This report, which covers developments affecting the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Tajikistan for the period from April 2024 to February 2025, was prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.
Fundamental freedoms continue to be severely suppressed. The government continues to arrest journalists, activists and opposition figures, accusing them of vague extremism, and to convict them in secret trials. The media is subject to strict restrictions and social media users risk prosecution for online interactions. Civil society organisations continue to struggle with shrinking space, the threat of closures and criminal prosecution, especially in the GBAO region.
Political opposition members or dissidents face harsh penalties or disappearances, even abroad, as transnational repression increases.
This is also reflected in a Freedom House report, which examines the state of democracy and human rights in 29 post-communist countries ranging from Central Europe to Central Asia. It evaluates Tajikistan as one of the countries with the “lowest democracy scores”, along with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Russia.
Since the last CIVICUS Monitor report from March 2024, there has been no progress in relation to accountability for serious human rights violations perpetrated in connection with the authorities’ response to mass protests that took place in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in November 2021 and again in May 2022. Despite numerous appeals from international human rights bodies and intergovernmental organisations including the European Union, none of the human rights activists, lawyers, bloggers or journalists imprisoned on politically motivated charges in relation with the GBAO events have been released.
Parliamentary Elections in Tajikistan
On 4th December 2024, the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, issued a decree officially setting the date for elections to the new composition of the Majlisi Oli (Tajikistan’s parliament) and local councils. According to the decree, the elections will be held on 2nd March 2025, encompassing the Majlisi Namoyandagon (the lower house of parliament), legislatures of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), provinces, the city of Dushanbe, and other cities and districts.
As part of preparations for the upcoming elections, Tajikistan has extended invitations to 26 countries and international organisations, including the OSCE/ODIHR and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) Parliamentary Assembly, to observe the process.
However, there is very limited information available in the media, and little genuine debate among candidates or political parties.
Expression
The situation for press freedom in Tajikistan has deteriorated over the past years, as described in previous CIVICUS Monitor reports (e.g. in March 2024, September 2023, March 2023)
The 2024 World Press Freedom (WPF) Index issued by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) on World Press Freedom Day on 3rd May, indicated that Tajikistan dropped two places in the ranking and now occupies 155th place (out of 180). RSF highlights, inter alia, that the government “closely monitors content broadcast on the radio, television and the Internet, and access to official information is extremely limited for independent media”, that the Tajikistani authorities “misuse legal provisions to punish incitement to hatred, discord or the dissemination of false information”, and that “these laws, which directly threaten journalists, create a climate of fear and prevent them from expressing any critical view of the regime”.
Throughout the reporting period, the authorities continued to put pressure on the media and independent journalists, particularly following the detention of several high-ranking political figures, including former Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi, who were reportedly accused of plotting a coup and maintaining ties with the banned Islamic Revival Party (see Association chapter, political opposition).
At the same time, critical voices continue to be targeted. In August 2024, Ahmad Ibrahim, editor in chief of the independent Payk newspaper, was arrested for allegedly attempting to bribe an official to secure his outlet’s re-registration. According to media reports in October, his case has been classified as secret, and two more charges - of extremism and extortion - have allegedly been added. In November, Radio Ozodi and Asia Plus reported that over a hundred officials were questioned in connection with Ahmad Ibrahim's case, as investigators sought to uncover financial crimes related to them. However, the majority stated that their dealings were legitimate and involved subscribing to his weekly newspaper, Payk. Ibrahim himself has rejected the extortion charge, calling it slander. His trial was held in Kulob pre-trial detention centre. A local official who was questioned during the trial allegedly told journalists afterwards that they had been threatened that “if we do not appear in court, a case will be filed against us”. On 10th January, Ahmad Ibrahim was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
In November, Radio Ozodi reported that in July Tajikistani law enforcement agencies opened a criminal case against journalist Rukhshona Khakimova. Khakimova is the niece of Shokirjon Khakimov, first deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan who was sentenced to 18 years in prison by the Supreme Court on 5th February 2025 in the so-called “coup attempt case” involving eight other high-ranking public figures (see below). Khakimova is reportedly suspected of ‘high treason’ (Article 305 of the Criminal Code). On 22nd November, the indictment against her and Shokirjon Khakimov was allegedly heard in a court session held behind closed doors. On 5th February, the Supreme court sentenced her to eight years in prison. According to Radio Ozodi, the criminal charges were brought in retaliation for the journalist’s articles about China's influence on Tajikistan.
