Kazakhstan: Pressure on media, LGBTQI+ “propaganda” law, and criminal cases against activists

This report covers developments affecting freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in Kazakhstan from June 2025 to January 2026. It was prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.

Reflecting a broader regional – and global – trend of growing authoritarianism and decreasing civic freedoms, authorities in Kazakhstan stepped up efforts to silence dissent, criticism and plurality of views during the reporting period. Independent media faced mounting pressure, while journalists, bloggers, and activists were increasingly subjected to intimidation, harassment, and prosecution for criticising authorities or peacefully advocating for democratic values, human rights, and minority protection. Peaceful protests were systematically suppressed, and oversight of foreign-funded CSOs tightened. New, recently adopted legislation threatens to further restrict civic freedoms, including rights advocacy and education deemed incompatible with so-called traditional values.

Following a law enforcement raid on the offices of Orda.kz and the detention of its staff at the beginning of December 2025, editor-in-chief Gulnara Bazhkenova was placed under house arrest pending investigation on charges of knowingly spreading “false” information – a broadly worded offence open to abuse. The case followed months of harassment against Orda.kz, with media and human rights groups denouncing it as retaliation for the outlet’s independent investigative reporting on corruption and other issues. In a further troubling turn, a local court ruled in January 2026 to strip Bazhkenova’s lawyer, Murat Adam, of his licence for allegedly spreading “incorrect” information after he publicly criticised procedural violations in the case, effectively penalising him for representing his client.

Director Aset Mataev and editor-in-chief Amir Kassenov of the KazTAG news agency also faced criminal charges of knowingly spreading “false” information in a case reportedly fraught with procedural violations. In late December 2025, Kassenov was placed under house arrest as the investigation continued. The charges stemmed from investigative reporting alleging fraud by an influential private company, and further reinforced concerns about the misuse of the Criminal Code provision on “false” information to restrict legitimate reporting and free expression.

The website of the independent outlet Respublika.kz.news was blocked across Kazakhstan in November 2025, ostensibly based on a court decision dating from over a decade ago, but in practice appearing to have been triggered by the platform’s recent coverage.

A series of online attacks against journalists and activists was also reported, including the suspension of social media accounts following posts on politically sensitive issues. These incidents highlighted the risk of abuse of content-complaint mechanisms to restrict freedom of expression.

Reports of extensive state monitoring of media and social media platforms aimed at identifying content critical of the authorities drew additional alarm, particularly as the president publicly endorsed efforts to scrutinise and locate users accused of spreading “disinformation” or “provocative” content.

The authorities’ refusal to renew the accreditation of 16 journalists from the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in July 2025 further corroborated concerns about the broad discretion granted to officials to deny or revoke accreditation for foreign media and journalists. Under legal amendments adopted in late 2025, foreign media and journalists working without accreditation may face fines.

In an alarming development, legislation banning so-called LGBTQI+ “propaganda” was adopted by Parliament through an accelerated process and signed by the president in December 2025, despite widespread criticism from human rights organisations, international experts, and the diplomatic community. Its vague wording means that the ban could be applied to virtually any information relating to LGBTQI+ issues, with sanctions including fines, administrative detention, and restrictions on the operations of media outlets. Critics warned that the law violates Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations, entrenches stigma and discrimination, and creates a high risk of arbitrary enforcement. Even before the legislation entered into force, LGBTQI+ activists faced renewed pressure. In two incidents in Astana in November 2025, homophobic activists disrupted LGBTQI+ gatherings and verbally attacked participants with impunity, as police detained LGBTQI+ activists rather than the intruders.

Other legislation adopted by Parliament in December 2025 expanded the powers of so-called community assistants in crime prevention, allowing them to report suspected offences and detain individuals without clear limits, training requirements, or accountability mechanisms. The legislation also mandates them to address vaguely defined “anti-social behaviour.” Human rights defenders warned that these provisions could enable arbitrary targeting, including for actions such as expressing support for LGBTQI+ rights, and facilitate the emergence of a para-policing system that legitimises surveillance, Soviet-style denunciations, and human rights violations.

Following renewed verbal attacks against foreign-funded CSOs by decision-makers, the government further tightened reporting requirements for organisations and individuals receiving foreign funding for core functions. Under the new rules, which entered into force in January 2026, recipients must notify tax authorities of the receipt of foreign funds within 10 days and submit biannual reports on their use, while a public registry of foreign-funded entities will be expanded to include funding sources and amounts. The government argued that these measures are necessary to enhance transparency and national security, but critics called them excessive and discriminatory and warned that they increase the risk of stigmatisation and pressure on foreign-funded organisations. The new Tax Code, which entered into force in January 2026, grants tax authorities enhanced oversight powers over foreign-funded organisations, reinforcing concerns that such organisations could be singled out for selective scrutiny and undue interference in their activities.

As of the beginning of 2026, more than 20 individuals remained behind bars on charges considered politically motivated by human rights defenders. Among them are opposition movement leader Marat Zhylanbaev, as well as activists-journalists Duman Mukhamedkarim and Aigerim Tleuzhan, all of whom are serving prison sentences on spurious charges amid ongoing concerns about their health and well-being. Authorities also targeted those raising concerns about imprisoned activists. For example, in summer 2025, prominent human rights defender Bakhytzhan Toregozhina was fined for allegedly spreading “false” information about Zhylanbaev’s health in social media posts and was subsequently detained for questioning in a criminal investigation related to a banned organisation.

