A growing climate of fear and self-censorship – new assaults on independent media, civil society and online activism

This update covers the protection of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Kyrgyzstan from the beginning of May to the beginning of October 2024. It has been prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor based on monitoring conducted together with local partners.

During the reporting period, the government moved forward with enforcing the "foreign agent"-style NGO law, adopted in spring 2024 despite widespread criticism from civil society, international human rights bodies, and the international community. Under the new Russia-inspired law, foreign-funded organisations involved in broadly defined “political activities” must register as “foreign representatives,” subjecting them to stigmatising public labelling and intrusive state oversight. NGOs that fail to comply risk suspension or closure. Implementing rules gave NGOs until November 2024 to register. By early October, only a few NGOs had done so, while others shut down or curtailed activities to avoid the law’s potential implications. The law has fostered a growing climate of fear and self-censorship among NGOs, and there are serious concerns that authorities will use it to suppress legitimate civil society activities. In a legal opinion adopted in early October 2024, the Venice Commission echoed these concerns, warning that the implementation of the law risks stigmatising, silencing, and ultimately eliminating NGOs receiving foreign funding, especially those critical of the government. In addition, a second restrictive NGO law remains under review.

The authorities continued their crackdown on independent outlets and journalists critical of the authorities. In a highly publicised case, 11 current and former journalists from Temirov Live, known for exposing high-level corruption, went on trial in June 2024. Arrested during raids in January 2024, they were accused of calling for riots and organising such calls - charges widely condemned by human rights groups as politically motivated. In early October 2024, Makhabat Tazhikbek kyzy - the director of Temirov Live - and Azamat Ishenbekov were sentenced to prison, while two others received probational sentences. Seven defendants were acquitted. Despite the acquittals, the convictions - particularly of the imprisoned journalists - were a serious assault on investigative journalism. In addition, Temirov Live’s founder, Bolot Temirov, remains in exile, having been unlawfully deprived of his citizenship and expelled from the country in 2022.

Other media outlets and journalists also faced pressure. In July 2024, the Supreme Court confirmed the closure of the organisation behind the award-winning Kloop news portal, in clear retaliation for its critical reporting. This marked another significant blow to independent journalism. Despite the liquidation decision, Kloop vowed to continue its work through alternative platforms.

Authorities continued prosecuting bloggers and activists for social media posts critical of the authorities, using vaguely worded Criminal Code provisions. These include provisions penalising calls for “disobedience” and unrest – the same charge used against the Temirov Live journalists - as well as “incitement” to hatred.

Writer Olzhobay Shakir and blogger Zarina Torokulova were both sentenced to five years in prison for “provocative” posts. Shakir’s sentence was later reduced to probation in October 2024, resulting in his release after more than a year behind bars. Musician-poet Askat Zhetigen, prosecuted after harshly criticising President Japarov on Facebook, received a three-year prison sentence. Human rights activist Ondurush Toktonasyrov was fined for posts allegedly inciting hatred, while former Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) correspondent Bayan Jumagulova went on trial in September 2024 on similar charges. Activist Kanykei Aranova received a three-year sentence for government-critical posts believed to be from a fake account created in her name. Blogger-activist Aftandil Jorobekov, who was accused of calling for “disobedience” and unrest after opposing a controversial government initiative to change the country’s flag, remained under investigation. In yet another case, whistleblower Zhoomart Karabaev was prosecuted after exposing the use of expert reviews dictated by security services in court cases against government critics. His trial began in early October 2024. All these cases were part of an alarming trend of using criminal law to stifle dissent.

In June 2024 a verdict was issued in the high-profile Kempir-Abad case, involving over two dozen activists, bloggers, and political figures charged with instigating unrest after peacefully opposing a government-negotiated border deal with Uzbekistan. Following a closed-door trial marred by due process violations, all 22 defendants were unexpectedly acquitted. As a result, they were all released – some after spending more than 19 months in deplorable pre-trial conditions. This decision was welcomed by human rights groups and representatives of the international community. However, prosecutors appealed the ruling after President Japarov publicly suggested that the defendants deserved punishment, with the appeal pending as of early October 2024. Additionally, four people prosecuted in the Kempir-Abad case are being tried separately.

