025 for allegedly discrediting the government through “negative” information, “sarcasm” and “ridicule.” As a result of this decision, the channel ceased its operations. Last year, the organisation running the Kloop platform was similarly shut down by court order over its allegedly “negative” coverage and “sharp criticism” of the authorities. However, Kloop has continued to operate through another entity – despite increasing harassment.

Along with the cases against Kloop contributors, several cases against other journalists, bloggers, and activists also illustrated the growing use of criminal charges to retaliate against government critics. This pattern has drawn strong criticism from civil society and international experts. In a joint communication to the Kyrgyzstani government in July 2025, several UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern about the increasing prosecution of activists, bloggers, and journalists over social media posts critical of the authorities, with cases often brought under vaguely worded provisions penalising the instigation of riots, discord, or the forceful seizure of power and relying primarily on assessments by state-appointed experts. They warned that this practice has a “profound chilling effect” on free expression and civic activism.

Targeted for her platform’s investigations into corruption, Temirov Live’s director Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy continued serving a five-year prison sentence. She was convicted in October 2024 for allegedly calling for riots due to video reports published by Temirov Live.

Independent journalist Kanyshay Mamyrkulova and human rights defender Rita Karasartova both spent several months in pre-trial detention on spurious charges before being released following the verdicts in their cases. Mamyrkulova received a four-year probationary sentence – accompanied by restrictions on her online activities – in July 2025. She was convicted of allegedly inciting unrest and inter-ethnic enmity due to social media posts criticising the government’s lack of transparency regarding a border demarcation deal with Tajikistan. Karasartova was handed a five-year probationary sentence following a closed trial in September 2025. She was prosecuted for allegedly provoking unrest and the forceful seizure of power after sharing an appeal by a persecuted opposition activist on social media.

Whistleblower Zhoomart Karabaev received a three-year probationary sentence in July 2025. He was prosecuted on charges of calling for riots and the forceful seizure of power after exposing the use of expert assessments dictated by security services in criminal cases against critics – cases based on the same type of vague charges for which he was ultimately convicted.

Exiled independent journalist Leyla Saralaeva reported being declared wanted by Kyrgyzstani authorities in connection with a criminal case for allegedly calling for riots, opened shortly after she fled the country in 2024. Her case is yet another illustration of how such charges are misused to target dissent.

In September 2025, human rights defender Kamil Ruziev was arrested on extortion charges related to a case he was working on, in what appeared to be a new attempt to retaliate against him for his efforts to ensure accountability for human rights violations. An earlier protracted criminal case against him ended in acquittal in 2023.

The adoption of a new media law in summer 2025 heightened concerns about mounting pressure on independent media. Passed through an expedited process in June 2025, the law featured major last-minute changes to a draft developed jointly with media representatives. The final version requires mandatory registration for both traditional and online media and grants the government wide discretion over registration procedures, raising fears it may be arbitrarily implemented to silence critical outlets. Despite strong domestic and international criticism, President Japarov signed the law in August 2025, and it entered into force later that month.

Other legislative changes adopted in summer 2025 introduced fines for disseminating “false” information, re-criminalised the possession of “extremist” materials, and empowered prosecutors to seek expedited court rulings declaring organisations “extremist”. Given the lack of clear legal definitions of “false” information and “extremism”, these amendments also raised concerns about misuse to suppress free speech and criticism of those in power.

The Russian-style “foreign representative” law continued to hang over civil society as a Damocles sword, although it has not been enforced as harshly as feared to date. President Japarov again accused CSOs of spreading “false” information, reinforcing mistrust and hostility. At the same time, increasing funding challenges following the overhaul of US foreign assistance programmes compounded the difficulties experienced by CSOs.

In June 2025, Parliament hastily moved to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture (NCPT) – an internationally recognised independent monitoring body long seen as a regional example. Despite appeals from civil society and international experts to preserve the NCPT, President Japarov signed the decision, transferring the Centre’s functions to the Ombudsperson’s office, which has been criticised for lacking full independence. Expressing regret over the decision, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that it “flies in the face of Kyrgyzstan’s human rights obligations”.