Radio Ozodi reported that on 29th November, a court in the Sino district of Dushanbe sentenced 74-year-old lawyer Faizi Oli (Faizali Yuldoshev) to 2.5 years in prison after finding him guilty of “knowingly making a false denunciation” against prosecutors. Days before the verdict, Faizi Oli stated that he had filed complaints with the Anti-Corruption Agency, the Security Council, and the Presidential Executive Office regarding alleged corruption by prosecutors. However, instead of investigating the allegations, authorities pursued charges against him. Reportedly, he was taken into custody immediately after the verdict was announced. Many human rights defenders believe that Faizi Oli was persecuted in retaliation for his professional work as a lawyer, in particular his work in defence of lawyer Saidnuriddin Shamsiddinov, who was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison on a similar charge of knowingly making a false denunciation, and because he had repeatedly criticised the authorities (see previous CIVICUS Monitor entry).
Internet freedom
Human rights defenders report that cases of private individuals being prosecuted for “likes” on social media have become more frequent in recent years and legal changes are urgently needed in this regard.
During a recent speech at a military training institution on 29th October 2024, President Rahmon urged authorities to cease prosecuting citizens for their “likes” and comments on social media. This statement is seen as a response to growing criticism regarding the criminal charges citizens are facing for online interactions. President Rahmon called these prosecutions “unfounded” and said that they should be “discontinued.”
Since amendments in 2016, Tajikistan’s Criminal Code has equated expressions of support for online content deemed “extremist” with “public justification of extremism and terrorism,” and Article 179 provides for prison terms of between 10 and 15 years for these crimes. The authorities have warned that interactions such as “likes” and reposts may fall under definitions of terrorism or extremism, leading to prosecution. It should be noted that the definition of ‘extremist’ used is vaguely defined in Tajikistani legislation and is frequently manipulated by the authorities to punish those who allegedly publish or refer material from banned organisations, such as opposition groups and independent media. Human rights activists have repeatedly criticised this and demanded that legal amendments meet international standards. Also UN experts criticised the government’s excessive use of broadly defined charges related to extremism and terrorism, as well as the disproportionate and unfair nature of criminal penalties imposed in this context in a statement from July 2023. The UN experts expressed concerns about the frequent use of such charges against human rights defenders and minority activists, in particular those defending the rights of the Pamiri minority. They concluded that these charges are used to discredit these individuals and justify the secrecy surrounding their cases.
In May 2024 the Supreme Court published a list of 29 organisations, movements, groups and associations which have been recognised as terrorist and extremist and whose activities are prohibited in Tajikistan. Included on the list are the independent news outlet "Pamir Daily News", which covers developments in the GBAO region, as well as opposition parties Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and Group 24, and its affiliated website “New Tajikistan-2”. The authorities have warned that any online engagement with these organisations—such as liking or sharing their content—can be deemed illegal. A similar list is available on the website of the National Bank of Tajikistan.
Currently Tajikistan’s national legislation includes a range of internet regulations that impose criminal charges and imprisonment for specific online actions. These measures aim to limit extremism, control criticism of government figures, and prevent anti-state activities.
Key offences include:
- Insulting the Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation (President Rahmon, who will be immune for life) can be punished with between two to five years of imprisonment (Article 137(1)).
- Facilitating or Committing Terrorist Acts Online: Using the internet to recruit for or support terrorist acts is punishable by 10 to 15 years (Article 179 (1)).
- Calls for Violent Change of Constitutional Order: Publicly advocating for violent change of Tajikistan's constitutional structure on the internet can be punished by eight to 15 years in prison (Article 307).