Five activists who peacefully opposed plans to construct a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan were convicted in August 2025 on charges of preparing mass riots, with the prosecution resting largely on recorded discussions about organising a peaceful protest. They were sentenced to four years of restricted freedom – later reduced to two and a half years on appeal – and banned from engaging in public or political activities for five years. This case demonstrates how authorities instrumentalise concerns about mass unrest to suppress peaceful protest on politically sensitive issues.

In another case, 19 activists affiliated with the Atajurt movement faced criminal charges of “inciting national hatred” after holding a peaceful protest in November 2025. The protest sought to highlight the persecution of ethnic Kazakhs in China’s Xinjiang region, demand the release of a co-activist and family member who was detained while travelling there in summer 2025, and express concern about China’s growing influence in Kazakhstan. During the protest, participants burned Chinese flags and a portrait of the Chinese president, chanted slogans such as “Down with China!”, and shared video recordings on social media, prompting an official diplomatic protest from China. Thirteen activists were placed in pre-trial detention and six under house arrest. Human rights groups, including IPHR and KIBHR, called for the charges to be dropped and for the activists’ release, stressing that the case reflects a broader pattern of pressure against Atajurt activists and violates Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations. As the trial in the case was approaching, several people taking part in a social media campaign in support of the activists were detained, intimidated and forced by police to delete their posts.

The vulnerability of Kazakhstan-based activists originating from Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan was illustrated by the case of Akylbek Muratov. While the Kazakhstani authorities refrained from extraditing him to Uzbekistan after holding him in detention for a year on charges related to his peaceful engagement on the situation in the autonomous republic, they denied him asylum, exposing him to a continued risk of forcible return. As a result, he was forced to resettle in a third country to ensure his safety in November 2025.

Kazakhstan’s persecution of critics also extends beyond its borders. In a welcome development, Montenegro rejected an extradition request in September 2025 in the case of women’s rights activist Dinara Smailova, whom Kazakhstani authorities have criminally prosecuted in absentia. She was also granted international protection. Human rights defenders and international experts have criticised the charges against Smailova as retaliation for her work exposing domestic and sexual violence.

Meanwhile, Ukraine-based opposition journalist Natalia Sadykova reported ongoing intimidation and surveillance. In November 2025, she confronted a person monitoring and filming her near her home, whom police reportedly identified as a Kazakhstani security officer. Sadykova viewed the surveillance as particularly threatening given that her husband, journalist Aidos Sadykov, was attacked and killed in Kyiv in 2024. Kazakhstani authorities have failed to cooperate meaningfully with the Ukrainian investigation into his killing.

Despite a Constitutional Court ruling from January 2025 prohibiting the automatic rejection of requests to hold peaceful assemblies, authorities continued to deny such requests on dubious grounds, while detaining and penalising participants in protests held without pre-approval. For example, in November 2025, a group of mothers calling for accountability for the deaths of their conscript sons in Astana were apprehended by police, held for several hours, and issued warnings for violating assembly rules. In January 2026, another group of women demanding fair investigations into the deaths of their children were similarly detained and fined. In addition, a journalist covering the protest was detained, questioned and pressured to sign an explanation, amounting to interference with his legitimate journalistic activity.

The practice of detaining activists to pre-empt possible protests also persisted. Ahead of Republic Day in October 2025 – when protests were feared following a call from an exile-based government opponent – dozens of activists were detained across the country and subjected to short-term arrests and fines.

Recent developments are covered in more detail in the full update below.

Expression

The reporting period saw increasing attacks on independent media and journalists, including through online attacks, detentions and politically motivated prosecution, such as on spurious charges of spreading “false” information. In December 2025, a coalition of nine human rights organisations – Amnesty International, Civil Rights Defenders, Crude Accountability, Freedom for Eurasia, KIBHR, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, IPHR and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee – issued a joint statement voicing alarm about this trend. The organisations called on the authorities to cease harassment, intimidation, and pressure, protect the public’s right to access to information, and cease spurious criminal cases. They also called on social media platforms to resist any content or account takedown requests that unlawfully restrict expression protected under international human rights law.

Orda.kz raided, its editor-in-chief criminally prosecuted, and her lawyer stripped of his licence

On 1st December 2025, law enforcement authorities raided the editorial offices of Orda.kz and detained several staff members, including editor-in-chief Gulnara Bazhkenova, whose Almaty home was also searched. While other staff were released after several hours of questioning, Bazhkenova was placed under two months of house arrest pending investigation on charges of repeated and deliberate distribution of “false” information under Article 274 of the Criminal Code – a broadly worded provision frequently used against critical voices.

Orda reported serious procedural violations during the searches, including denial of access to lawyers, refusal to present search warrants, prolonged detention of staff, and the seizure of equipment, documents, and cash without explanation. These actions followed months of harassment against Bazhkenova and the outlet, including cyberattacks, threats, and disinformation campaigns, and are widely viewed by journalists and human rights defenders as retaliation for Orda’s high-profile investigative reporting, including on corruption.

Both Kazakhstani media groups and international human rights organisations raised alarm over the case. The Committee to Protect Journalists warned that it illustrates “how susceptible Kazakhstan’s ‘false information’ laws are to abuse” and called on authorities to drop the charges and urgently reform the law to ensure such cases are addressed exclusively through civil proceedings, a position echoed by Kazakhstan’s Union of Journalists. The head of the Adil Soz foundation, Karla Zhamankulova further noted that the charges may be subject to amnesty under a June 2025 law, underscoring concerns about both the legality and legitimacy of the prosecution.