A court-sanctioned ban on protests in central Bishkek – first introduced in spring 2022 at the request of the Russian embassy – remained in force. Although authorities claim the ban prevents unrest, in practice it continues to block citizens from exercising their right to peaceful assembly near government buildings and other central locations.

New proposed regulations on mass events, which were published for discussion in October 2025, gave rise to concerns that security services and other authorities could be granted excessive powers to control and restrict gatherings by citizens under the pretext of ensuring security. The proposed regulations require the organisers of public, in-person events — including those with fewer than 500 participants — to notify authorities well in advance and agree on security protocols. If measures to mitigate security risks are deemed insufficient, permission to hold events could be denied. The drafters stated that the regulations would not apply to protests regulated by the Law on Assemblies, but virtually any other public gathering could fall within their scope.

The developments outlined above run counter to key recommendations Kyrgyzstan received during the Universal Periodic Review of its human rights record, including calls to repeal the laws on “foreign representatives” and “false’’ information; align media and anti-extremism legislation with international standards; lift the blanket ban on protests in Bishkek; maintain the NCPT as an independent body; and end intimidation, harassment and arbitrary detention of journalists and activists. These recommendations are all featured in the outcome report from the April 2025 review, adopted at the UN Human Rights Council’s session in September-October 2025.

Similarly, a European Parliament resolution adopted in September 2025 calls on the Kyrgyzstani authorities to address the deteriorating civic space situation. It urges the authorities to repeal the “foreign representative” and other repressive laws, release unjustly detained journalists and activists, and take other concrete steps ahead of the Parliament’s vote on ratifying the EU-Kyrgyzstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed last year. The resolution also calls for an effective assessment of the implementation of this agreement based on clear, time-bound human rights benchmarks.

In a major political development in Kyrgyzstan during the reporting period, early parliamentary elections were scheduled for 30th November 2025. The elections are expected to further consolidate the influence of political forces aligned with President Japarov. The move comes amid the weakening of Parliament’s role and growing suppression of political opposition under Japarov, who rose to power after mass protests over the disputed 2020 parliamentary elections triggered a political crisis.

Shortly after the September 2025 announcement of early elections, President Japarov sparked controversy by proposing to consider reinstating the death penalty, following the brutal murder of a young woman. The proposal, made despite Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 2007 abolition of capital punishment, heightened concerns about further deepening human rights backsliding and disregard for international commitments.

These issues are described in more detail in the sections below.

General developments

Early parliamentary elections announced

During the reporting period, President Japarov set early parliamentary elections for 30th November 2025 after the current legislature voted to dissolve itself. This step was justified by the need to allow more time between the parliamentary elections – originally due in November 2026 – and the next presidential elections in January 2027, in order to avoid “instability”. The upcoming elections, which will take place under new electoral legislation adopted this year, are expected to further consolidate the influence of political forces aligned with President Japarov.

Since Japarov took office and a new controversial constitution was adopted in 2021, the role of Parliament has significantly weakened and political opposition has been increasingly suppressed, reflecting a broader trend of erosion of democratic standards and growing authoritarianism. Japarov came to power after the 2020 parliamentary elections, which plunged Kyrgyzstan into a political crisis, as mass protests against the results eventually forced the then president and government to step down and led to the annulment of the election results. New parliamentary elections were not held until a year later, in November 2021, with parties supportive of Japarov winning most of the votes.

Shortly after it was announced that early parliamentary elections would be held this year, President Japarov made the controversial proposal to consider re-introducing the death penalty in Kyrgyzstan. Made in response to a shocking case in which a young girl was kidnapped, raped and brutally murdered, and against the background of the authorities’ failure to implement effective measures to improve protection against gender-based violence, this initiative reinforced fears about Kyrgyzstan’s increasing human rights regression and failure to uphold its international obligations. Kyrgyzstan has ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which obliges states to abolish the death penalty and refrain from executions, and it abolished capital punishment in 2007 following a moratorium introduced in 1998.