There were ongoing concerns about misuse of the 2021 law on the protection against “false” information to block critical online media resources, further heightened by the creation of a new body to systematically monitor the internet for “provocative” and “incorrect” information. In September 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Information threatened to block the Novye Litsa news site unless it removed an article about alleged ties between President Japarov’s 2021 election campaign and the late Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. The ministry also warned the Kyrgyz RFE/RL service, Radio Azattyk for covering the story, raising further concerns about the abuse of this law to shield high-ranking officials from public scrutiny.

Draft amendments submitted to Parliament in August 2024 could result in new restrictions on free speech by allowing the Ministry of Culture and Information to fine media outlets and individuals for disseminating “defamatory” and “false” online content. NGOs and international experts warned that these changes could lead to increased self-censorship and have a chilling effect on public debate. As of early October 2024, the amendments remained under consideration in Parliament.

A working group set up to revise the draft media law, which had been withdrawn from Parliament in March 2024 due to widespread criticism, presented a new version in June. The revised version addressed key concerns and was generally seen as an acceptable compromise by media representatives, despite some remaining concerns. However, as of the beginning of October 2024, the revised version had not yet been submitted to Parliament.

Human rights defenders raised concerns about court decisions restricting the right to assembly, in violation of national and international law. A court-sanctioned blanket ban on protests in central Bishkek, first introduced in spring 2022, remained in force until the end of September 2024, making it the longest such ban to date. Local activists, who planned to protest the decline of eco-friendly trolleybus transportation in the capital, attempted to challenge the ban in court in July 2024. However, their appeal was rejected on the grounds that the appeal deadline had expired and could not be reinstated. The Supreme Court upheld this decision. In the same month, similar blanket restrictions were imposed in central Osh.

These issues are covered in more detail below.

Association

Deadline set for NGOs to register under ‘’foreign agent’’ law

As covered in the previous update, a “foreign agent”-style NGO law was passed by parliament in March 2024 and thereafter quickly signed by President Japarov, despite widespread criticism by civil society, international human rights bodies, and representatives of the international community.

IPHR and partners stressed that, while purportedly aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability of foreign-funded groups, the law’s true intent appears to be to stifle scrutiny, discussion, and criticism of those in power. It draws heavily on similar Russian legislation, which has been systematically used to discredit, harass and silence NGOs in the past decade. Proponents of the law used negative and hostile language toward NGOs, baselessly accusing them of undermining national security and promoting values that are allegedly foreign to the national mentality and traditions of Kyrgyzstan.

In accordance with the new law, foreign-funded organisations are mandated to register under the stigmatising label of “foreign representatives” if they engage in “political activities” - a term that is broadly defined as influencing decision-making, policies or public opinion and effectively can be interpreted to encompass core civil society activities. NGOs registered as “foreign representatives” will be included in a public registry and forced to use this negative label in public materials. Groups that fail to register risk harsh sanctions: following a written warning, their activities can be suspended for up to six months without court approval and subsequently they can be closed down by court order. The law also grants authorities extensive powers to oversee NGOs’ compliance with their obligations under national law, as well as their own statutes, including by accessing their internal documents, attending their events, and conducting inspections.

The Ministry of Justice will have primary responsibility for the implementation of the new law. However, separate implementing rules, approved by the Ministry of Justice in May 2024, allowed the Ministry to also engage the tax service, prosecutor’s offices and other state bodies in the oversight and control of NGOs. In addition, these rules required NGOs to provide the names of all staff members when registering as “foreign representatives”. The Ministry announced that NGOs were required to register under the “foreign representative” law within two months of the adoption of these rules.

However, in August 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a new decree on the implementation of the “foreign representative” law, which set the deadline for registration as two months from the official publication of this decree. This means that the new deadline expires on 9th November 2024.

