Hopes for a thaw recede amid renewed persecution of critical voices

Disclaimer: The information presented in the update below is based on publicly available sources, and International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) takes full responsibility for the content.

This report provides an update on civic space and the protection of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Kyrgyzstan from mid-March to mid-August 2026. It has been prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.

The political fallout from President Sadyr Japarov’s unexpected dismissal of the head of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), Kamchybek Tashiev – his former close ally and, in Japarov’s own words, planned successor – continued during the reporting period. In July 2026, Tashiev and several co-defendants were convicted of plotting to seize power in connection with calls for early presidential elections made by a group of public figures perceived as his supporters. They received four-year prison sentences but were released on probation. As Tashiev had overseen a widening campaign against government critics during his tenure, his departure initially sparked some hope for a change in the authorities’ approach to dissent. However, despite some limited positive developments, the broader pattern of persecution of critical voices has persisted, with new cases being initiated during the reporting period.

While Japarov again publicly insisted that freedom of expression is upheld in Kyrgyzstan, he defended a narrow interpretation of this right, under which the authorities assume broad powers to thwart the dissemination of allegedly false, slanderous or otherwise impermissible information. Reflecting this approach, journalists, bloggers, activists and other critical voices continued to face criminal prosecution under broadly worded Criminal Code provisions.

Temirov Live journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy remained subject to criminal prosecution after the Supreme Court ruled in March 2026 that her case be reopened based on an opinion from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which found her 2024 imprisonment unlawful. While she was released under a travel ban following the Supreme Court’s decision, a subsequent attempt by her defence to have the case terminated was unsuccessful, meaning that she will again have to face full proceedings on the charges of allegedly calling for riots previously brought against her. Hearings on the merits of the case were set to begin in late August 2026.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court reportedly rejected a request to reconsider the case of imprisoned activist-blogger Kanykei Aranova. She was previously handed a prison sentence over Facebook posts allegedly inciting hatred and calling for the forcible seizure of power, although she has maintained that they were published from a fake account – a claim supported by independent investigations.

Musician-poet Askat Zhetigen was released from prison in August 2026 after serving out a sentence imposed in 2024 on charges of calling for the forcible seizure of power on social media. While still behind bars, he reported that detainees at the prison where he was held were subjected to abusive treatment and denied adequate medical care. The prison service denied these allegations, but representatives of the Ombudsperson’s Office visited Zhetigen and forwarded his complaint to the General Prosecutor.

Other cases documented during the reporting period also illustrated the continuing pattern of prosecution over critical social media expression. While acquittals, reduced sentences or releases in some of these cases were welcome, these outcomes did not dispel concerns about the use of broadly worded legal provisions against legitimate free speech in the first place. For example, in June 2026, an appeals court acquitted retired journalist Bayan Jumagulova of inciting hatred on social media, overturning a conviction and fine issued two months earlier following extended proceedings. An appeals court likewise acquitted media designer Ernis Zheentaev of disseminating “extremist” materials and released him on probation, while leaving in place his earlier conviction for calling for riots. Blogger Adilet Ali Myktybek, who was imprisoned in 2023 for allegedly calling for riots after he criticised the government on social media, was released under a presidential pardon in May 2026. In another case, a local court dismissed charges initiated against journalist Gulnaz Abylkasymova for alleged online defamation over a social media post, in which she ironically commented on a private donation of rubber boots to the emergency services.

Moreover, a new wave of pressure against critical voices emerged amid heated public discussion of foreign investment and controversial changes allowing state-owned land to be allocated for long-term use for investment and construction projects. In a Facebook post published in July 2026, Daiyrbek Orunbekov, head of the presidential administration’s information policy service, threatened criminal prosecution and imprisonment against those accused of spreading “fake news” and “discrediting” the government in relation to China, land use and foreign debt. His post featured photographs and personal information of dozens of human rights defenders, activists, journalists, lawyers and opposition figures, some of whom said they had never posted about China or related issues. His post prompted serious criticism because of its threatening and discrediting tone, as well as concerns that some of the photographs featured in it might have been unlawfully obtained from a state-run digital services platform. While authorities reportedly opened a preliminary investigation into Orunbekov’s post based on complaints received, it remained unclear whether any concrete measures had been taken against the official, and as of mid-August 2026, his post remained publicly available.