In a further worrying development, in mid-January 2026 a local court in Almaty ruled in favour of a request by the Ministry of Justice to strip lawyer Murat Adam of his licence to practise law, citing alleged “multiple violations” committed during his defence of Orda chief editor Gulnara Bazhkenova. Specifically, he was accused of disseminating “incorrect” information on social media, where he reported procedural violations in the case and criticised the Criminal Code provision under which Bazhkenova is charged. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) expressed serious concern over the initiative to revoke Murat Adam’s licence “for his legitimate conduct, which, in fact, was an integral part of his representation of a client facing criminal proceedings”, stressing that such action is incompatible with international human rights law and standards relating to the independence of the legal profession.

Criminal case against the leadership of KazTAG news

The leadership of KazTAG, a well-known news agency that covers politically sensitive issues, also faced criminal charges of knowingly disseminating “false” information. A criminal case was opened against its general director, Aset Mataev, and editor-in-chief, Amir Kassenov, following a complaint by the company Freedom Finance – a company managed by one of the country’s most influential business figures, Timur Turlov. The case relates to KazTAG publications alleging that Freedom Finance was involved in fraudulent schemes. While Freedom Finance claimed that these allegations were false, KazTAG maintained that its reporting was based on information provided by alleged victims, and their lawyer and noted that the company had failed to respond to requests for comment. KazTAG had also published a transcript of an audio conversation with a former high-level representative of Freedom Finance discussing possible ways to circumvent international sanctions against Russia.

According to KazTAG, it was not properly informed about the opening of the criminal case or the investigative actions taken and only learned of them through media reports in November 2025, in violation of due process standards. Mataev and Kassenov were subsequently questioned by police, and on 24th December 2025, Kasenov was placed in house arrest for two months after being temporarily detained. A few days later, police searched his home, reportedly denying lawyers access, as well as the premises of the news agency.

Among others, the Adil Soz Foundation expressed serious concerns over the opening of the criminal case against KazTAG and the reported procedural violations, calling on the authorities to strictly comply with criminal procedure legislation, ensure transparency of the investigation, and guarantee the journalists’ professional rights.

Online attacks on media, journalists and activists

During the reporting period, online attacks on journalists and activists intensified, including through a growing tactic of using opaque copyright claims and content removal requests to stifle their free speech. A series of such incidents was highlighted in the December 2025 NGO statement on media freedom, which was mentioned above.

Independent journalist Lukpan Akhmedyarov’s Facebook account became inaccessible for several days in November 2025 after he posted about threats received over a documentary film he had been working on, covering cases of deaths of conscript soldiers. Earlier, in summer 2025, his YouTube channel and Instagram account were temporarily blocked without warning.

In the same month, Akhmedyarov’s colleague - independent journalist Vadim Boreyko - also reported that his Instagram account had been emptied of content following earlier repeated removals of his Instagram and Facebook posts due to alleged violations.

As documented in the joint NGO statement, also in November 2025, activists Askhat Niyazov and Sanjar Bokayev both received notification that their Instagram accounts had been removed due to alleged violations of community guidelines. In addition, Bokayev’s Facebook account was blocked for alleged security reasons. The accounts were later restored.

In another direct assault, the independent outlet Vlast.kz reported being subjected to intensive DDoS attacks over several days in December 2025, causing interruptions to the website’s operations.

The site of the independent Respublika.kz.news resource was blocked across Kazakhstan in November 2025. Authorities claimed that this measure was based on a 2012 court decision which banned the “Respublika” newspaper, its supplements and online resources as “extremist” as part of a broader crackdown on independent media following the 2011 Zhanaozen unrest. However, the current site was launched in 2014 and thus is not directly affected by that court decision. As of the beginning of 2026, the site remained inaccessible in the country.

Surveillance of online platforms

There were concerns about extensive state monitoring of media and social media platforms targeting the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. These were reinforced by the publication of a procurement announcement by the Astana Communications Service for a contract of approximately €27,000 to monitor more than 55,000 media and social media sources. The contractor was expected to flag “aggressive” and “strongly aggressive” content – particularly criticism of the government – and to compile monthly reports identifying specific authors, accounts, and platforms.

Online monitoring to identify critical content was also publicly endorsed at the highest political level. In September 2025, President Tokayev publicly expressed indignation over social media users allegedly spreading “disinformation” and “provocative” or “destructive” content, stating that state agencies were working to identify such users and determine where they live.

RFE/RL journalists denied accreditation

New accreditation rules introduced in 2024 grant authorities broad powers to deny or revoke accreditation for foreign media and journalists. In an example of the misuse of accreditation rules, the Foreign Ministry refused to renew the accreditation of 16 journalists from the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in July 2025. Authorities claimed they had violated the law by working without valid accreditation, but RFE/RL stressed the Ministry failed to process their applications within the required two-month period, causing their permits to lapse before a decision was made. The service filed complaints to court about the rejections of accreditation for its journalists; however, these complaints were rejected in two separate court rulings issued in August and September 2025. The first of these two rulings was upheld on appeal in January 2026, while the appeal hearing on the second ruling was pending at the time of writing.

In 2024, over 30 RFE/RL contributors were similarly denied accreditation, but that time the service eventually reached an agreement with the Foreign Ministry, allowing them to continue their work.

In a further related development, amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences, which were signed by the president at the end of December 2025, introduced fines for foreign media outlets and journalists engaging in professional journalistic activities in the country without accreditation.