- Participation in Extremist Organisations: Organising or participating in extremist group activities online is punishable by five to eight years’ imprisonment (Article 307(3)).
- Insulting Government Officials: Insulting authorities online can be punished by fines ranging from 50,000 to 75,000 somoni (the equivalent of approximately 4,400 to 6,500 EUR) or up to two years in prison (Article 330).
- Planning or Preparing for Aggressive War: Using the internet to plan acts of aggression against other states can result in five to 10 years in prison (Article 395).
These strict laws have led to numerous arrests and imprisonment for social media interactions, with “likes” or shares of content which the government considers to be extremist - often interpreted as support for banned ideologies - underscoring Tajikistan's stringent controls of online expression and political dissent.
Access to information
The possibility to access information of public interest from state authorities continues to be limited. Interactions between state officials and the media in Tajikistan are regulated by a presidential decree issued on 4th March 2005. This decree was aimed at fostering transparency and ensuring that government agencies regularly communicated with the media. It mandated state authorities to hold quarterly press conferences, providing a platform for public information and accountability.
However, in September 2011, the regulation was amended, reducing the frequency of these mandatory press conferences. Under the updated rules, the heads of ministries and agencies are now required to conduct press conferences twice a year.
Draft media law
On 28th September 2024, the government of Tajikistan halted work on drafting the new Unified Law on Mass Media which an expert working group of state and civil society representatives had been developing since 2023 , criticising it for failing to “pay attention to issues of independence, state security, territorial integrity, culture and national culture”. The Working Group was set up under the Action Plan (2023-2025) for implementing the recently adopted National Strategy of Human Rights (NSHR).
When drafting the new media law, the Working Group conducted a comparative analysis of relevant legislation in other countries and of the existing media legislation in Tajikistan, taking into account some 100 recommendations made by international experts and those made at several public hearings, which were attended by government officials, civil society representatives, media experts, lawyers and journalists. The draft law set out clear improvements for freedom of speech and access to information; prohibited censorship and harassment for criticism and guaranteed state protection to journalists as persons performing public duties. Other progressive legislative provisions in the draft included media pluralism, the protection of children from prohibited content, and accreditation of foreign media in Tajikistan.
Human rights defenders expressed concerns that the authorities appear to be backtracking on previous commitments to adopt a media law that is in line with international standards on freedom of expression and respects the provisions of Tajikistan’s own human rights strategy.
New Legislation Threatens Personal Freedoms in the Name of Tradition
Under the pretext of preserving national traditions and values, Tajikistan continues to restrict citizens' personal freedoms through legislative measures. During the reporting period, several new amendments — some of which are highly discriminatory — were introduced, further infringing upon rights, including freedoms of religion and belief. The trend of invoking traditional norms and values to curtail citizens' rights is an increasing cause for concern.
In May 2024, Tajikistan’s lower house of parliament, the Majlisi Namoyandagon, adopted amendments that prohibit “Idgardak”, a customary celebration held for children during the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. Additional nationwide restrictions have also been enforced, including a ban on attire that does not align with national cultural norms, and stricter controls over weddings, celebrations, and the welcoming of returning pilgrims. These regulations form part of a broader campaign to enforce cultural and traditional standards, raising serious concerns about citizens’ personal freedoms and rights.
According to the General Prosecutor’s Office, 1,100 administrative cases were opened in the first half of 2024 for violations of the Law “On the Ordering of Traditions, Celebrations, and Rites” in Tajikistan.
Tajikistani officials are attempting to counter reports of rights violations by presenting these new legislative measures as necessary in order to preserve the nation’s cultural heritage. They have sought to reassure international Islamic organisations and the broader global community that such reports are disinformation, claiming that the amendments aim to “harmonise cultural preservation with religious practices.” Officials argue that these measures will uphold freedom of religious expression while ensuring that traditional values remain protected.
