INTRODUCTION
This report, which covers developments affecting the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Tajikistan for the period from March 2025 to October 2026 was prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.
Between March 2025 and October 2026, the human rights situation in Tajikistan continued to deteriorate, with mounting restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society organisations and government critics faced persistent legal and administrative pressure, intimidation and prosecution, while accountability for serious past violations remained largely absent.
Freedom of expression and media freedom remained severely constrained.
A September 2026 report by IPHR describes a climate of deepening repression in Tajikistan, where speaking openly about human rights abuses risks harassment and reprisals and politically motivated imprisonment, which has driven human rights work increasingly into silence. Independent media and civic actors face increasing political, legal, and administrative pressures. Fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and access to information, are increasingly restricted. Recent public statements by government representatives justified closures of media outlets on the grounds of them allegedly overstepping the “boundaries of democracy”. Tajikistan ranked among the ten countries with the highest numbers of imprisoned journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2026 report, and fell to 155th place in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. Although criminal liability for social media “likes” was abolished in May 2025, uncertainty persists over the impact on existing convictions, and online activity continues to carry risks of administrative or criminal punishment. The July 2026 release of several imprisoned journalists and a blogger under an amnesty law was a positive development, but their convictions remain in place, highlighting the absence of justice and accountability for politically motivated prosecutions. The closure of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Dushanbe office in August 2026 further reduced the presence of independent media in the country.
Freedom of association and civil society space continued to shrink. Over 80 civil society organisations ceased operations in 2025, while burdensome reporting requirements, unpredictable registration procedures, intrusive inspections and pressure from state agencies undermined the ability of organisations to operate independently. Proposed legislative changes, including amendments to the Law on Public Associations and a draft Law on Non-Commercial Organisations, risk imposing further restrictions. Increased registration fees have also created additional financial barriers, particularly for smaller and regional organisations. Human rights defenders reported threats, intimidation and reprisals against themselves and their families, contributing to widespread self-censorship and a climate of fear.
Transnational repression is a serious concern. A September 2026 agreement among the prosecutors general of six countries, including Tajikistan, to strengthen cooperation against terrorism and extremism raised questions about safeguards against the misuse of cross-border law-enforcement cooperation to target political opponents and government critics abroad. The European Parliament had identified Tajikistan as being among the ten countries responsible for nearly 80% of documented cases of transnational repression worldwide.
Freedom of peaceful assembly and accountability for past violations remained deeply problematic. Authorities imposed strict restrictions on public gatherings, while participants in unauthorised or dispersed events risked detention, fines and other penalties. No meaningful progress was reported towards a thorough and independent investigation into serious human rights violations committed during the violent suppression of protests in GBAO in 2021–2022, when at least 40 civilians were reportedly killed. The UN Committee against Torture expressed concern about the lack of investigations and ongoing impunity.
International scrutiny and accountability faced significant challenges. In July 2026, the UN Human Rights Council discontinued its confidential Complaint Procedure review of Tajikistan after taking note of measures and commitments presented by the government. Tajikistan’s parliament considered a draft resolution on withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in September 2026. The implications remain unclear, and Tajikistan continues to be listed as a State Party to the Rome Statute.
Overall, the developments documented during the reporting period point to a sustained pattern of repression and shrinking civic space, compounded by weak domestic accountability and limited transparency around international commitments. While releases under amnesty offered some relief to individuals imprisoned for their work or expression, they did not remedy the underlying injustices. Meaningful progress requires the immediate and unconditional release of those arbitrarily detained, the quashing of politically motivated convictions, independent investigations into serious violations, protection for civil society and independent media, and sustained international scrutiny of the government’s compliance with its human rights obligations.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
UN Human Rights Council discontinues confidential review of Tajikistan
In July 2026, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) discontinued its consideration of the situation in Tajikistan under its confidential Complaint Procedure, raising concerns about transparency and accountability. The UN HRC Complaint Procedure is a confidential mechanism designed to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested human rights violations anywhere in the world.