Thus, groups that receive foreign funding and conduct activities which can potentially be interpreted as ‘’political’’ now face the difficult decision of whether to register as ‘’foreign representatives’’ and submit to stigmatising and excessive state control, refuse to do so and risk harsh sanctions, or pre-emptively close down their operations. As of early October 2024, only three organisations had voluntarily registered as ‘’foreign representatives’’ and been included in the public register created for this purpose. Other NGOs had initiated self-liquidation procedures or limited their activities to avoid the potential implications of the law. NGO representatives have also taken legal action to challenge the law and its implementing regulations, but without success to date.  

There are concerns that the government might intensify efforts to enforce the law after the expiration of the new registration deadline. This could lead to increased pressure, particularly on groups working on human rights and other issues sensitive to the authorities, although government representatives have claimed that there “will be no persecution.”

In a legal opinion adopted in early October 2024, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission expressed similar concerns. The Commission concluded that the law on “foreign representatives” fails to meet the requirements set out by Kyrgyzstan's Constitution and international treaties for permissible restrictions on the operation of associations, including the principles of legality, legitimacy, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. It also stressed that the implementation of the law poses a “real risk of stigmatising, silencing and eventually eliminating” NGOs that receive foreign funding, in particular those critical of the government. According to the Commission, this risk is reinforced by the lack of adequate legal recourse for affected organisations. For these reasons, the Commission found that the law deals “a severe blow” to human rights and the rule of law in the country. It called for repealing the “foreign representative” amendments and revising the Law on Non-commercial Organisations to align with international human rights standards and create a supportive environment for civil society.

Due to the adoption and enforcement of the “foreign representatives” law and other alarming developments, Kyrgyzstan was added to the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist in March 2024 for its dramatic decline in civic freedoms. In July, it remained on the Watchlist for a second period.

Another NGO law is also currently in the pipeline in Kyrgyzstan. This draft law, initially set in motion by the presidential administration in autumn 2022, remains under review within a government-led working group. The timeline for the review has been repeatedly extended, most recently to 1st November 2024. In May 2024, a lawyer-member of the working group told the media that a “completely new concept” was being prepared. However, civil society members of the working group have previously expressed concerns that their recommendations have not been adequately considered in the revision process, and there are concerns that the draft law may be re-introduced, still featuring highly restrictive provisions governing the registration, operation and oversight of NGOs working in the country.

Expression

Highly publicised trial results in convictions of investigative journalists reporting on corruption

As covered in the previous update, in January 2024, law enforcement authorities raided the offices of the 24.kg news agency and the Temirov Live investigative group and detained journalists associated with these outlets. The 24.kg journalists were released after questioning, but the office remained sealed for over two months due to allegations of ‘war propaganda’ related to its coverage of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Eleven current and former Temirov Live journalists arrested during the raids were charged with calling for riots under a vaguely worded provision of the Criminal Code (article 278, part 3), which has been increasingly misused against government critics (see more below). The arrests were linked to video reports published by Temirov Live, known for its exposés into high-level corruption, as well as its sister project Ait Ait Dese.

Those arrested include Sapar Akunbekov, Tynystan Asypbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva, Joodar Buzumov, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov, Akyl Orozbekov, Saypidin Sultanaliev, Makhabat Tazhikbek kyzy, Maksat Tazhibek uulu and Jumabek Turdaliev.

Initially all of the arrested journalists were held in pre-trial detention; later six were moved to house arrest and one released with a travel ban. However, four (Beishekeyeva, Ishenbekov, Kaparov and Tazhibek kyzy) remained in custody throughout the court hearings, which began in June 2024. When the trial entered its final stage in late September 2024, prosecutors requested six-year prison sentences for all the defendants.

In a joint statement issued on the eve of the trial’s final day, 11 human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Article 19, Civil Rights Defenders, Frontline Defenders, IPHR, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and others called for the dismissal of the charges against the 11 journalists. The signatories stated that the charges “are a textbook example of retaliation against investigative journalism and reporting on high-level corruption”.

On 10th October 2024, the Leninsky District Court in Bishkek announced the verdict. Makhabat Tazhikbek kyzy, Temirov Live’s director, and Azamat Ishenbekov were sentenced to six and five years in prison, respectively. Tazhikbek kyzy was convicted of “organising” calls for riots, while Ishenbekov was found to have been an accomplice. Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov were also sentenced to five years in prison for calling for riots, but their sentences were commuted to three years’ probation. The remaining seven defendants were acquitted. Makhabat Tazhikbek kyzy’s and Azamat Ishenbekov’s lawyer said they would appeal their prison sentences.