Tajikistan’s use of national tradition and public morality as justifications for restricting personal freedoms has particularly affected women. The government's focus on preserving cultural values and national identity has resulted in legal amendments that severely infringe on women’s rights to freedom of belief, faith, personal liberties and choice of clothing.
On 8th May 2024, amendments to the 2007 Law on the Regulation of Traditions and Rites were adopted, prohibiting the import and sale of clothing that is deemed inconsistent with national culture, as well as the public wearing of such clothes. The Code of Administrative Offences provides for fines from 8,000 up to 54,000 Somoni (approximately 680 and 4,600 Euro) for violating these provisions (Article 481). These restrictions, which were formalised after the president’s signature in June 2024, are supported by a fatwa issued by the Islamic Council of Ulema on 26th July 2024, which banned women from wearing black, tight-fitting, or transparent clothing. The decree further stated that the colour black is incompatible with Tajikistan’s “national and geographical characteristics.”
Alongside these legal measures, the authorities have set up task forces to regulate women’s clothing in accordance with the country’s “national values.” In early August 2024, Sulaimon Davlatzoda, head of the Committee for Religious Affairs, announced a joint effort among the Culture Ministry, Women’s Committee, and Religious Affairs Committee to determine which clothing reflects Tajik traditions. On 13th August, Deputy Foreign Minister Farrukh Sharifzoda additionally recommended citizens avoid “alien influences” and wear national attire to preserve cultural identity.
According to civil society activists, these restrictions are particularly aimed at certain practising Muslim women, as the authorities have prohibited, inter alia, women from wearing black clothing, which they associate with “Arab influence” (such as the black headscarf and the hijab), and consider to be as alien to Tajik culture and tradition, particularly after the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March 2024.
ASSOCIATION
The Ministry of Justice reportedly continues to reject registration applications from public associations, citing inconsistencies with national legislation and non-compliance with the provisions of the law. Such actions underscore a pattern of restrictive measures taken by the Tajikistani authorities, which have increasingly constrained the operating space for CSOs across the country.
This restrictive trend is especially evident in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), where only 35 registered organisations remain. This figure includes numerous local branches of some organisations across different districts; for example, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan alone has 17 branches registered in GBAO. The Department of Justice in GBAO has consistently rejected registration applications from CSOs focused on human rights or democratisation, advising them to register as national entities at the Ministry of Justice in Dushanbe, with branch offices in GBAO. For local CSOs, this alternative requires maintaining offices in both Dushanbe and Khorog, entailing a considerable financial burden, and many organisations simply cannot afford these dual costs, further shrinking the space for civil society in the region. In early September, the GBAO Justice Department reportedly reached out to CSOs whose registrations had been unjustifiably delayed for over a year, asking them to resubmit their documents and promising a faster review process. However, at the time of writing, it remains unclear how many organisations have resubmitted their applications or the current status of these reviews.
The declining number of CSOs in GBAO illustrates the growing barriers that organisations face in their work to promote human rights and address critical social issues. As the operating space for civil society in Tajikistan continues to shrink, the ability of CSOs to effectively serve their communities and uphold fundamental rights is increasingly under threat.
In May Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights defenders published details of a letter she – together with her colleagues Irene Khan (UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression) and Clément Voule, (UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and association) - had sent in February 2024 to the Tajikistani authorities regarding the liquidation of 700 civil society organisations in the country, calling on Tajikistan to reconsider its attitude towards civil society and to view civil society activists as allies rather than adversaries. She also requested data on the number of civil society organisations whose activities had been suspended over the past five years and information about measures taken to ensure the safety of human rights defenders in the country. Lawlor also mentioned that the Tajikistani government had now responded to this letter but refrained from providing detail about its content.
GBAO
In May, two years after the government’s violent crackdown on mostly peaceful demonstrations in Khorog and Rushan in GBAO and the subsequent mass arrests and dissolution of civil society, several human rights organisations, including the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and the Tajikistan Civil Society Coalition against Torture and Impunity, expressed concern about the state of health of imprisoned lawyer and human rights defender Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and called for his immediate and unconditional release.