The Council took note of the “measures and commitments” presented by the Tajikistani government and requested it to provide Member States with updated information on their implementation by the Council’s 63rd session, in accordance with the confidentiality of the procedure. However, neither the commitments nor the substantive outcome of the process have been made public, leaving victims and civil society unable to assess the basis for the decision or whether it will lead to meaningful improvements. These concerns were the focus of a side event held on 24th September 2026 during the Council’s 63rd session, organised by CIVICUS together with Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, IPHR, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. Speakers emphasised that discontinuing the complaint procedure should not bring international scrutiny to an end, particularly amid continuing repression of human rights defenders, journalists and activists, and the lack of accountability for serious violations during the 2021–2022 crackdown in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). They called for sustained international engagement and accountability based on the assessment of Tajikistan’s international commitments against tangible human rights developments on the ground.
Tajikistan’s Potential Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC)
On 16th September 2026, Tajikistan’s lower house of parliament considered a draft resolution on withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC), although the authorities provided no public explanation for the move or details of the decision-making process. The domestic steps required for withdrawal remain unclear, and Tajikistan continues to be listed as a State Party to the Rome Statute. The move follows tensions over Tajikistan’s refusal to execute the ICC arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who visited the country in October 2025. In March 2026, the ICC rejected Tajikistan’s arguments for not executing the warrant, and in May referred the country’s non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties. If confirmed, withdrawal would mark a significant shift in Tajikistan’s international legal commitments.
EXPRESSION
Persecution of human rights defenders
A September 2026 report by IPHR examining the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Tajikistan - based on interviews with HRDs on the ground - states that many human rights concerns that were confidently and publicly discussed in previous years are off-limits today and anyone who speaks out about them risks imprisonment, harassment, intimidation and reprisals against themselves and members of their families. Human rights defenders in today’s Tajikistan have seen many cases of fellow activists, journalists and lawyers being imprisoned for peacefully carrying out their work and exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly. Lawyer Buzurgmehr Yorov, human rights defender Manuchehr Kholiqnazarov, journalists Rukhshona Khakimova, Daler Imomali and others are currently serving lengthy prison terms on politically motivated charges. Many have received threats from officials of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) to harm them or their children unless they stop working on certain topics or tone down their activism, or they are aware of such threats having been made to their colleagues. One HRD told IPHR: “A decade ago, we were not afraid to speak out – we used the language of human rights, we criticised, we advocated. Today, that space is gone. We still continue our work, but in silence, choosing every word with care.”
Media freedom and harassment of journalists
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) 2026 report, Tajikistan now figures in the world’s top ten countries with the highest number of imprisoned journalists.
Tajikistan was also ranked 155th in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index, dropping two places since last year. The country is among the states with the most restrictive conditions for journalists and independent media in the region.
The cancellation of the second international conference of women journalists and bloggers of Central Asia, convened in early May 2025 for World Press Freedom Day, in the presence of European diplomats, illustrates the precarious and volatile situation of human rights activism and independent journalism in Tajikistan. The conference was abruptly broken up as hotel staff forced participants out of the venue while Ambassadors of the European Union (EU), Germany, France and the United Kingdom were delivering their opening remarks. According to reliable sources, the conference was aborted following pressure from security services on the hotel management. Members of the Coalition of Women Journalists in Tajikistan reported being followed and targeted by attempted hacks following the event, reinforcing a climate of fear amid persecution of media actors.
Independent media in Tajikistan continue to face a shrinking operating space, with the number of independent newspapers declining and fewer than ten remaining actively operational, according to the report. Several publications have ceased publishing after being unable to renew their registration, while others have struggled to register. In January 2026, government representatives defended the closure of media outlets on the grounds that they had allegedly crossed the “boundaries of democracy”. At a press conference held by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Culture in January 2026, officials explicitly outlined these boundaries and justified the closure of media outlets for exceeding them. Deputy Minister Davlat Safar noted that some outlets had previously “ceased operations for going beyond the limits of freedom of speech.” Media experts have also criticised the requirement to obtain certificates from the State Committee for National Security during registration, arguing that it lacks a legal basis and creates additional barriers for independent media.
Continued criminalisation of online expression
In May 2025 Tajikistan removed criminal liability for social media “likes”. On 2nd May 2025, Radio Liberty reported Deputy Prosecutor General Umed Karimzoda as saying that over 1500 individuals were currently serving prison sentences for “likes” or comments on social media. During a press conference on 7th August 2025, senior judicial officials clarified that while cases involving only “likes” and reposts could, in theory, be reconsidered under current legislation, most cases involving social media activity also include other charges, meaning that past convictions are unlikely to be overturned. For example, in February 2025, journalist and editor of the regional newspaper “Paik” Ahmad Ibrohim was convicted under Article 307(1) for extremist-related social media activity and was additionally charged with bribery under Article 320 of the Criminal Code, which prevents his case from being reconsidered.