While it is a relief that some journalists in the case were acquitted, the convictions are deeply disappointing due to the retaliatory nature of the charges.

In addition to human rights groups, representatives of the international community also criticised the convictions. For example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the authorities to ensure that the cases are fully reviewed in line with international human rights standards, expressing regret that they were arbitrarily detained “for simply doing their job”. Similarly, the UK and US embassies in Bishkek urged for a prompt consideration of their appeals, stating the convictions were “part of a pattern of shrinking space for media freedom” in Kyrgyzstan. The EU delegation and EU embassies in Bishkek also issued a statement on the case, emphasising that “media workers should never be punished for doing their work”.

When delivering the sentences, the court also ordered social services to determine who would assume custody of Makhabat Tazhikbek kyzy’s 12-year-old son due to her imprisonment and the absence of the child’s father. The father, Bolot Temirov, founder of Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese, was deported from Kyrgyzstan in 2022 after being prosecuted on spurious criminal charges and unlawfully stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship. The court order raised concerns, as Temirov previously reported that the child’s birth certificate had been confiscated during his wife’s arrest and withheld by authorities for several months. He also claimed that police had threatened to place the child in an orphanage. However, according to Tazhikbek kyzy’s lawyer, the child currently lives with his grandmother and there is no immediate threat of him being taken into care. The court’s press service also issued a statement, saying “At the moment, the child is with close relatives, and no one intends to take him away. The court only imposed the obligation to determine his place of residence.”

Shortly before the verdict was issued, Bolot Temirov announced that a team of lawyers had submitted a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee in his case. The detailed submission covers violations of his right to freedom of expression, freedom from arbitrary detention, a fair trial, and citizenship in connection with his 2022 prosecution and deportation. Temirov also reported facing new criminal charges in absentia, similar to those initiated against his colleagues.

Final decision on the closure of well-known media organisation

As reported before, in February 2024, a local court in Bishkek ordered the dissolution of the organisation running the Kloop news portal at the request of prosecutors. While Kloop was accused of conducting work that goes beyond the scope of its charter, the decision was clearly issued in retaliation for the portal’s investigative and independent reporting. Thus, the decision focused on the purported harmful impact of Kloop’s “negative” coverage of current affairs and its “sharp criticism” of the government. Court-commissioned experts even accused it of contributing to mental illness, sexual depravity and drug addiction among the population through its reporting.

Kloop's appeal against this decision was rejected by Bishkek City Court on technical grounds. Initially, the appeal was returned due to an incorrect address, and when Kloop resubmitted it, the Court refused to accept it because the original deadline had passed. Kloop then appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the City Court’s decision, thereby confirming the organisation’s liquidation. Although the Supreme Court made its ruling in July 2024, Kloop only learned of it the following month. It vowed to continue its work despite the liquidation, using alternative platforms.

Commenting on the court’s decision to shut down Kloop, President Japarov essentially confirmed that the portal was targeted for its reporting, which he described as “one-sided” and “false”. He also claimed that the move “will not affect” freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan, despite Kloop being a leading source of independent information on developments in the country.

In a joint statement issued on 6th September 2024, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, IPHR and five other international human rights groups criticised the decision to liquidate Kloop as an unacceptable attack on media freedom and called for its retraction. They stressed that Kloop is an award-winning investigative outlet that has also collaborated with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a global investigative journalism network.

Misuse of the fight against “false” information to stifle free speech

The government has repeatedly used a controversial 2021 law to block access to independent news and information resources because of publications allegedly containing “false” information. Under this law, the Ministry of Culture and Information may suspend access to websites for up to two months without court approval. Those targeted include Kloop, Radio Azattyk (the Kyrgyz service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), 24.kg and other sites.

According to official information, the Ministry of Culture and Information considered nine complaints filed under the law on the protection against “false” information in the first six months of 2024, and initiated blocking measures in relation to three sites.