Ban on so-called LGBTQI+ “propaganda” adopted

During the reporting period, new legislation banning so-called LGBTQI+ “propaganda” was initiated and adopted through an accelerated and non-transparent process. The Lower House of Parliament (Majlis) passed the relevant provisions as part of a broader package of legislative amendments on archival affairs and the dissemination of illegal content on 12th November 2025. The Upper House (Senate) approved the amendments on 18th December 2025, and the president signed them on 30th December 2025.

Mirroring similar legislation in Russia, the new provisions prohibit the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation”, broadly defined as the dissemination of information about “non-traditional sexual orientation” or “adherence” to it through media, online platforms, or other public means for the purpose of “forming a positive public opinion.” This overly broad and vague definition means that the publication of virtually any information relating to LGBTQI+ issues, as well as public expressions of support for people identifying as LGBTQI+, could be deemed prohibited propaganda. Violations may result in sanctions, including the blocking of online resources and restrictions on the operations of media outlets. In addition, in accordance with separate amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences (Article 456-2), which were also signed by the president at the end of 2025, the dissemination of “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation” – designated a form of “illegal content” – will be punishable by fines or, in cases of repeated violations, by up to 10 days’ administrative detention.

The legislation prompted strong criticism from human rights organisations and independent experts. In a joint statement issued in November 2025, Access Now, Civil Rights Defenders, the Eurasian Coalition on Health, Rights, Gender and Sexual Diversity, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, IPHR, and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee called on the authorities to reject the draft legislation. They stressed that the proposed provisions would blatantly violate Kazakhstan’s international human rights commitments and significantly increase the vulnerability of LGBTQI+ people in the country. These concerns appeared to be materialising already during the parliamentary consideration of the bill, with several attacks on LGBTQI+ activists reported (see more under Association).

Six UN human rights experts likewise warned that the proposed law “would entrench stigma, outlaw expression, and contravene international human rights obligations.” They expressed particular alarm at the apparent equation of so-called “non-traditional sexual orientation” with paedophilia, describing this as “an affront to human dignity.” The experts also challenged official claims that the ban was aimed at safeguarding children, stressing that the protection of children “is not advanced by censorship, exclusion and vilifying minorities, but by equitable and inclusive education, access to information, measures that ensure equality and non-discrimination, and the affirmation of all human rights of all persons.”

Diplomatic representations also criticised the initiative to ban so-called LGBTQI+ propaganda. In a joint communication, the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan and the embassies of 19 EU member states and partner countries expressed “deep concern” over the legislative amendments, noting that they run counter to Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations and “leave room for arbitrary misinterpretation affecting fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom from discrimination.” They also voiced strong disagreement with the analogy drawn between sexual orientation and paedophilia and warned that the law would negatively affect Kazakhstan’s international image.

The legislation now adopted follows earlier initiatives to ban so-called LGBTQI+ propaganda in Kazakhstan. In 2024, MPs from the ruling Amanat party proposed introducing criminal liability for the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations.” That same year, the government established a working group to consider a public petition to ban such “propaganda” and commissioned an expert study on its alleged impact on children. According to media reports, the resulting study concluded that sexual orientation “cannot be arbitrarily influenced from the outside by propaganda” and that the LGBTQI+ movement has a positive effect on young people’s sexual identity, including by providing support and reducing isolation. These findings were reportedly removed from the Ministry of Health’s website following public remarks by the president in March 2025, portraying LGBTQI+ rights as a tool for foreign interference in Kazakhstan.

As of January 2026, the authorities were working on implementing rules for the new legislation, which is due to enter into force 60 days after its official publication, i.e. in March 2026. Activists pointed out that these rules will be crucial for the application of the legislation in practice.

Community assistants granted broad policing powers, including over ‘’anti-social’’ behaviour

In another development of concern, new legislation on preventing offences, which was passed by Parliament and subsequently signed by the president in December 2025, expands the role of so-called community assistants in crime prevention.

The legislation grants these assistants broad powers, including reporting suspected offences to the police and detaining suspected offenders. It does not specify any training requirements for assistants and fails to clearly define the limits of their authority or establish accountability mechanisms. Community assistants will also be eligible for compensation, including financial remuneration, for their engagement. Human rights activists have warned that this could result in a para-policing system that legitimises surveillance of co-citizens’ behaviour, encourages denunciations – similarly to under the Soviet system – and facilitates human rights violations.

Of particular concern is that community assistants are empowered to respond to so-called “anti-social behaviour,” broadly defined as actions that violate “generally accepted norms of behaviour and morality” and the “rights and legitimate interests of others”, including conduct that does not entail administrative or criminal liability. Human rights defenders fear this could allow community assistants, under the pretext of upholding public morality, to arbitrarily target individuals for pressure, attacks, or detention for behaviour deemed undesirable, such as so-called LGBTQI+ propaganda. They warn that the fact that the definition encompasses actions that are not in breach of national law undermines legal certainty – a fundamental principle of a society based on the rule of law – which enables individuals to foresee the legal consequences of their actions and protects them from arbitrary state interference.

New proposed restrictions on social media use

Draft legislation introducing amendments to several existing laws affecting social media was developed by the Ministry of Culture and Information and put forward for public consultation until the end of December 2025.

The proposed amendments would, inter alia, require foreign online platforms with an average of more than 100,000 daily users in the country to open representative offices in Kazakhstan and cooperate more closely with authorities, including by deleting any content deemed unlawful within 24 hours. They would also require platforms to enforce a ban on the use of online platforms by persons under 16, except for messenger services, and to ensure that all account holders with more than 5,000 followers provide identification information to the authorities. Failure to comply with the new requirements could result in the blocking of platforms or other restrictions on their operations in Kazakhstan. Commentators warned that these provisions could prompt foreign platforms to exit the Kazakhstani market, to the detriment of citizens’ ability to seek, receive and share information freely.