On 12th February 2026, the Chair of the Supreme Court, Rustam Mirzozoda, stated at a press conference that in 2025 not a single request for the review of such cases had been submitted to the courts. The following day, General Prosecutor Habibullo Vokhidzoda was reported by media as announcing at a press conference that 405 individuals had been released from criminal liability in 2025 for “liking” online content deemed to be extremist or terrorist.
Even though criminal liability for social media likes was abolished, authorities continued to prosecute "likes" and reposts as administrative offences. For example, on 11 September 2025, Murghab District Court fined Farhod Bekov, a 47-year-old resident of the district, 5250 Tajik Somoni (the equivalent of approx. 470 EUR) for “liking” a post on the Facebook page “Pamir Inside”. The court found him guilty of the administrative offence of “participation in the activities of public or religious associations and organisations not registered in Tajikistan or whose activities are prohibited”.
It remains unclear whether these 405 individuals were persons whose cases were still under consideration at the time, or those who had already been convicted and were serving sentences. At the same time, officials have warned that forms of online engagement with organisations banned in Tajikistan, other than liking or reposting their content, may still be treated as illegal activity and prosecuted under criminal law. Authorities maintain extensive lists of banned organisations. In May 2024, the Supreme Court published a list of 29 organisations, movements, and groups designated as terrorist or extremist and prohibited in Tajikistan. These include Pamir Daily News (Pamir Inside), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Group 24 and New Tajikistan-2. A similar list of prohibited organisations is available on the website of the National Bank of Tajikistan.
In its Concluding Observations adopted in April 2026, the UN Committee against Torture raised concern “about the reported misuse of criminal law, especially the application of national security-related charges and broadly worded terrorism-related provisions under articles 179 and 180 of the Criminal Code, to suppress dissenting or critical expression.”
Amnesty without justice
In a positive development, in July 2026, independent journalists Zavqibek Saidamini and Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda and blogger Mamadsulton Mavlonazarov were released from prison following the application of an amnesty law adopted in June 2026.
As reported in previous Civicus Monitor entries, Saidamini and Pirmuhammadzoda were sentenced to seven years of imprisonment in 2022 on charges related to their alleged participation in a banned organisation. Their convictions were widely criticised by civil society and international organisations as politically motivated and part of a broader pattern of increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom in Tajikistan. Both journalists had spoken out openly against the imprisonment of their colleagues, journalists Abdullo Gurbati and Daler Imomali in June 2022, whose sentences were reportedly also reduced under the amnesty law. According to relatives, Abdullo Gurbati is expected to be released later in autumn 2026, while Daler Emomali is expected to be released in 2027 under the amnesty.
Mavlonazarov, a blogger, retired journalist and ex-security officer, was sentenced to seven years in prison in September 2022. He was found guilty of “insulting a representative of the authorities in the media or on the internet” (Article 330, part 2 of the Criminal Code), and of “publicly calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order through the media or the internet” (Article 307, part 2). Mavlonazarov denied the charges, insisting that his Facebook posts were truthful and not offensive. He had repeatedly spoken out against the authorities’ response to mass protests in GBAO, and many human rights defenders consider his prosecution to constitute retaliation for his critical views.
While IPHR welcomed the releases under amnesty, they stated that a presidential amnesty is no substitute for justice and accountability for years of arbitrary detention on politically motivated grounds. They further noted that the presidential amnesty stipulates that the politically-motivated convictions stand, fails to fully exonerate the individuals targeted for exercising their fundamental rights and carrying out peaceful journalistic or human rights work, and allows the authorities to portray these measures as acts of leniency without addressing the problematic laws and practices that enabled the repression in the first place, concluding that “True justice requires not only the release of those unjustly detained, but also the quashing of politically motivated convictions, meaningful remedies for victims, and an end to the repressive legal framework used to silence dissent.”