In a more recent case, in September 2024, the Ministry threatened to block the Novye Litsa site unless it promptly removed an article about the alleged involvement of associates of the late Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in President Japarov’s 2021 election campaign. According to the Ministry, this article contained information that “did not correspond to reality”. The Ministry also warned Radio Azattyk because of a report covering the Novye Litsa story. In addition, in this context, President Japarov’s press secretary publicly stated that “the question may arise whether we need such a media”, alleging that Radio Azattyk’s editorial policy is “aimed at deliberately discrediting” the country’s leaders.

The Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan, a network of over 60 journalists, activists, bloggers and civil society representatives, expressed serious concerns about these developments. They stressed that the law on the protection against “false” information is not being used to combat disinformation but rather as a tool to shield high-ranking officials from criticism and investigations into misconduct. Media and human rights groups have repeatedly called for the repeal of the 2021 law, arguing it falls short of international standards for protecting freedom of expression.

There are concerns that misuse of the 2021 law might further increase following the creation of a new body under the Ministry of Culture and Information, tasked with systematically monitoring the internet for “provocative” and “incorrect” information and initiating blockings in response.

Draft legislation currently under consideration could also lead to the potential misuse of charges of disseminating “false” and “defamatory” information to put pressure on independent media, journalists and others critical of the government. Draft amendments, submitted to Parliament in August 2024, would grant the Ministry of Culture and Information discretionary powers to fine those accused of disseminating insulting or slanderous and knowingly false information through media or online channels. Fines could amount to approx. 1000 EUR for individuals and 2000 EUR for legal entities.

CSOs have criticised the draft legislation, citing the lack of impartiality in the proposed arrangement and the risk of violations of the freedom of expression. In a legal opinion issued at the request of the Ministry of Justice, the Venice Commission concluded that the draft amendments “exhibit significant deficiencies” that must be addressed to ensure compliance with international standards. The Commission particularly stressed the risk that these amendments could promote self-censorship and undermine open public debate unless revised. The Ombudsperson has also called for a revision of the proposed provisions. As of early October 2024, the draft law remained under consideration in Parliament.

New version of criticised media law

As covered in the previous update, a draft media law submitted to Parliament in December 2023 proposed the imposition of extensive state regulation of media and online platforms, with wide and disproportionate powers granted to authorities to control and sanction them. The draft law drew significant criticism from human rights groups, the media community and international experts due to its inconsistency with the constitution and international human rights standards. In response, President Japarov ordered the withdrawal of the draft law from Parliament in March 2024, and the establishment of a working group including media representatives to revise it.

The revised media law, presented by the working group in June 2024, marked a clear improvement over the previous version, with major concerns addressed. For example, a proposed requirement for websites to obtain state registration was excluded, criticised accreditation rules were revised, and the procedure for suspending or closing media operations was clarified. Despite some remaining problematic provisions, media representatives considered it an acceptable compromise. However, as of the beginning of October 2024, the revised draft law had yet to be submitted to Parliament for consideration.

Criminal prosecution of outspoken bloggers-activists

In an alarming trend, a growing number of activists, bloggers and journalists have faced criminal charges initiated over social media posts critical of those in power. These charges have often been opened under broadly worded provisions of the Criminal Code, which do not clearly define the offences set out, such as article 278, part 3, which prohibits calls for “disobedience to the lawful demands” of representatives of authorities and for riots and article 330, which penalises “incitement” to ethnic, national and other hatred.

As covered above, journalists associated with Temirov Live were charged with calling for “disobedience” to authorities and for riots. Other recent examples of cases initiated under Criminal Code article 278, part 3 include:

• Writer Olzhobay Shakir was arrested in September 2023 because of “provocative” social media posts. He has repeatedly criticised authorities and was arrested shortly after announcing plans to peacefully rally against a government initiative regarding Soviet-era property – the transfer of four resort centres located near Issyk-Kul Lake to Uzbekistan. In May 2024, he was sentenced to five years in prison, a ruling that was upheld on appeal by a regional court in July. However, in early October 2024, the Supreme Court replaced his prison sentence with three years of probation, while still upholding his conviction. As a result, he was released after more than a year behind bars.