International engagement on Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record

As covered in our previous update, Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record was reviewed under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in April 2025 – a peer review mechanism through which all UN Member States are periodically examined. The outcome report from the review, published in June 2025 and adopted at the September–October 2025 session of the Human Rights Council, includes important recommendations concerning civic space and fundamental freedoms. Among other things, Kyrgyzstan was urged to repeal the law on “foreign representatives”, rescind provisions on “false” information and defamation that can be used to suppress free speech, and align media legislation with international standards. It was also recommended to lift the blanket restrictions on peaceful assembly introduced in 2022, and to maintain the NCPT as an independent, separate and adequately resourced mechanism. Further, it was urged to cease intimidation and harassment of journalists and activists, release those arbitrarily detained, and ensure a safe and enabling environment for civil society. These recommendations were in line with calls made by IPHR and other NGOs ahead of the review.

In September 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) signed between the EU and Kyrgyzstan in 2024. The resolution expresses concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan and urges the authorities to take concrete steps to address it — including repealing the “foreign representative” and other repressive laws, and releasing unjustly detained journalists, bloggers, and activists — ahead of the Parliament’s vote on ratification of the EPCA and the subsequent implementation of the agreement. The resolution also calls for an effective assessment of the EPCA’s implementation, based on clear human rights benchmarks and a specific timetable within two years, stressing that a negative assessment could lead to the agreement’s suspension. Key concerns raised by IPHR in briefing materials shared with the European Parliament were reflected in the resolution.

In a joint communication to the government sent in July 2025, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, and several other UN experts criticised ‘’the growing trend of activists, bloggers and journalists in Kyrgyzstan who are facing criminal charges over social media posts critical of authorities’’, saying they were concerned that these cases are often based on vaguely defined Criminal Code provisions, such as those on organising or calling for mass disorder (article 278), calling for the forceful seizure of power (article 327), and “incitement” to ethnic or other enmity (article 330). They also noted that charges, in most cases, ‘’rely exclusively or primarily on assessments by State-appointed forensic experts engaged by law enforcement and/or the State Committee for National Security’’, stressing that this pattern has ‘’a profound chilling effect, deterring citizens from freely expressing their opinions or carrying out their work as journalists, lawyers, or social activists.’’ UN human rights representatives also raised concerns about individual cases of persecution of journalists and activists (see Expression).

In addition, UN experts, including UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, severely criticised the decision to abolish the NCPT – the country’s independent torture monitoring and prevention body (see Association).

Expression

Media law adopted following significant last-minute revisions

The adoption of a new media law in summer 2025 heightened concerns that pressure on independent media will increase further in Kyrgyzstan.

In June 2025, Parliament passed the new media law in an expedited process, combining the second and third readings, after significant last-minute changes were made to a compromise draft developed by a working group involving media representatives following extensive consultations. As previously covered, that draft had been approved on first reading in April 2025.

It is of particular concern that the revised media law adopted by Parliament reintroduces a previously excluded provision requiring compulsory registration of both traditional media outlets and online resources. At the same time, it grants the government powers to determine the procedures for the registration, re-registration and denial of registration for media outlets, raising fears they could be used to arbitrarily silence platforms critical of the authorities.

In a joint appeal, journalists, media experts, and lawyers from the media law working group that developed the earlier draft stated that the amendments introduced before the second and third readings “essentially annul previously reached agreements, compromises, and expert assessments.” They warned that by giving the government discretion over registration procedures, the law risks abuse of power and undermines the separation of powers, as such procedures should involve Parliament and the judiciary. They called for further revisions of the law following inclusive discussions. In a joint statement, IPHR and nine other international NGOs voiced similar concerns, concluding that the revised law poses “serious threats to media freedom, journalistic independence, and public access to diverse information.”

However, despite widespread criticism and calls to veto the media law approved by Parliament, President Japarov signed it into law in August 2025, and it entered into force later that month. According to the law, the government must develop implementing regulations within six months.

Other new legislation threatening free speech

As covered in our previous update, amendments to the Code of Offences in force since February 2025 grant police broad discretion to fine those accused of spreading ‘’insulting or knowingly false defamatory information.’’ Additional amendments to the same code, which were signed into law by the president in July 2025, penalise the dissemination of ‘’false’’ information via mass media or online platforms, including social networks, in a manner that disrupts public order or infringes on the rights and legally protected interests of individuals, organisations, or the state. Human rights defenders fear that these provisions may be misused to suppress legitimate expression and intimidate government critics. Pre-existing legislation allowing authorities to block websites over alleged “false” content without court approval has repeatedly been used to restrict access to independent news sites.