Other proposed provisions would introduce fines for the dissemination of photo or video materials of individuals without their permission, except in cases where consent is waived, such as during mass events, in public places, or with respect to individuals performing their professional duties. Commentators noted that this could effectively prohibit photographing or filming officials outside their places of work, making it more difficult to document misconduct or corruption.

As of mid-January 2026, the draft legislation remained under government review and had yet to be submitted to Parliament.

Association

Oversight of foreign funded organisations expanded

As reported in the previous update, discussions surrounding the overhaul of US foreign assistance in 2025 were used to justify renewed attacks on civil society in Kazakhstan. In this context, decision-makers – ranging from MPs to President Tokayev – accused CSOs of using foreign grants to promote “alien” values and undermine the country’s image. Against this backdrop, a member of a pro-government parliamentary faction proposed adopting a “foreign agent” law, arguing that it was time to “rewrite the rules of the game with foreign donors who disguise political interests as ‘media support’, ‘human rights’ and ‘increasing tolerance.’”

Subsequently, the government initiated the elaboration of new general draft legislation on NGOs and established a working group composed of officials, MPs, and leaders of public associations for this purpose. As of the beginning of 2026, a policy document prepared by the working group as a basis for the new legislation was under consideration by the Ministry of Justice. While the process is still under way, there are fears that independent civil society representatives may be sidelined during the elaboration of the new legislation.

Under existing legislation, organisations receiving foreign funding for several broadly worded purposes – including legal assistance and consultations, sociological and public surveys, and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information – are subject to a specific reporting regime and included in a stigmatising public registry. During the reporting period, the government initiated changes to this regime. Under new rules, which were approved by the Ministry of Finance in November 2025 and entered into force on 1st January 2026, legal entities and individuals receiving foreign funding for the relevant purposes must report the receipt of such funds to state revenue authorities within 10 days. In addition, they are now required to submit biannual reports on the use of foreign funds, whereas previously it was sufficient to report only on their receipt. The information published in the public registry was also expanded to include the specific sources and amounts of foreign funding received, in addition to the names and identification numbers of recipients.

The government argued that these changes are necessary to ensure transparency in the receipt of foreign funding and to enhance national security through strengthened control over foreign influence. However, critics concluded that the new rules are discriminatory and excessive, as they do not apply equally to all categories of legal entities and individuals, and previously CSOs were already subject to extensive reporting obligations. Critics also warned that the public disclosure of detailed information on foreign funding could increase the risk of stigmatisation and pressure on organisations that rely on foreign support for their work.

During a parliamentary discussion in December, Magerram Magerramov – an MP from a pro-government faction who has repeatedly lashed out against foreign-funded initiatives – claimed that the alleged lack of adequate oversight of the use of “massive” amounts of foreign funding received by human rights, media, and civil society actors poses serious security risks. He therefore called for a further expansion of reporting requirements related to foreign funding, as well as for tougher penalties for concealing information or submitting false data. In response, the Minister of Culture and Information noted that reporting obligations had already been strengthened and emphasised that failure to submit information, late reporting, or the provision of incorrect data may result in fines, while deliberate tax evasion is punishable under the Criminal Code. She further highlighted that the new Tax Code, which entered into force in January 2026, grants tax authorities expanded powers to conduct checks and inspections of organisations receiving foreign funding, with a view to overseeing their use of funds and ensuring compliance with tax legislation. This raises concerns that CSOs receiving foreign funding could be selectively subjected to enhanced supervision and intrusive checks, without compelling reasons, which could result in undue interference with their activities.

Attacks on LGBTQI+ activists

As the legislation introducing a ban on so-called LGBTQI+ “propaganda” was advancing in Parliament, LGBTQI+ activists faced renewed pressure, including through the following incidents taking place in late November 2025 where homophobic activists and police appeared to be cooperating:

On 21st November 2025, the civil society initiative Education Community organised a roundtable event at the Human Rights Hub in Astana to present research findings on the situation of the LGBTQI+ community in Kazakhstan. A known homophobic activist from the Parents Union of Kazakhstan disrupted the event, interrupting speakers and verbally abusing LGBTQI+ activists. Police were called to the scene, but instead of acting against the intruder, they detained activist Ardzh Tursynkan, allegedly for swearing at the homophobic woman. He was placed in detention on charges of “minor hooliganism” under Kazakhstan’s Code on Administrative Offences (article 434, part 1) and held overnight before being fined the equivalent of approximately €133 and released.

On 22nd November, a group of women associated with the Parents Union, including the same activist who had disrupted the event on 21st November, burst into a café in Astana where LGBTQI+ activists were having lunch and yelled insults at them. After reportedly being called by the homophobic activist involved in both incidents, police detained Temirlan Baymash, co-founder of the LGBTQI+ organisation Queer.kz for allegedly using obscene language in public. Later the same day, Zhanar Sekerbayeva, co-founder of the civil society group Feminita who had also been in the café, was detained without explanation in a food store. In the evening, both LGBTQI+ activists were released without charge.

Concerns for the well-being of imprisoned activists and targeting of those supporting them

The leader of the unregistered party Alga Kazakhstan!, Marat Zhylanbaev, continued to serve a seven-year prison sentence on extremism-related charges, issued in 2023 in retaliation for his peaceful opposition activities. In an opinion made public in July 2025, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that his deprivation of liberty violated Kazakhstan’s international obligations and called for his release. Zhylanbaev has reported being subjected to pressure in prison and has repeatedly held extended hunger strikes to protest inhuman and degrading treatment, compounding concerns about his health and well-being. Prison authorities have reportedly obstructed his lawyer’s access to his client on various pretexts.

