GENERAL
CJEU ADVOCATE GENERAL QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF EU’S €10 BILLION FUNDING RELEASE TO HUNGARY
Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued an opinion on 12th February 2026 as part of CJEU proceedings initiated in March 2024 after the European Parliament referred the Commission over its December 2023 decision to unfreeze €10.2 billion of EU funds to Hungary on the basis of claimed judicial reforms. The amount formed part of EU funds previously frozen in December 2022 over concerns about judicial independence, systemic corruption, and rule of law violations in Hungary. The Advocate General largely upheld the European Parliament’s arguments, finding that the Commission’s decision was insufficiently justified and based on an inadequate assessment of whether Hungary had met the required judicial reform conditions, and therefore should be annulled.
The partial release was previously criticised as politically influenced, amid tensions with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán over Ukraine’s EU accession process and financial support for Ukraine. If the CJEU follows the Advocate General’s opinion, Hungary could be required to repay funds already received.
HUNGARY-UKRAINE DISPUTE OVER THE DRUZHBA PIPELINE
In February and March 2026, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refused to approve a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine amid a full halt of Russian oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline. The stoppage followed a Russian attack on 27th January 2026 that damaged an oil storage facility connected to the pipeline. Orbán, together with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, accused Ukraine of deliberately refusing to resume transit for political reasons and threatened to restrict gas flows to Ukraine in response. On 10th April 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that repairs to the Druzhba pipeline were expected in spring 2026. Following the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12th April 2026, in which Orbán was defeated, Zelenskyy specified a revised timeline for restoration as “the end of April” 2026. The dispute ended with the resumption of oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline on 22nd April 2026, followed by approval of the EU loan to Ukraine the next day.
2026 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS END ORBÁN’S 16-YEAR RULE
Parliamentary elections were held in Hungary on 12th April 2026, resulting in the defeat of the right-wing Fidesz party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who had been in power for 16 years. The election saw record turnout, with 79.56 percent of registered voters casting ballots. The pro-European, centre-right Tisza party secured 141 out of 199 seats, achieving the two-thirds supermajority required for constitutional reforms. The inaugural session of the new Parliament is scheduled for 9th May 2026, when Tisza leader Péter Magyar is expected to be sworn in as Prime Minister.
The election campaign preceding the parliamentary elections was marked by several controversies, including an alleged blackmail campaign against Péter Magyar and reported Russian influence efforts in support of Orbán. In a joint report, civil society organisations, including the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, described the 2026 parliamentary elections as taking place on an uneven playing field, where the line between state institutions and the ruling Fidesz party was blurred, and public resources and media largely favored the government.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
CJEU ADVOCATE GENERAL FINDS HUNGARIAN SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION ACT IN BREACH OF EU LAW
On 12th February 2026, the Advocate General of the CJEU issued an opinion concluding that Hungary’s 2023 “Sovereignty Protection Act” and the resulting Sovereign Protection Office (SPO) are incompatible with EU law.
As previously reported by the CIVICUS Monitor, the legislation established a body with broad powers to investigate activities deemed to threaten national sovereignty, particularly in relation to alleged foreign influence in media and civil society. Following infringement proceedings launched by the European Commission in February 2024, the case reached the Court at the end of 2024.
Advocate General Juliane Kokott found that the framework grants the SPO excessive discretion and is disproportionate to its stated aims. She warned that its investigative and publication powers could have a chilling effect on journalism and civil society, while also raising concerns under EU law on fundamental freedoms, internal market rules, and data protection. Although non-binding, Advocate General opinions are highly influential. The opinion is also relevant to broader rule of law disputes, including a proposed 2025 “Transparency of Public Life” bill that would have expanded the SPO’s ability to restrict the work of foreign-funded NGOs and media (see the previous CIVICUS Monitor update). If the Court follows this reasoning, or if a future government under Péter Magyar dismantles the framework, the SPO’s current powers would end, along with related plans to further extend its reach over civil society funding and activity.