A human rights defender told IPHR after the July releases: “Of course, we are happy about the recent releases, and we welcome the fact that these journalists are finally free. But this does not change the situation at all. Something more fundamental needs to change. We cannot keep waiting for an amnesty law to release people who should never have been in prison in the first place. What is needed is real, lasting change that ensures people are not imprisoned for doing their jobs in the first place.” Another human rights activist stated: “A release under amnesty does nothing to restore justice. These journalists are free, but they cannot properly return to work. They now have criminal records and are stigmatised, and employers may be afraid to hire them because they could get into trouble for employing them.”
Radio Ozodi closed
According to media reports, the Dushanbe office of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), (known as Radio Ozodi in Tajikistan), ceased its operations on 17 August 2026. RFE/RL confirmed the closure to Asia-Plus, describing it as part of organisational restructuring, while stating that it would continue reporting for audiences in Tajikistan from its Prague headquarters and maintain its network of journalists in the country.
Media experts and human rights defenders have expressed concerns that the termination of the local RFE/RL office limits access to independent information, freedom of expression and public-interest reporting in Tajikistan. Radio Ozodi has operated in the country for decades and was an important source of independent reporting on politically and socially sensitive issues that receive limited or no coverage in other independent or state-controlled media. Media experts such as Nouriddin Qarshiboyev, head of the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan (NANSMIT), highlighted RFE/RL’s role as a source of independent information and its contribution to professional journalism, including by providing experience to young journalists and reporting on sensitive issues.
The closure also needs to be considered against the broader pattern of pressure faced by Radio Ozodi and other independent media in Tajikistan. Its journalists have faced sustained pressure over the years, including difficulties obtaining and renewing accreditation, questioning by state bodies, and other forms of interference with their work. Journalists from other independent media outlets faced similar difficulties with accreditation, including during the March 2025 parliamentary elections. The restrictions observed during the parliamentary elections raise legitimate concerns about the conditions under which the 2027 presidential election will be conducted, particularly with respect to independent media access, transparency and public scrutiny of the electoral process.
Continued reprisals against Rukhshona Khakimova
In August 2025, a Supreme Court representative confirmed that imprisoned journalist Rukhshona Khakimova’s bank savings had been confiscated by the state. Khakimova was sentenced to eight years in prison after being found guilty of high treason in February 2025 (see 2025 CIVICUS Monitor People Power Under Attack 2025 report) after she investigated Chinese influence in Tajikistan and interviewed former highly placed officials convicted of plotting a coup in 2025. The confiscation of her personal savings in August 2025 represents an escalation of punitive actions against her and may be seen as a means of further economic and psychological pressure. In August 2026, Rukhshona Hakimova’s prison sentence was reduced by three years under Tajikistan’s recent amnesty law, although she remains imprisoned. Numerous international organisations and human rights experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, have called for her release.
Officials in GBAO hold seminar calling for pre-approval of journalistic publications
On 2nd October 2026, a seminar for media representatives was held in Khorog, where officials from Tajikistan’s Main Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets reportedly called for media materials to be reviewed before publication, particularly those concerning military facilities. According to the regional newspaper Badakhshon, officials said that institutions and their press services should submit materials for prior review and emphasised compliance with the Law on State Secrets. The reported requirement raises concerns about editorial independence, particularly in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), where independent journalism is highly restricted. The article does not provide information about the legal basis or scope of the proposed review, whether it applies to all media outlets, or whether it is limited to classified information.
ASSOCIATION
The operating space for civil society in Tajikistan has continued to shrink over the past year. CSOs are subject to burdensome oversight and reporting obligations, including those related to foreign funding, against a backdrop of official rhetoric that increasingly casts civic actors as potential threats rather than legitimate participants in public life.
The ability of CSOs to effectively serve their communities and uphold fundamental rights is increasingly under threat. According to official information, more than 80 organisations ceased operations in 2025 alone, with government pressure, alongside funding difficulties, contributing significantly to this decline. Seven organisations were dissolved by court order, prompting concerns about inadequate procedural safeguards and the disproportionate use of dissolution in response to alleged regulatory violations.