Journalist and activist Duman Mukhamedkarim similarly continued to serve a seven-year prison sentence issued on spurious extremism-related charges following a closed trial in 2024. In violation of the legal requirement that prisoners serve their sentences in their home regions, he is held in a facility about 1,000 kilometres from his home in Almaty region. The activist reportedly went on hunger strike in August 2025 to protest the failure of prison authorities to adequately address his complaints and requests for assistance, including those regarding his health and threats received.

Journalist and activist Aigerim Tleuzhan was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for her alleged involvement in the seizure of Almaty airport during the January 2022 events following a flawed and politically motivated trial. She has also experienced serious health problems in prison. In October 2025, her lawyer reported that Tleuzhan’s health had deteriorated following recent surgery, noting significant weight loss, fatigue, and repeated fainting. According to the lawyer, she did not receive adequate medical assistance in prison. Only a month later, Tleuzhan was temporarily hospitalised for comprehensive medical examinations. The prison in the Zhaugashty settlement where she is held is reportedly characterised by harsh conditions, including overcrowded barracks, poor ventilation, extreme temperatures, and constant surveillance.

In another worrying development, authorities have detained and intimidated activists expressing support for imprisoned activists, such as in these cases:

In July 2025, prominent human rights defender Bakhytzhan Toregozhina was fined the equivalent of about €125 for allegedly spreading ‘’false’’ information over social media posts expressing concern about Marat Zhylanbaev’s health based on information provided by his lawyer. The decision was later upheld on appeal. In a further act of intimidation, the following month she was detained for questioning as an alleged witness in a criminal investigation on involvement in a banned organisation. The same day – Zhylanbaev’s birthday – several other activists were detained for allegedly violating rules for holding assemblies in relation to support actions for him.

In August 2025, civic activist Bibigul Imangalieva was sentenced to 10 days’ detention for allegedly violating the rules on holding assemblies (under Article 488 of the Code on Administrative Offences) due to a video clip she had recorded in Zhylanbaev’s support. The penalty was issued shortly after she spoke at a press conference organised to draw attention to Zhylanbaev’s deteriorating health.

Activists protesting nuclear power plant convicted

As previously covered, a group of activists faced criminal charges of allegedly preparing mass riots (Article 272, Part 1 of the Criminal Code) after peacefully opposing the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. According to the case materials, the charges were based on recorded conversations in which the activists discussed plans to hold a peaceful protest on the issue. Investigators construed these discussions as preparations for mass riots. Human rights defenders have deemed the charges politically motivated.

On 26th August 2025, a local court in Almaty found five activists – Aidar Mubarakov, Nurlan Zhauylbaev, Fazylzhan Sydykov, Nurlan Temirgaliev, and Zhanat Kazakhbai – guilty and sentenced each of them to four years of restricted freedom, a non-custodial sentence. The court also banned them from engaging in public or political activities for five years. Having spent more than ten months in pre-trial detention, the activists were released following the announcement of the verdict. In November 2025, an appeals court reduced their sentences to 2.5 years of restricted freedom, while upholding the ban on public and political engagement.

While the outcome of the trial was less severe than feared, as prosecutors had sought five-year prison terms, the convictions nevertheless caused alarm. In a joint communication to the government, six UN human rights mandate holders expressed serious concern over the criminal prosecution and sentencing of the five activists, noting that most hearings reportedly were conducted in a rushed manner, leaving the defendants little opportunity to present their views. The experts also raised concerns that detention conditions had not been adapted to the needs of three activists with chronic medical conditions and reduced mobility.

Activists protesting China’s repressive policies charged with “inciting discord”

Activists from the Atajurt movement, which advocates for the rights of victims of China’s repressive policies against ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region, faced criminal prosecution following a peaceful protest.

On 13th November 2025, police detained 19 activists affiliated with the Atajurt movement when they staged a peaceful protest near the Kazakhstan–China border in Almaty region to highlight the persecution of ethnic Kazakhs in China, demand the release of a co-activist and family member who was detained while travelling to China in the summer of 2025, and express concern about China’s growing political and economic influence in Kazakhstan. During the protest, activists burned three small Chinese flags and a portrait of the Chinese president and shouted slogans such as “Down with China!”, “Down with the Communist Party!”, and “Down with Xi Jinping!”. Video recordings of the protest were shared on social media. However, the protest remained peaceful throughout and did not include any calls for violence, hostility, or discrimination.

After being apprehended by police, 12 protesters were sentenced to between seven and 15 days of administrative detention, while others were fined under Article 434 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“petty hooliganism”). The following week, the authorities also initiated more serious charges against the activists under Article 174(2) of the Criminal Code, which criminalises “incitement” to ethnic, national, or other discord and carries penalties of up to ten years’ imprisonment. This development followed the issuance of a diplomatic note by the Chinese General Consulate in Almaty, raising concerns about the protest and requesting “appropriate measures” to address it.

Thirteen activists were remanded to custody, while six others – including a pregnant woman – were placed under house arrest. In December 2025, the investigation was finalised and the case referred to court, with the trial expected to start in late January 2026.