ORBÁN PROMISES POST-ELECTION “CLEAR-OUT” OF INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY
On 14th February 2026, during his annual State of the Nation address in Budapest, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continued his aggressive rhetoric against civil society and media on the grounds of combating alleged foreign influence and sovereignty protection. He said that efforts to remove what he considers a “threat to sovereignty,” including parts of the media and civil society, remain “half-finished.” He added that after the April 2026 parliamentary elections, these groups would be “cleared out,” referring to what he described as “fake civil society organizations, bought journalists, judges, politicians, algorithms and bureaucrats.” Linking these remarks to his broader criticism of the EU, Orbán said that, in his view, this is what Brussels represents in Hungary today.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
CJEU RULES ANTI-LGBTQI+ LEGISLATION VIOLATES EU LAW
On 21st April 2026, the CJEU found the 2021 anti-LGBTQI+ “propaganda law” to be in violation of EU law and required Hungary to bring it into compliance, which in practice would entail its repeal. The Court held that the legislation breached several rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including protection from discrimination on grounds of sex or sexual orientation, respect for private and family life, and freedom of expression and information. It also found that the legislation contravened Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, marking the first time the Court has found a member state in breach of the Union’s foundational values under Article 2, rather than specific directives or provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. On 2nd May 2026, it was reported that Viktor Orbán’s government would not implement the ruling, leaving its execution to the incoming Tisza government and Prime Minister Péter Magyar.
The law, adopted by the Fidesz government in June 2021 in spite of mass protests, restricted access for minors to content or advertising related to diverse gender identities and sexual orientations, including homosexuality, and was widely compared to similar Russian legislation. Building on this framework, the government adopted further legislation in March 2025 banning public events organized by LGBTQI+ communities, effectively prohibiting Pride demonstrations. Despite this ban and associated risks, a record number of participants (estimated to be between 100,000 and 200,000) joined the Budapest Pride parade on 28th June 2025 (see the previous CIVICUS Monitor update).
RESTRICTIONS ON JOURNALISTS COVERING POLITICAL EVENTS
Between November 2025 and March 2026, several journalists were blocked from covering political events through bans, denial of accreditation, or physical removal.
On 11th November 2025, Gulyás Balázs, editor-in-chief of Gulyáságyú Média, and a camera operator were banned from entering the Hungarian Parliament due to an alleged breach of security protocols after attempting to film and question Attila Fülöp, the state secretary responsible for child protection. The journalists approached Fülöp in a ground-floor corridor and the underground garage of the Parliament building. According to the parliamentary press office, this breached a 2020 decree restricting filming in certain areas of the building, prompting the authorities to ban both journalists from entering Parliament in the future. Balázs described the sanction as disproportionate and contrary to parliamentary regulations, noting that the footage recorded in the garage hadn’t even been published.
On 5th January 2026, several independent media outlets, including Jelen, Kontroll, Partizán, and Gulyáságyú Média, were denied access to the Prime Minister’s annual press conference. Some rejections were justified by missed registration deadlines, while others were issued without explanation.
On 10th March 2026, Telex journalists were physically removed from a political forum involving Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén. The incident prompted a formal complaint and was criticised by the Committee to Protect Journalists, which called for an investigation and improved safeguards for journalist safety.
RADIO FREE EUROPE’S HUNGARIAN UNIT CLOSED FOLLOWING FUNDING CUT
On 20th November 2025, the Hungarian-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Szabad Európa) announced its permanent closure following US President Donald Trump’s administration’s decision to terminate its funding. The decision was justified on the grounds that Szabad Európa had “undermined President Trump’s foreign policy by opposing the duly elected Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban.” The outlet thus ceased operations five years after its relaunch in 2020, following a 27-year gap since it last operated as a radio station in 1993. Following the acquisition of the country’s largest tabloid Blikk by a pro-government media group, the closure of Szabad Európa removed a significant independent news source from the Hungarian media landscape just four months before the 2026 parliamentary Hungarian elections.
COURT FINDS SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION OFFICE VIOLATED ÁTLÁTSZÓ’S REPUTATION
The Budapest-Capital Regional Court ruled on 4th December 2025 that the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) violated the reputation of investigative outlet Átlátszó by making false claims that it was foreign-funded and engaged in intelligence and disinformation activities. The case stems from a November 2024 lawsuit filed by Átlátszó against the SPO, following a “report” and video in which the agency accused the outlet of espionage, foreign influence, falsifying news, and conducting intelligence activities (see previous CIVICUS Monitor update). The court ordered the SPO to pay 3.8 million forints (around EUR 10.500) in damages and 2.4 million forints (around EUR 6.600) in legal costs, and to issue a public apology once the judgment becomes final. The SPO appealed the decision, and the case reached the Court of Appeal, which held its first hearing on 30th April 2026; a further session was scheduled for 28th May 2026.
INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE LAUNCHED UNDER THE EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT
As previously reported by the CIVICUS Monitor, on 10th July 2024, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán brought an action before the CJEU, challenging the legal basis of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) and seeking its annulment. Tensions over the EMFA, which is aimed at protecting journalists and media providers from political interference, escalated further on 11th December 2025, when the European Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Hungary. This marked the first such procedure under the EMFA, launched just four months after most of its provisions entered into force on 8th August 2025. The Commission cited government interference in journalism, weak protection of sources and confidential communications, and failures to comply with rules on public service media, transparency of media ownership, and the fair allocation of state advertising. More broadly, this reflects a continuing deterioration of media freedom in Hungary in recent years, as shown in the latest Reporters Without Borders (RSF) rankings, where Hungary ranks among the lowest in the European Union, ahead of only Greece and Cyprus.
ESPIONAGE CHARGES AGAINST JOURNALIST SZABOLCS PANYI
On 26th March 2026, Gergely Gulyás, Head of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Office, announced that the Ministry of Justice had prepared an expert report and filed a complaint against journalist Szabolcs Panyi on suspicion of espionage. Panyi is an investigative journalist at the independent outlets Direkt36 and VSquare, known for reporting on alleged Russian influence in Hungary and on links between Hungarian and Russian officials. Panyi has denied all allegations, calling them politically motivated.
On 23rd March 2026, the pro-government outlet Mandiner published an edited recording of Panyi’s conversation with a confidential source concerning an ongoing investigation into communications between Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian officials. Government-aligned media presented the recording as evidence of links to foreign intelligence services, including claims that Panyi had shared sensitive information such as Szijjártó’s contact details. Panyi stated the recording was unlawful, related to protected source work, and part of his efforts to verify information in ongoing investigations.
The dispute unfolded in a broader political and information environment shaped by the period surrounding Hungary’s April 2026 parliamentary elections. On 6th March 2026, Szabolcs Panyi, as a journalist of VSquare, published an investigation alleging Russian interference in the electoral process. This was followed by international coverage, including a 21st March 2026 article by The Washington Post describing alleged communications between Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during EU meetings. On 31st March 2026, Panyi, in cooperation with journalists from other media outlets, published further investigative material, including audio and transcript excerpts of a 2024 Szijjártó-Lavrov call.
In response, on 3rd April 2026, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán escalated the accusations, alleging that Panyi had cooperated with multiple European intelligence services and acted in coordination with opposition political actors. After the elections, on 28th April 2026, Hungary’s National Bureau of Investigation dismissed the espionage complaint against Panyi for lack of evidence.
TEACHER INVESTIGATED OVER PROTEST MESSAGES ON GOVERNMENT BILLBOARDS
On 24th March 2026, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee reported that a Hungarian teacher is under criminal investigation on suspicion of vandalism after writing political protest messages on already damaged government billboards in Budapest. She sprayed slogans such as “Don’t hate, love!” over government posters in February 2026, which reportedly contained anti-Ukrainian and anti-opposition messages. She said she deliberately chose already defaced billboards and intended the act as a protest against government communication campaigns. Police detained her for several hours and seized her phone on suspicion of property damage. Zsolt Szekeres, a lawyer for the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, argues that no actual damage occurred, as the posters were already unusable, and that the action constituted protected freedom of expression rather than a criminal offence. A complaint challenging the suspicion has been submitted to the prosecutor’s office.
DATA LEAK FOLLOWING CYBERATTACK ON FIDESZ-LINKED MEDIA COMPANY
In April 2026, a leaked internal memo from Mediaworks Hungary Zrt, a major pro-government media company linked to Orbán’s Fidesz party, surfaced following a large-scale cyberattack by the hacker group World Leaks, which stole around 15 million files (8.5 terabytes of data) and made them available on the dark web. The memo, reportedly from a 7th January 2025 meeting, describes internal editorial planning and includes a reference to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and “smear articles” that would involve Tamás (presumably one of the meeting participants) requesting phone assistance from Moscow. The passage drew attention as it appeared to suggest external input in politically sensitive editorial work, although its precise meaning and context remain unclear.
Mediaworks confirmed the cyberattack on 1st May 2026, stating that significant volumes of data may have been unlawfully accessed and announcing legal action over the use and dissemination of the leaked material.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
MASS PROTESTS OVER SZŐLŐ STREET CHILD ABUSE SCANDAL
In mid-December 2025, large protests took place in Budapest over the growing Szőlő Street Correctional Institution child abuse scandal. The demonstrations were triggered by leaked security camera footage in December 2025 showing the institution’s acting director, Károly Kovács-Buna, violently assaulting children. The broader scandal began in May 2025, when the institution’s former director, Péter Pál Juhász, and a female colleague he was romantically involved with were arrested on suspicion of human trafficking, sexual abuse, and running a prostitution ring involving young people raised in state care. In the following months, the case gained political significance after former child protection official Gábor Kuslits claimed that allegations against Juhász had been known for years but police failed to act.