The registration process for CSOs also remains highly unpredictable, with applications frequently delayed or rejected on arbitrary grounds: According to the Ministry of Justice, in the first six months of 2025 138 applications for the registration of new associations and for the accreditation of branches and representative offices were received, compared to 158 applications in the same period in 2024. Of these, 29 applications were rejected on the grounds of alleged non-compliance with national legislation, including provisions of the “Law on Public Associations”. Authorities have also arbitrarily rejected or delayed applications for the registration of new CSOs, particularly in GBAO. CSOs report that the registration process is unpredictable, inconsistent, and vulnerable to political influence, creating a chilling effect on civil society initiatives. According to the Ministry of Justice, as of July 2026, there are currently 1,700 public associations registered in the country.
Intrusive monitoring by state authorities is a persistent feature of the operating environment. CSOs, especially those working on issues considered politically or socially sensitive, such as human rights, governance, gender equality, or minority rights, are frequently subjected to intimidation through additional tax inspections, fire safety checks, and other forms of administrative scrutiny. These measures are often disproportionate and selective, contributing to a chilling effect on civil society activity. In practice, there are few effective safeguards to protect CSOs from arbitrary or excessive interference by state bodies.
Evidence from a confidential 2025 confidential study cited by IPHR in its report illustrates the scale and frequency of such interference. According to the study, which surveyed over 50 organisations, CSOs in Tajikistan are regularly subjected to inspections by multiple state institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Tax Committee, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Approximately 65 percent of respondents reported that their organisation had undergone at least one inspection. Nearly half cited inspections by the Ministry of Justice, while 42 percent reported checks by tax authorities. In many cases, inspections were carried out by several agencies simultaneously and were broad in scope, placing considerable administrative and financial strain on organisations.
The study also found that 21 CSOs experienced repeated inspections, suggesting a pattern of sustained pressure rather than routine oversight. Fifteen percent of respondents reported being fined for “formal violations”, most commonly related to accounting or reporting requirements. Notably, eight percent of organisations stated that they never received official inspection results, leaving them in a state of prolonged legal uncertainty and increasing their vulnerability to future sanctions. This lack of transparency further undermines any meaningful protection against interference.
In addition to existing pressures, several recent and proposed legislative initiatives threaten to further shrink civic space. In July 2026, President Emomali Rahmon called for tighter oversight and greater financial transparency of CSOs. Draft amendments to the Law on Public Associations were subsequently considered by Parliament in September but have not been made public, raising concerns about their potential impact on civil society. A Draft Law on Non-Commercial Organisations is still in development as of October 2026 (see previous CIVICUS Monitor update), which seeks to regulate non-commercial organisations other than public associations under one unified framework. Under the current proposal, this would require organisations registered as public foundations to liquidate and re-register, creating a significant risk of selective refusals and could lead to the closure of established organisations, particularly those engaged in human rights work. The last version of the draft law was made publicly available in 2018. Although selected CSO representatives were invited to participate in discussions about the draft law with government officials in August 2025, they were not given access to the draft text, and it remains unclear whether their input will be included. The overall process has also been marked by a lack of transparency, including limited public access to draft texts and insufficient clarity regarding decision-making and review procedures.
Further restrictions on CSO activities were proposed in May 2025, when the government submitted draft legislation to parliament to significantly increase state registration fees for non-commercial entities. As of 1st October 2025, registration fees for political parties were increased from 3,750 to 7,500 Somoni (approximately 750 USD). Fees for registering international organisations or their representative offices increased from 7,500 to 15,000 Somoni (approximately 1,500 USD), while registration costs for public associations were also doubled. These increases create additional financial barriers to entry and sustainability, particularly for smaller or regional CSOs, and further undermine the enabling environment for civil society.
Many CSOs reported to IPHR that they are subjected to various forms of pressure by government agencies. These interactions can take the form of seemingly informal phone calls framed as “normal conversations,” yet containing intimidating elements, such as references to personal details or family members (including children), signalling close surveillance. In other cases, CSO representatives are formally summoned by security services for interrogations, during which they are questioned about their activities and accused of “speaking negatively about the country.” Importantly, these practices affect a broad range of civil society actors, including CSOs working in so-called “non-sensitive” fields, such as the social sector. Such measures contribute to self-censorship, intimidation, and the creation of a wider climate of fear, significantly constraining independent civil society activity.