Draft law on Non-Commercial Organisations
Information about the status of the new draft law on Non-Commercial Organisations remains unavailable at the time of writing. Despite the Government's commitment to include CSO representatives in the working group developing the draft, no CSO has received an invitation, nor has the draft been shared with them. CSOs in Tajikistan are concerned that the new draft legislation may result in new restrictions on their operations. They fear in particular that a proposed requirement to re-register could result in arbitrary denials of registration for some.
Political opposition
In June 2024, several media outlets reported that former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamrokhon Zarifi, and former parliamentarian Saidjafar Usmonzoda,
were allegedly detained on charges of “attempting to seize state power.” While the security services have not officially confirmed these detentions, Tajikistan’s Prosecutor General Yusuf Rahmon has publicly acknowledged that criminal proceedings have been initiated against Zarifi, as well as other prominent figures, including officials Akbarsho Iskandarov, Ahmadshoh Komilzoda, and the deputy head of the Social Democratic Party, Shokirjon Hakimov. Speaking at a press conference on 9th August 2024, the Prosecutor General declined to disclose specific details, citing the classified nature of the cases. He emphasised that those found guilty of “betraying the state, nation, or president” would be held accountable, regardless of their current or former positions. Although it was initially expected that the case would be submitted to the Supreme Court in early September, the investigation was deemed incomplete, leading to a return for further inquiry. Media outlets have been unable to obtain statements from the accused or their families due to the secrecy surrounding this case - and this lack of transparency, compounded by the growing repression of media, has raised concerns regarding due process and the independence of the judiciary, as well as the broader implications for freedom of expression and press freedom in Tajikistan.
According to media reports, the trial began behind closed doors on 14th November at a detention centre in Dushanbe, with no official announcement from the court or government. Relatives, journalists and the public have been prevented from attending. Although the specific charges are unknown, sources familiar with the case suggest that the allegations involve attempting a violent seizure of power, treason, incitement of hatred, and forgery.
Tajikistan's Supreme Court ruled in the case on 5th February, handing down long prison sentences. Reports indicate that former Foreign Minister Khamrokhon Zarifi and Saidjafar Usmonzodan (former MP and former leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan) each received 27-year sentences. The court also sentenced Shokirjon Khakimov, deputy leader of the Social Democratic Party, to 18 years in prison. The former deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Ahmadshokh Komilzoda, the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, Akbarsho Iskandarov, and Nuramin Ganizoda (a retired colonel of the GKNB) were also reportedly sentenced to 18 years in prison.
In addition, the court sentenced journalist Rukhshona Khakimova (a relative of Shokirjon Khakimov), to eight years in prison (see chapter on Freedom of Expression above).
On 26th July, Muhammadali Faizmuhammad, former leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), died at a prison hospital in Vahdat. Reports indicate that he suffered from heart failure and diabetes. Concerns about his health had been raised in 2023, when Radio Ozodi reported that he had lost the use of one of his legs due to health complications.
Transnational repression
The Tajikistani government continued to use transnational repression against critical journalists, bloggers, and opposition members living abroad and sought their return based on international arrest warrants issued through Interpol. Concerns about transnational repression have intensified following the February 2024 ratification of an agreement between Tajikistan and Russia on international information security, which could be used to justify the detention and extradition of individuals accused of disseminating information deemed harmful to the social, spiritual, moral, or cultural environment of either state.
According to media news, on 7th April Sulaimon Davlatov, a former member of Group 24 and the Congress of Constructive Forces opposition movements, was detained in Vilnius (Lithuania) on an unspecified charge related to an alleged violation of Lithuania’s national security. His lawyer successfully lodged an appeal, a forced deportation to Tajikistan was prevented and he was released on 4th June. Davlatov has lived in Lithuania for nine years and was known for his online criticism of Tajikistani authorities.