Other legislation adopted by Parliament in June 2025 and signed by the president the following month raised concerns about the growing misuse of “extremism” charges to restrict free speech and suppress dissent, given the absence of a clear legal definition of the term. The amendments reintroduced criminal liability for the mere possession of “extremist” material – an offence now punishable by up to three years in prison following a written warning. Moreover, while prosecutors could already previously seek fast-track court rulings to declare information materials ‘’extremist’’, the amendments expanded this procedure to include legal entities. Thus, courts are now required to consider prosecutors’ requests to declare such entities ‘’extremist’’ within five to ten days. Human rights defenders have warned that the new provisions could be used to stifle critical voices. In its comments on the draft law, Human Rights Watch cautioned that criminalising mere possession of “extremist” content “opens the door to targeting dissenting voices”, while allowing prosecutors to seek extremist designations of legal entities through an expedited procedure could “lead to the swift liquidation of civil society organisations and media outlets.”

Detention, prosecution and imprisonment of Kloop contributors

As covered before, the organisation behind the investigative platform Kloop was closed down by court order in 2024 over its allegedly ‘’negative’’ coverage and its ‘’sharp criticism’’ of the government. While continuing its work through another organisation, the platform has faced renewed pressure.

During a sweeping operation conducted in May 2025, security services arbitrarily detained eight Kloop contributors – both journalists and non-editorial staff – along with two of their friends, and searched their homes without presenting warrants. Most of them were eventually released after several hours of questioning, during which they were not allowed to contact their lawyers or family. However, video operators Aleksander Aleksandrov and Joomart Duulatov were placed in pre-trial detention on charges of publicly calling for riots – a vague provision frequently used against critics. Two accountants faced similar charges.

The prosecuted Kloop contributors were accused of involvement in the production and distribution of several videos published by Bolot Temirov – the exiled founder of the investigative Temirov Live platform – which were deemed to be “destructive” and to contain “false” information and ‘’unfounded criticism’’ of authorities. During the trial, the court ignored the lack of any evidence linking the defendants to these videos, in which experts also found no direct calls for unrest. The defendants denied the charges, with the two former video operators retracting ‘’confessions” made when they were first interrogated without a lawyer present, saying their statements were coerced through pressure and promises of release. According to the court’s verdict, issued on 17th September 2025, Aleksandrov and Duulatov were each sentenced to five years in prison, while the two accountants received three year probationary sentences.

Along with other human rights NGOs, IPHR condemned the convictions of the Kloop contributors, saying they marked a new peak in the authorities’ campaign of retaliation against Kloop, and sent a chilling message to all those engaged in independent journalism in the country. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called their sentences ‘’deeply troubling’’.

The lawyer of the former Kloop contributors later appealed the rulings.

As covered in our previous update, Temirov Live’s director Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy – who is also Bolot Temirov’s wife – remains behind bars in apparent retaliation for her platform’s anti-corruption investigations. She was handed a five-year sentence on similar charges as the Kloop journalists in October 2024.

TV station closed over ‘’sarcasm’’

In July 2025, a local court ordered the closure of the April TV channel and the blocking of its social media accounts. This decision followed a petition by prosecutors, who – citing expert opinions – accused the channel of spreading “negative” information using “sarcasm”, “ridicule” and “expressive speech and facial expressions.” They claimed such reporting portrayed the government in an “unfavourable light”, undermined its authority, and fostered public mistrust. According to April TV’s lawyer, the court did not cite any specific legal provisions that the channel had allegedly violated. Shortly before the ruling, at least seven current and former contributors to April TV were summoned for questioning by security services.

April TV’s team subsequently announced that the channel was closing down, in accordance with the court decision.

Other retaliatory criminal cases

The following cases, involving the use of criminal charges as a tool of retaliation against individuals peacefully exercising their freedom of expression and other fundamental rights, were also of serious concern during the reporting period:

As covered in our previous update, human rights defender Rita Karasartova was arrested in April 2025 after posting an appeal on social media from a persecuted opposition activist, who was later forcibly returned to Kyrgyzstan under unclear circumstances. In September 2025, following several months in pre-trial detention, she was given a five-year probationary sentence on charges of allegedly organising riots and calling for the forceful seizure of power. While the case was classified and the trial held behind closed doors, prosecutors appear to have provided no credible justification for the charges, with the defender linking them to her support for peaceful political change.