• Accused of “systematically” posting “provocative” content on social media, blogger Zarina Torokulova was sentenced to five years in prison in January 2024. Prior to her arrest, she had shared Olzhobay Shakir’s post announcing plans to hold a peaceful protest against the transfer of four resort centres to Uzbekistan. Unlike Shakir, Torokulova was initially released on probation but later imprisoned after her prison sentence was reinstated on appeal by a regional court in April 2024. Later, in July 2024, the Supreme Court upheld this decision.
• Blogger-activist Aftandil Jorobekov was arrested in December 2023 after publicly opposing a controversial government initiative to change the country’s flag, an initiative that sparked a public backlash. Prior to his arrest he had posted a video on Facebook in which he criticised the proposal for the new flag and said that he was planning to hold a peaceful protest against it. His trial started in February 2024, but was suspended the following month pending additional expert assessments. In June 2024, he was moved to house arrest.
• Academic-whistleblower Zhoomart Karabaev was arrested in July 2024 after publishing social media posts alleging that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has provided expert reviews dictated by security services in cases involving government critics. A former NAS employee, Karabaev also testified on this issue during Olzhobay Shakir’s trial. In September 2024, Karabaev alleged that a security service official had threatened to strangle him while in detention. Following this, the Ombudsperson requested relevant state bodies to investigate Karabaev’s allegations and ensure his protection. The trial in Karabaev’s case began in early October 2024.

• Musician-poet Askat Zhetigen was arrested in March 2024 after publishing a social media appeal critically assessing a media interview with President Japarov. In his appeal, he resorted to swearing. Prior to this, he had publicly criticised various government policies, including the initiative to change the country’s flag and the arrest of government critics. Zhetigen was charged both with calling for “disobedience” and riots (under Criminal Code article 278.3) and for the forceful seizure of power (under article 327.2). In July 2024, he was convicted of the second charge and sentenced to three years in prison. He alleged being subjected to ill-treatment in pre-trial detention. The appeal hearing in his case was under way as of early October 2024.

The following cases illustrate the misuse of Criminal Code article 330 to restrict free speech:

• In June 2024, human rights activist Ondurush Toktonasyrov was fined 100,000 som (around 1000 EUR) for Facebook posts allegedly inciting national hatred and offending national values. Prosecutors had requested a three-year prison sentence for him. Toktonasyrov and his colleagues consider the charges retaliation for his civic engagement, including social media posts and peaceful protests on issues such as politically motivated persecution of government critics and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The activist said that he would appeal his conviction, calling it completely groundless. Within less than 24 hours of the verdict being announced, Toktonasyrov’s supporters had raised the money needed to pay the fine.

• Journalist Bayan Jumagulova, who previously worked for the local RFE/RL service but is now retired and lives abroad, was summoned for questioning by police about her Facebook posts when visiting Kyrgyzstan in June 2024. She learned that her social media activities had been under surveillance for a long time and that a criminal case had been opened against her for allegedly inciting hatred. She was reportedly banned from leaving the country pending the investigation. The trial in her case began in September 2024.

• Activist-blogger Kanykei Aranova, known for her criticism of the authorities, was charged with “inciting” hatred and calling for the violent seizure of power (Criminal Code articles 330 and 327) over Facebook posts she claims were from a fake account. Investigations conducted by the Organized Crime Reporting Project (OCCRP) confirmed the account was initially created under a different name, with several posts edited after it was changed to Aranova’s. These posts criticised President Japarov and called for a change of power. The account is no longer accessible. Aranova was extradited from Russia in February 2024, and thereafter convicted and fined 120,000 soms (about 1300 EUR). However, after prosecutors appealed, her sentence was changed to 3.5 years in prison in June 2024, a ruling upheld by the Supreme Court.

Unexpected acquittals in high-profile Kempir-Abad case

As reported before, over two dozen activists, bloggers and political figures were arrested in October 2022 and charged with instigating mass unrest and attempting to seize power after peacefully opposing a government-negotiated border deal with neighbouring Uzbekistan concerning the Kempir-Abad water reservoir. Their pre-trial detention was repeatedly extended in violation of international standards, resulting in the defendants spending months in unsanitary conditions, with limited access to medical treatment and family visits. While some of them were eventually moved to house arrest due to health issues, others spent over 19 months in pre-trial detention.