In a joint statement, IPHR and KIBHR expressed serious concerns about the case in the light of Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations and called for the dismissal of the case and the release of activists. The two organisations stressed that the criminal case forms part of a broader pattern of pressure against the Atajurt movement due to its advocacy on behalf of victims of China’s repressive policies and noted that the Criminal Code provision invoked has been repeatedly criticised by international experts for its overly broad wording, which allows for undue restrictions on fundamental freedoms when applied.

Human Rights Watch also called for dropping the charges against the activists and releasing them, noting that the case illustrated a trend in which the Kazakhstani government “has sacrificed respect for human rights in an apparent effort to maintain good relations with the Chinese government”. Amnesty International similarly called for quashing the charges, stressing that “peaceful protest is not a crime simply because it makes those in power uncomfortable – even when that discomfort extends to displeasing a powerful geopolitical player such as China.”

Satirical blogger and activist exposing child rights violations targeted in criminal cases on spreading “false” information

As previously reported, blogger Temirlan Ensebek was arrested in January 2025 and charged with “inciting discord” for sharing a controversial but widely available song on his satirical Instagram channel Qaznews24. In April 2025, he was sentenced to five years of restricted freedom and prohibited from publishing on social media, speaking to journalists, or taking part in public activities. Human rights defenders believe the song was used as a pretext to punish him for his satirical posts critical of Kazakhstani and Russian public figures.

In December 2025, Ensebek was summoned for questioning by police in relation to a new criminal case on knowingly spreading “false” information (Criminal Code Article 274) – another broadly worded provision frequently used against critical voices. He was informed that the case had been opened based on a complaint filed by an MP over material posted by Qaznews24, although it remained unclear what exact posts it concerned. Ensebek has not been posting on Qaznews24 since his previous prosecution and the channel stopped its activities in August 2025. According to Ensebek’s lawyer, he was questioned as a witness in the case, with the questions focusing on the activities of Qaznews24.

In another case, civic activist Ayazhan Mameshova faced similar charges of deliberately spreading “false” information following social media posts drawing attention to alleged violations of the rights of children at an orphanage in Almaty, including the unlawful appropriation of their property. She was placed under house arrest in September 2025 pending investigation of these charges. Her lawyers described the charges as completely unfounded, stressing that the allegations she raised were based on extensive documentation, including official reports and testimonies from children living at the orphanage, and that an audit conducted by a state commission overseeing orphanages had confirmed financial misconduct at the institution. As of late 2025, Mameshova remained under house arrest.

New criminal cases against opposition activists

During the reporting period, new cases of detentions and prosecutions of opposition activists were documented, in apparent retaliation for their criticism of the authorities and their peaceful civic engagement. These are two examples:

On 18th November 2025, police detained Amangeldy Jahin, a leading figure of the Alga Kazakhstan! opposition party, following a search of his home in Astana. He was reportedly charged with involvement in a banned extremist organisation and financing extremist activities (under Articles 405 and 258 of the Criminal Code), the same charges for which the party’s leader, Marat Zhylanbaev, is serving a seven-year prison sentence (see more on his case above). As of the beginning of 2026, Jahin remained in pre-trial detention pending further investigation. As previously covered, the Alga Kazakhstan! party has been denied registration more than 25 times on alleged technical grounds, and its activists face ongoing intimidation and harassment.

In December 2025, criminal proceedings were initiated against opposition activist Nurbol Onerkhan, based in Petropavlovsk, on charges of involvement in a banned organisation (under Article 405 of the Criminal Code). He was placed in pre-trial detention pending further investigation. Onerkhan has publicly criticised the authorities and expressed support for the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK), an opposition movement banned as “extremist”, as well as for its exile-based founder, Mukhtar Ablyazov. He had previously been prosecuted and convicted in 2020 under Article 405 for his alleged involvement in the DVK. At that time, he was sentenced to one year of restricted freedom, which was later converted to imprisonment, and was banned from engaging in public and political activities.

Karakalpak activist leaves Kazakhstan amid a continued threat of extradition to Uzbekistan

As previously reported, Uzbekistani authorities have sought the extradition of several Kazakhstan-based activists originating from Uzbekistan’s autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. Serious criminal charges were brought against them in apparent retaliation for their peaceful efforts to raise awareness about the situation in Karakalpakstan and to demand accountability for the Uzbekistani authorities’ forceful dispersal of mass protests there in July 2022.

One of these activists, Akylbek Muratov (also known as Muratbai), was released in February 2025 after spending one year in detention in Kazakhstan. While the Kazakhstani authorities ultimately refrained from extraditing him to Uzbekistan, they did not grant him asylum, thereby placing him at continued risk of forcible return to Uzbekistan, where he would face a serious risk of torture, unfair legal proceedings, and politically motivated imprisonment.

Because of these ongoing risks to his safety, in November 2025, Muratov left Kazakhstan and resettled in a third country. This was possible thanks to the efforts of KIBHR and other human rights organisations.

Women’s rights activist granted asylum abroad, her organisation forced to suspend its activities

As covered in the previous update, women’s rights activist Dinara Smailova (also known as Dina Tansari) was briefly detained in Montenegro in April 2025 following an extradition request by Kazakhstani authorities, which have brought multiple criminal charges against her in absentia. Both human rights defenders and UN experts have expressed serious concern about the charges against her, deeming them retribution for her work with survivors of domestic and sexual violence. In a welcome development, in June 2025 Smailova and her husband were granted international protection in Montenegro, and the Supreme Court subsequently rejected Kazakhstan’s extradition request.

However, illustrating the ongoing challenges facing Smailova and her colleagues, her organisation “Ne Molchi” announced in December 2025 that it had been forced to temporarily suspend its activities due to a lack of funds and an overburdened staff.