Together with other human rights NGOs, IPHR had raised concerns about Karasartova’s case and called for her release. In a joint communication to the government, several UN human rights experts concluded that the case appeared to be directly related to Karasartova’s human rights engagement and her legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and highlighted serious procedural violations, such as that she was not informed of the charges against her at the time of arrest and was questioned without being told that she was a suspect. Following Karasartova’s conviction, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders reiterated her concerns.

As reported before, independent journalist Kanyshay Mamyrkulova was arrested in March 2025 on charges of allegedly calling for riots and inciting inter-ethnic discord following social media posts criticising the government’s lack of transparency over a border demarcation deal with Tajikistan. In July 2025, a local court handed her a four-year probationary sentence, imposing wide-ranging restrictions on her movement and online activities. Following the verdict, she was released from detention; however, any breach of the conditions of her release could lead to the revocation of her probation and her imprisonment. IPHR and its partners stressed that her case “sends yet another warning signal” that the authorities “are willing to use overly broad criminal provisions to silence critical journalism.” In the same joint communication that addressed Rita Karasartova’s case (see above), UN experts also expressed concern about Mamyrkulova’s prosecution, stating that it appeared linked to her legitimate free speech and noting gross due process violations, including denial of access to a lawyer after her arrest. As of the beginning of October 2025, the appeal hearing in Mamyrkulova’s case was pending.

Whistleblower Zhoomart Karabaev was convicted of calling for riots and the forceful seizure of power in June 2025 and handed a three-year probationary sentence. A former employee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Karabaev faced the charges after alleging that this institution has provided expert reviews dictated by security services in cases involving government critics. Following his arrest in July 2024, he spent several months in pre-trial detention before being released under a travel ban in October 2024. He reported receiving serious threats by a security service official while behind bars. The appeal hearing in Karabaev’s case began in early October 2025.

Journalist Leyla Saralaeva, who runs the online platform New Faces and has contributed to various independent outlets, fled Kyrgyzstan in early 2024 after being warned that her arrest was imminent. Now in exile, she reported on social media in September 2025 that Kyrgyzstani authorities had declared her wanted in connection with a criminal case on allegedly calling for riots, opened shortly after her departure from the country. The journalist strongly dismissed the allegations, stressing that she was being targeted merely for documenting human rights abuses, corruption, and violations of the law in Kyrgyzstan. Her case fits into the broader pattern of using broadly defined criminal charges to intimidate critical voices.

Human rights defender Kamil Ruziev was arrested in the city of Karakol in September 2025 on extortion charges related to a case in which he has been assisting the family of a young rape victim. Together with a relative of the victim, he was accused of extorting the suspected offender’s family and was placed in pre-trial detention. These charges appeared to be another attempt to retaliate against Ruziev for seeking accountability for human rights violations, including those perpetrated by local law enforcement officials. He was previously arrested in 2020 and faced forgery charges in a protracted legal case that ended with his acquittal by the Supreme Court in January 2023. That case followed his complaints against security service officials over torture and other abuses, as well as a lawsuit against a former senior official who had threatened to kill him because of his work.

Association

‘’Foreign representative’’ law – a continued threat

As covered before, the Russian-style “foreign representative” law adopted in 2024 has created a climate of fear and self-censorship, with some CSOs shutting down and others scaling back their activities to avoid being targeted under it. While the law has not been enforced as harshly as feared to date, it remains a constant threat, with the Venice Commission warning that its implementation poses a ‘’real risk of stigmatising, silencing and eventually eliminating’’ foreign-funded NGOs.

Public statements by President Japarov have contributed to deepening mistrust toward foreign-funded organisations and heightened fears of further restrictions. In an interview with the state news agency Kabar in August 2025, given in the context of sanctions imposed on Kyrgyzstani legal entities and individuals for aiding Russia in evading international sanctions, he claimed that NGOs had provided “false” information to foreign governments – offering no evidence to support these accusations. In a public address in December 2024, he similarly accused independent media and human rights organisations of spreading ‘’false’’ information and concealing the use of foreign funds.