In April 2026, the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) called on the Tajikistani authorities to: “take all necessary measures to ensure that human rights defenders, minority and civic activists, lawyers, and journalists are able to carry out their legitimate work in a safe and enabling environment, free from intimidation, threats, harassment, arbitrary criminal prosecution or conviction, and other forms of retaliation against them or their families.”
Transnational Repression
On 30th September 2026, the Prosecutors General of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement in Kazan to strengthen cooperation against terrorism and extremism, which provided for exchanging information about individuals and organisations considered extremist or terrorist, their international links, potential threats and foreign fighters. However, the agreement’s broad scope raises concerns about how participating states verify information provided by one another and prevent politically motivated cases from being used to target government critics abroad.
Tajikistan has repeatedly faced allegations of using terrorism- and extremism-related charges against opposition figures and government critics. The new agreement heightens concerns that cross-border law-enforcement cooperation could facilitate further persecution of government critics unless safeguards are in place. Official statistics on wanted persons do not clarify how many are political opponents or human rights defenders, making independent scrutiny and reliable verification of shared information essential. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, more than 6,700 people were listed as wanted in 2025. Of these, over 2,600 people were detained, while 835 were forcibly returned to Tajikistan with assistance from foreign law enforcement agencies.
These concerns are particularly relevant given Tajikistan’s documented record of transnational repression. In its November 2025 resolution on transnational repression of human rights defenders, the European Parliament identified Tajikistan among the ten countries responsible for nearly 80% of documented cases worldwide.
A recent case of TNR involves Tajikistani opposition activist Asadullo Boboev, who was reportedly sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment following his forcible return from Germany in June 2026. Boboev was convicted of three criminal offences, including Article 307 of the Criminal Code (“public calls for violent change of the constitutional order”) in, what many observers believe, to be retaliation for his peaceful exercise of freedom of expression criticizing the Tajikistani government online.
German authorities deported Boboev and his son despite documented evidence submitted by legal counsel demonstrating a clear, real risk of persecution, arbitrary detention, and torture or ill-treatment upon return. Upon arrival in Dushanbe, Boboev was immediately taken into custody by the State Committee for National Security (SCNS). Human rights defenders report that he was subjected to incommunicado detention—denied access to an independent lawyer and family visits for over two months—and faced credible allegations of physical abuse during the deportation flight.
Boboev is reportedly the fourth Tajikistani opposition activist deported from Germany since 2023 to face immediate detention and prosecution upon return. His case exemplifies a systemic pattern of transnational repression in which Tajikistani authorities weaponise broadly worded national security and extremism laws, alongside extradition frameworks and Interpol mechanisms, to target dissidents abroad. The case also underscores grave non-compliance by German authorities with their absolute obligation of non-refoulement under international human rights law, which strictly prohibits the return of any individual to a territory where they face a real risk of torture, ill-treatment, or egregious human rights violations.
ASSEMBLY
Freedom of peaceful assembly remains severely restricted in Tajikistan, with gatherings perceived as critical of government policies rarely permitted, and participants at unauthorised or dispersed events facing detention, fines or other penalties. Although Article 29 of the Constitution of Tajikistan guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, legislation regulating meetings, demonstrations and marches imposes strict requirements, including 15 days’ advance notification, extensive restrictions on locations, and no provisions allowing spontaneous assemblies or counter-protests.
Accountability is still absent for past human rights violations committed by authorities during the violent suppression of peaceful protests in Khorog, the capital of GBAO, in 2021 and 2022. The four year anniversary of the events occurred on 16th May 2026, but there has been no progress on organising a thorough, independent investigation into the serious human rights violations committed when authorities suppressed mass protests leading to the reported killing of at least 40 civilians. In the wake of the events in Khorog, many civil society activists, journalists and others who publicly criticised the use of unnecessary force by law enforcement officials were caught up in the ensuing clampdown, including members of a joint committee composed of government and civil society representatives established to investigate the events.
In its 2026 concluding observations on Tajikistan, the UN CAT stated that it “remains concerned about the lack of investigations and prosecutions in [connection with the GBAO events], a very small number of adjudicated cases and the low amounts of compensation awarded, particularly in light of the high number of [reported deaths, injuries and arbitrary detentions].” The Committee also took note of two reported cases from GBAO in which domestic courts awarded compensation for damages resulting from torture. However, no information on these cases is available.