Wife of killed opposition journalist reports surveillance

As previously covered, there has been no meaningful progress in ensuring accountability for the July 2024 killing of Kazakhstani opposition journalist Aidos Sadykov in Kyiv. Kazakhstani authorities have failed to cooperate constructively with the investigation by Ukrainian prosecutors, who have identified two Kazakhstani citizens as suspected perpetrators.

Sadykov’s widow, Natalia Sadykova – also an opposition journalist – has repeatedly reported intimidation and surveillance. In a video posted on 13th November 2025 on the BASE YouTube channel that she runs, she described an incident in which she noticed a man covertly watching and filming her near her home in Kyiv. When confronted, the man claimed to live nearby and said he was on his way to work at the Kazakhstani embassy, denying that he knew her. Sadykova called for Ukrainian police, who reportedly later identified the man as an officer of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee operating in Ukraine under diplomatic cover. Sadykova stated that she considers the surveillance particularly threatening given the killing of her husband, and her lawyer warned that the monitoring of her movements could indicate preparations for an attack on her life. Sadykova has also been subjected to phishing attempts and online harassment.

Peaceful Assembly

Authorities continued to reject requests to hold peaceful protests on dubious grounds, such the proposed venue allegedly already being occupied, despite a Constitutional Court ruling from January 2025 stating that such requests should not be automatically denied and that suitable alternatives must be offered. At the same time, participants in occasional peaceful protests held without official approval faced detention and penalties. Preventive detentions of activists ahead of state holidays – when protests are feared – also persisted. This ongoing clampdown has further restricted the already limited space for exercising the right to peaceful assembly in the country, with any protests – as well as plans or discussions related to assemblies – viewed by the authorities as potential riots.

These are a few examples of cases when protest rights were violated during the reporting period:

• On 15th January 2026, three women gathered in front of the House of Ministries in Astana to draw attention to the cases of their children who had died under unclear circumstances and to demand fair investigations. They planned to submit a collective petition to the president at the House of Ministries, where such appeals are received. However, before they were able to do so, police intervened and detained them. They were all subsequently fined approximately €200 for allegedly violating assembly rules. Journalist Nurbol Kuralov from Ulysmedia.kz, who was present to cover the protest, was also apprehended without explanation, taken to a local police station, and held there for about an hour before being released. He reported being pressured to write an explanatory note and questioned about why he was present at the protest, who had invited him, and whether he had received payment. His phone was confiscated, and when it was returned, all photos and videos had been deleted.
• In another incident in mid-January 2026, Baghdat Toghyspaev was detained by police in Turkestan region after publishing photos of activists holding placards reading “Trump, pay attention to Kazakhstan.” The images were shared as part of a broader social media campaign in support of 19 Atajurt activists charged with “inciting national hatred” over their participation in a peaceful protest (see more under Association). Toghyspaev was subsequently sentenced to five days’ administrative arrest, officially due to an unpaid fine imposed for an earlier peaceful protest. Several other individuals who posted similar photos were reportedly summoned, threatened and asked to delete the posts by police.
• On 3rd December 2025, transgender activist Yara Tychina held an individual picket in Astana calling on the authorities to refrain from adopting draft legislation banning so-called LGBTQI+ “propaganda”, which was under parliamentary consideration at the time. Shortly after she began her picket she was detained by police and taken to a local police station. Later the same day she was released, but in mid-January 2026, a local court fined her the equivalent of approximately €215 for allegedly violating assembly rules.
• On 10th November 2025, a group of mothers whose sons had died while serving in the army — often as a result of hazing — held a protest outside the House of Ministries in Astana, where citizen appeals to the president are received. They called for fair, independent and transparent investigations into the deaths of their sons and accountability for those responsible. Police detained several protest participants, holding them until the evening before releasing them with warnings for allegedly violating the rules on organising assemblies. The following day, however, President Tokayev ordered the General Prosecutor’s Office to review the appeals of parents whose children have died in the army and to examine the lawfulness of the investigative measures taken.
• Ahead of Republic Day, marked on 25th October, exile-based government opponent Mukhtar Ablyazov called on his supporters to hold protests on this day against rising prices and taxes. To prevent protests, authorities detained dozens of activists across the country before the state holiday, issuing short-term arrests and fines for alleged violations, e.g. because of social media posts and reposts. The detentions were reportedly carried out using force in several cases, with those targeted including people with disabilities and the elderly.

• In the summer of 2025, Guldaria Sherizatkyzy and her daughter, Riza Alimnur, were repeatedly detained, fined, and warned by police for allegedly violating assembly regulations while organising public actions in Almaty. These actions sought to draw attention to the case of their husband and father, Alimnur Turganbai.

Turganbai, an ethnic Kazakh who left China’s Xinjiang region for Kazakhstan in 2017 and subsequently obtained Kazakhstani citizenship, was detained in July 2025 while travelling to China for work as a long-haul truck driver. As the family received no information about the grounds for his detention or his legal status, Sherizatkyzy and Alimnur sought support from the Kazakhstani authorities by staging peaceful actions near the Chinese Consulate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the city administration in Almaty.

In November 2025, Sherizatkyzy and 18 other activists from the Atajurt movement were detained while holding a peaceful protest near the border with China to demand Turganbai’s release and to express broader concerns about Chinese government policies. To amplify their message, the activists burned Chinese flags and a portrait of the Chinese leader. The activists were initially fined and sentenced to short-term detention on charges of “petty hooliganism”, but later faced criminal charges of allegedly “inciting national discord” (see further under Association).