The largest protest took place on 13th December 2025 and was organized by Péter Magyar, leader of the opposition Tisza Party and Orbán’s main challenger ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Tens of thousands of people gathered at Deák Ferenc Square in central Budapest before marching across the Chain Bridge to the Carmelite Monastery and Sándor Palace, where the Prime Minister’s and President’s offices are located. Protesters carried torches and banners accusing the government of protecting abusers instead of children.
A second protest took place on the next day, 14th December 2025, directly outside the Szőlő Street correctional facility. Organized by publicist Róbert Puzsér and the Civil Resistance movement, the event was a silent demonstration and candle-lighting ceremony attended by around one thousand people. Participants lit candles, left messages for the children inside the institution, and protested the collapse of Hungary’s child protection system. Speakers and participants criticized government attempts to portray the victims primarily as criminals rather than abused minors.
TRUCK DRIVERS’ PROTEST AGAINST TOLL INCREASES
On 22nd December 2025, Hungarian truck drivers staged a large protest in Budapest against planned increases in road tolls affecting freight transport. The demonstration caused major traffic disruptions, as long convoys of trucks moved slowly toward the capital on the M3 motorway.
The protest was linked to a government-backed toll reform for 2026 introducing a 4.3 percent increase from January 2026 and a total rise of 35 percent from March 2026. According to the government, the measures aimed to reduce heavy freight traffic in residential areas by redirecting transit vehicles toward the main highway network. Protesters responded that the measures would significantly increase transport costs, force long detours, and raise prices for goods across the economy, including food and everyday products.
According to organizers, several thousand trucks joined the action, while only 50 vehicles were allowed to remain at Heroes’ Square, where the main rally was held. Transport Minister János Lázár did not attend the protest and defended the reforms online, saying the government had reached agreements with major transport associations and arguing that the changes were needed to reduce heavy traffic in residential areas and protect people living along busy roads.
PROTEST AGAINST SLOVAK LAW ON BENEŠ DECREES
On 3rd January 2026, Hungarian students and young activists protested in front of the Slovak Embassy in Budapest against a recently adopted Slovak law criminalising public questioning of the post-World War II Beneš Decrees. The December 2025 amendment introduced up to six months’ imprisonment for challenging the post-war legal settlement under which many ethnic Hungarians in former Czechoslovakia were deprived of property and citizenship.
The protest was organized by university students and framed as a demonstration for minority rights, and an expression of cross-border solidarity. Speakers argued the law creates a chilling effect on research and free expression, while demonstrators called for its withdrawal. The protest reflects ongoing tensions between Hungary and Slovakia over the legacy of the Beneš Decrees, which remain a source of dispute due to their lasting impact on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
ROMA PROTEST CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS BY MINISTER JÁNOS LÁZÁR
On 29th January 2026, Roma activists and supporters protested during a public forum held by Minister of Construction and Transport János Lázár in Gyöngyös. The demonstration followed controversy over remarks he had made at another public forum the previous week, which were widely criticised as offensive towards Roma communities. Responding to an audience member’s question about demographic decline in Hungary, Lázár said: “If we do not allow migrants, and someone has to clean the toilets on InterCity trains … then we must uncover internal reserves. And the internal reserve refers to the Roma population in Hungary.”
The Gyöngyös forum took place under heavy police presence, with tensions escalating when Roma attendees confronted Lázár over his comments. The exchange became heated, with interruptions, chanting and demands for his resignation. Lázár rejected accusations of racism, saying he had been referring to labour needs and social integration. He also argued that his use of the term “reserve” was intended positively, referring to people who had not yet been integrated or provided with sufficient opportunities.
Two days later, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán claimed on Facebook that Roma protesters at the Gyöngyös forum had been sent by the Tisza Party and described them as criminals with a long list of alleged offences, including rioting, robbery, embezzlement, assault, sexual violence, blackmail and murder. He also said they had attended the event “to intimidate and harass Fidesz supporters”. Later that day, hundreds of people demonstrated in Budapest, gathering outside the Ministry of Construction and Transport with torches, toilet brushes and banners. The protesters called for Lázár’s resignation and accountability over his remarks about Roma communities.
FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE
On 22nd February 2026, around 200 people took part in a demonstration and commemoration in Budapest marking the approaching fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The event included speeches in front of Budapest City Hall, a march through central Budapest, and a final gathering near the Russian Embassy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Hungary Sándor Fegyir condemned Russia’s actions, referring to war crimes and violations of international law, while other speakers at the event emphasized Ukraine’s defense as a matter of broader European security.
PRO-GOVERNMENT PROTEST OVER HUNGARY–UKRAINE DRUZHBA PIPELINE DISPUTE
On 6th March 2026, a demonstration was held in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in Budapest, organized by the Movement of National Resistance, a group politically aligned with the Fidesz governing party. The protest was linked to a dispute over the suspension of Russian oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline (see more on this dispute above). It was also partly triggered by a 5th March 2026 statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referring to a “certain person in the EU”, widely understood to be Viktor Orbán, blocking a €90 billion loan to Ukraine, and suggesting he could share that person’s address with the Ukrainian armed forces.
The demonstration featured speeches by high-profile Hungarian political figures, including Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Fidesz parliamentary leader Máté Kocsis. Speakers accused Ukraine and EU institutions of coordinating political pressure on Hungary, including alleged interference in domestic elections and energy policy decisions. The event took place under heavy police presence and concluded without major disruption. Attendance was estimated in the low hundreds.
COURTS SUSPEND PRIDE-RELATED PROSECUTIONS AND REFER LAW TO CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
At the end of February 2026, the Pest Central District Court suspended criminal proceedings against Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony and Pécs Pride organizer Géza Buzás-Hábel, referring key legal questions on the constitutionality of Hungary’s assembly and child protection laws to the Constitutional Court.
The cases stem from prosecutions initiated after Pride-related events in 2025, which were banned by legislation adopted on 18th March 2025 under the pretext of “child protection” against LGBTQI+ propaganda (see the previous CIVICUS Monitor update).
In November 2025, police submitted case files against Buzás-Hábel to prosecutors with a proposal for indictment over his role in organizing Pécs Pride on 4th October 2025. In Karácsony’s case, prosecutors charged the mayor in January 2026 after he organized and led the Budapest Pride march on 28th June 2025. In both proceedings, courts suspended the criminal cases and asked the Constitutional Court to review whether provisions of the assembly law and child protection legislation comply with the Fundamental Law, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly. The Pécs court also referenced ongoing CJEU court proceedings related to Hungary’s 2021 “child protection” legislation as relevant context (see more on the CJEU decision above).
TRANS PRIDE EVENT BAN UPHELD BY COURT
In March 2026, Hungarian authorities banned a planned Trans Pride event in Budapest. The demonstration, organized by the Prizma Community, was scheduled for 29th March 2026 in connection with International Transgender Day of Visibility on 31st March and was intended as a peaceful gathering in front of the Ministry of Justice to highlight discrimination and violence faced by trans people in Hungary.
On 11th March 2026, the Budapest Police Headquarters prohibited the event, arguing that its content fell under the scope of the 2025 amendment to Hungary’s assembly and “child protection” legislation, which restricts LGBTQI+ related public gatherings (see previous CIVICUS Monitor update). Following the ban, the organizers challenged the decision in the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria), which upheld the police ruling on 19th March 2026. In response, the organizers and supporting human rights groups announced further legal action, including appeals to Hungary’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
NATIONAL DAY MARKED BY COMPETING POLITICAL RALLIES AHEAD OF 2026 ELECTIONS
On 15th March 2026, both Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party and the opposition Tisza Party led by Péter Magyar held large political rallies in Budapest during national celebrations marking the anniversary of the 1848-49 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence. The competing events were widely viewed as a major demonstration of political strength ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 12th April 2026.
Fidesz held its traditional “Peace March”, a recurring pro-government mobilisation organised since 2012, which culminated at Kossuth Square near the Hungarian Parliament. The organisers, the pro-government CSO Civil Összefogás Fórum – Civil Összefogás Közhasznú Alapítvány (CÖF–CÖKA), described the 2026 march as a demonstration against deeper Hungarian involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war. In his speech, Orbán similarly framed the election as a choice between “war and peace”. Tisza held a separate “National March”, travelling from Deák Square to Heroes’ Square, where Magyar addressed supporters. He linked the legacy of the 1848 revolution to what he described as Hungary’s struggle for freedom, including its place in the European Union and NATO and opposition to Russian influence.
Attendance figures became politically contested. Government representatives described the 2026 Peace March as the largest ever, while Tisza leader Magyar claimed that around half a million people attended his party’s rally. Independent reporting, however, generally estimated turnout at over one hundred thousand for the opposition rally and in the tens of thousands for the Fidesz march.