At the same time as the legal and political environment has become more hostile, CSOs in Kyrgyzstan have also faced increasing funding challenges, especially following the overhaul of US foreign assistance programmes. Given the lack of national funding opportunities, most CSOs are dependent on foreign funding for their work, and US grants have made up a large share of this support.

Move to abolish independent torture monitoring and prevention body

Parliament voted in June 2025 to dissolve the NCPT, an independent body mandated to monitor detention facilities and prevent torture in line with Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT). NCPT has cooperated closely with both state bodies and civil society. Provisions to liquidate the NCPT were added to a draft law on the Ombudsperson’s Office at the final stage of its consideration.

This move was severely criticised by civil society and international experts. The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), which monitors state parties’ adherence to the OPCAT, expressed dismay and called the decision ‘’a serious setback’’. It noted that the authorities had failed to honour prior assurances that they would engage in consultations with the SPT and concluded that the abolition of the NCPT ‘’through a completely opaque process’’ is ‘’plainly incompatible with the requirements of the OPCAT.” In a joint statement, IPHR and six other international NGOs stressed that the Parliament’s decision threatened to dismantle an internationally recognised mechanism that has effectively uncovered abuses, improved detention conditions, and provided vital independent oversight for over a decade. While the NCPT’s responsibilities are due to be transferred to the Ombudsperson’s Office, it is unclear how this institution would fulfil this function, raising serious concerns that torture prevention could become sidelined. The NGO signatories urged President Japarov to return the draft law to Parliament for revision and safeguard Kyrgyzstan’s hard-won progress in preventing torture and protecting detainees’ rights.

The president eventually returned the draft law on the Ombudsperson’s Office to Parliament for revision; however, his objections concerned procedural issues related to the functioning of this office rather than the dissolution of the NCPT. In late September 2025, he signed the revised law abolishing the NCPT. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk concluded that this decision ‘’flies in the face of Kyrgyzstan’s human rights obligations’’, noting that he had highlighted the importance of preserving the NCPT’s independence during his visit to Kyrgyzstan in March 2025. Türk called for urgent steps to ensure continued torture prevention monitoring in line with Kyrgyzstan’s treaty obligations and to involve civil society and independent experts in this process.

Peaceful Assembly

Blanket ban on protests remains in force in the capital

During the reporting period, a court-sanctioned ban on protests remained in force in central areas of the capital, Bishkek. This ban, first introduced in spring 2022 following a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises, has been repeatedly prolonged. Most recently, it was extended from 1st July to 30th September 2025, and again from 1st October to 31st December 2025. Thus, it has now been in force for more than three and a half years.

Under the ban, protests are not allowed outside the Russian embassy, near the presidential and parliament building, on Ala-Too Square and in other central areas, with protesters instructed to gather instead in a specifically designated park. The ban is discriminatory, as official events are exempted from it, and has prevented citizens from holding peaceful protests within the sight and sound of major target audiences.

Appeals to court by activists challenging the ban have been rejected.

Proposed new rules for mass events

New draft regulations on mass events, prepared by the State Committee for National Security, were presented for public discussion on 1st October 2025. The new rules are argued to be aimed at improving efforts to ensure public order and safety during mass events, with organisers required to submit detailed information about planned events and security measures to authorities 10 to 30 days in advance, depending on the expected number of participants. Mandatory threat and risk assessments would be conducted, and if proposed mitigation measures are deemed insufficient, permission to hold events could be denied. Failure to comply with the requirements could also result in legal liability.

According to the explanatory notes, the regulations would not apply to gatherings regulated by the Law on Assemblies, which covers events held to express opinions and attract the attention of authorities or the public. However, as the draft regulations broadly define mass events as any cultural, sports, educational, leisure or other public, in-person events — including those with fewer than 500 participants — virtually any other gathering could fall under their scope. This raises concerns that the regulations could grant security services and other authorities overly broad powers to control and interfere with a wide range of gatherings under the pretext of ensuring security.