Radio Ozodi reported in April that in February 2024 a court in Dushanbe's Ismoili Somoni district sentenced Bilol Qurbonaliyev, a member of the banned Group 24, to 10 years in prison. As reported in the previous CIVICUS Monitor update, he had been deported to Tajikistan from Germany in November 2023 for allegedly violating immigration rules and was detained in December by the security services. The Tajikistani authorities confirmed his arrest on 16th February 2024. The activist was among protesters against the visit of the president Emommali Rahmon in Berlin in September 2023. The opposition movement has repeatedly expressed concerns about the risk of torture and ill-treatment to Qurbonaliyev.
On 3rd May 2024, Human Rights Watch, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the International Partnership for Human Rights jointly called on Tajik authorities to "immediately confirm the detention and whereabouts of and release" Suhrob Zafar. Zafar is the leader of the outlawed opposition Group 24 movement whose whereabouts have been unknown since March 2024 after he was forcibly disappeared while in Turkey despite holding official UNHCR asylum seeker status there. Reliable sources said that the Tajikistani State Committee on National Security was holding him in Dushanbe, was periodically torturing him, and had denied him medical assistance. On 17th October, according to media reports, Suhrob Zafar was sentenced to 30 years in prison on alleged extremism charges. His mother said in a media interview that she managed to see her son in the pre-trial detention centre during the trial, but was not allowed to attend the announcement of the verdict. According to her statement he had no legal defence counsel, not even a state appointed lawyer, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Another Group 24 representative, Nasimjon Sharifov, received a 20 year prison sentence.
According to media reports on 29th July, Asliddin Sharipov, the brother of the director of Payom TV - an opposition online TV station - was sentenced to 12 years in prison in March on undisclosed charges. He is the brother of Shavkat Muhammadi, the head of the opposition Payom online TV channel, who currently resides outside Tajikistan.
Sharipov was arrested by police in Russia in September 2022 and extradited to Tajikistan on 1st October 2023. At the time, a court in Nizhny Tagil, Russia, stated that he was wanted in Tajikistan on allegations of collaborating with a banned organisation and promoting its activities online.
The specific charges against Sharipov remain unclear, as the authorities have not issued any public statements about his case.
In November 2024 popular imprisoned Tajikistani MMA fighter and blogger Chorshanbe Chorshanbiev was sentenced to an additional four-year term for his alleged involvement in a prison fight. Originally from GBAO, Chorshanbiev was forcibly returned from Russia to Tajikistan because the Tajikistani authorities regard him as a leading supporter of the protests. He was sentenced in 2022 to 8.5 years in prison on charges of calling for the overthrow of the government – an accusation he has always denied. Many believe that he was persecuted because of the statements critical of the government he posted on his social media channels (see also CIVICUS Monitor entry from 2022).
On 6th November, Tajikistani opposition activist Dilmurod Ergashev was deported from Germany, despite serious concerns about the risk of his detention and torture upon return to Tajikistan – expressed by many human rights organisations. Upon arrival at Dushanbe airport he was reportedly handed over to Tajikistani authorities, who handcuffed him, covered his head with a black bag and escorted him into a vehicle before driving away. Human Rights Watch reported he was subsequently provisionally detained for two months by a city court in Dushanbe on unclear charges, and that he was in a Dushanbe hospital at the time of writing due to medical concerns.
ASSEMBLY
No accountability for human rights violations in GBAO
There has still been no accountability during the reporting period for serious human rights violations perpetrated in connection with the authorities’ response to mass protests that took place in GBAO in November 2021 and May 2022. Despite numerous appeals from international human rights bodies and intergovernmental organisations including the EU, none of the human rights activists, lawyers, bloggers or journalists have been released.
In June 2024, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published an opinion recognising the human rights defender Manuchehr Kholiqnazarov as a victim of arbitrary detention and reiterating national and international organisations’ call to the government of Tajikistan to unconditionally release him and grant him compensation and other reparations.
On 21st November, the Martin Ennals Foundation granted its annual award to Manuchehr Kholiqnazarov, thus honouring his courage and outstanding human rights work in Tajikistan.