Following a closed-door trial marred by serious due process violations, prosecutors requested 20-year prison sentences for 22 defendants in June 2024, despite a lack of credible evidence to support the charges. In a joint statement, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, IPHR, Human Rights Watch and other groups stated that this request compounded ‘’an already shocking miscarriage of justice’’ and called for dropping the politically motivated charges and immediately releasing the group. 

In an unexpected development, welcomed by human rights groups, Pervomaysky District Court in Bishkek acquitted all defendants on 14th June 2024. However, prosecutors appealed the acquittals after President Japarov publicly commented on the case, stating he “would have imposed some kind of punishment” if he were the judge. As of early October 2024, the appeal was still pending, with hearings repeatedly postponed. In addition, the cases of four defendants charged in relation to their engagement on the Kempir-Abad issue are being heard separately.

Peaceful assembly

The continued use of blanket bans on peaceful protests, in violation of international standards, remained of serious concern. As covered before, in spring 2022, a local court in Bishkek banned peaceful protests outside the Russian embassy, near the presidential and parliament building, on Ala-Too Square and in other central areas of the capital. This ruling was issued following a request from the Russian embassy to prevent protests against the Russian war against Ukraine outside its premises. Protesters were instructed to instead gather in a specifically designated park (Gorky Park), while official events were exempted from the ban, illustrating its discriminatory nature. The ban was repeatedly prolonged, with the most recent extension by Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court covering the period from 1st July to 30th September 2024. After expiring on 30th September, the ban had not been extended further as of early October 2024.

While local authorities claimed that the blanket ban on assemblies in central Bishkek was necessary to prevent “possible mass unrest”, its enforcement prevented citizens from holding peaceful protests on issues important to them within the sight and sound of major target audiences. Here are two examples from the reporting period, both related to a controversial initiative of local authorities to dismantle eco-friendly trolleybus services in Bishkek:

• On 28th June 2024, the Peshkom initiative planned to organise a photo exhibition entitled “My Love – Trolleybus” in a square in central Bishkek to raise awareness about the decline of trolleybus transportation. However, police requested that they move the exhibition to Gorky Park, citing the blanket ban on assemblies. After the activists complied, the lights in the park were turned off without explanation, leaving the exhibition in darkness. The lights only came back on after the activists had already dismantled the exhibition.

• On 3rd July 2024, activists gathered at a bus stop near the Philharmonic Hall to protest the dismantling of trolleybus services. However, police redirected them to Gorky Park, referring to the blanket ban on assemblies. The activists tried to challenge this ban by filing an appeal with Bishkek City Court on 18th July 2024. However, the court refused to accept the appeal on the grounds that the appeal deadline had expired and could not be reinstated, despite the activists’ argument that the ruling imposing the ban had not been properly communicated, in violation of the Law on Assemblies. This law requires that court decisions concerning bans on peaceful assemblies be communicated to protest organisers and participants within 24 hours. The activists took their case further to the Supreme Court. However, on 22nd July, this court upheld the earlier refusal.

Problematic blanket bans have also been imposed in other cities. For example, Osh City Court banned assemblies outside the mayor’s office and at the central square in Osh from late July through December 2024. During this time, protests are only allowed in Ataturk Park.

The human rights organisation Khylym Shami raised concerns about the growing trend of restricting peaceful assemblies on grounds not permitted by the Law on Assemblies or international law. After analysing 50 court decisions that imposed restrictions on peaceful assemblies, the organisation found that 49 violated the Law on Assemblies. According to the head of the organisation, Gulshayir Abdirasulova, they shared the analysis with the Supreme Court, requesting its assistance in ensuring that future court rulings on these matters comply with the law.

In another worrying development, activists have been prosecuted when seeking to peacefully protest. For example, Aftandil Jorobekov and Olzhobay Shakir both faced criminal charges after announcing plans to protest against controversial government initiatives (see more about their cases under Expression).