Several individuals who criticised the new land-use regulations or foreign investment on social media faced criminal prosecution or questioning. Notably, activist Azamat Bayamanov was detained after publishing video appeals opposing the long-term allocation of land to foreign investors and was remanded in custody on charges of complicity in organising mass riots. In a related case, political activist Mavlyan Askarbekov was detained in June 2026 and charged with inciting discord after criticising growing Chinese business influence in Kyrgyzstan. His trial started in August 2026.

Prominent human rights defender Aziza Abdurasulova faced intimidation after publicly expressing support for Askarbekov following his detention and criticising the broader pattern of imprisonment of government critics. She reported receiving threats and pressure to delete social media posts before being detained without explanation in June 2026 and held for several hours for questioning as a purported witness in an unspecified criminal case.

Concerns about the politically motivated prosecution of opposition figures persisted. Leader of the opposition Social Democrats party Temirlan Sultanbekov and several co-defendants went on trial in June 2026 on charges of allegedly preparing riots and attempting to seize power in connection with the November 2025 parliamentary elections. The fact that the trial was held behind closed doors reinforced concerns that the proceedings were politically motivated and aimed at sidelining opponents.

Pressure on independent media also continued. The government adopted new regulations for the implementation of the media law in force since August 2025. Like the media law, the implementing regulations require both traditional and online media to register with the authorities and contain provisions that are open to arbitrary implementation, in particular broadly worded grounds for warning and closing media outlets. Founders and editors who fail to provide required information for inclusion in a publicly accessible register of media outlets may face legal liability.

The independent news outlet 24.kg reported a suspected act of retaliation after local authorities dismantled the entrance structure to its office in Bishkek in July 2026. While a municipal representative reportedly linked the action to the outlet’s critical reporting in a private conversation, authorities publicly denied any such connection and said that the structure lacked the required permits.

Reflecting a broader regional trend in which social media complaints mechanisms are increasingly being misused to restrict access to critical content, a satirical account publishing animated videos about President Japarov was among those that reported being subjected to repeated, unfounded copyright complaints. These resulted in the blocking of the account and the removal of content.

The restrictive 2024 “foreign representatives” law remained in force and continued to pose a threat to civil society, while new reporting requirements affecting CSOs and other legal entities entered into effect. Organisations registered before March 2026 were required to report information about their beneficial owners to the authorities by 1st August, with fines possible for non-compliance. A study published by the Bir Duino Human Rights Movement during the reporting period highlighted persistent obstacles faced by CSOs seeking effective judicial review of restrictions on freedom of association, against the backdrop of expanding state oversight of civil society.

Restrictions on peaceful assembly remained in place. In June 2026, a court upheld a renewed ban on protests in central Bishkek, including at Ala-Too Square and key government buildings, until mid-September. The blanket restrictions, first introduced in 2022 following a request from the Russian embassy to stop anti-war protests outside its premises, have since been repeatedly extended, with protesters instead directed to gather in Gorky Park. Against this backdrop, authorities characterised social media calls for a protest on Ala-Too Square against the new land-use regulations as unlawful, although it remained unclear whether this was because of the blanket ban on assemblies in central Bishkek or on other grounds. At least one social media user faced criminal charges in connection with such calls.

At the same time, proposed amendments to the Law on Assemblies that would further expand the authorities’ powers to restrict protests advanced during the reporting period. The draft legislation would allow local authorities to designate specific venues for assemblies and determine demonstration routes without first obtaining court approval. Human rights defenders have warned that the proposed changes would facilitate further restrictions on peaceful assemblies and make it easier to prevent protests from taking place within sight and sound of their intended audiences, representing a significant setback compared with Kyrgyzstan’s current, relatively liberal assembly legislation.

In an incident raising concerns about the obstruction of foreign civil society representatives, university professor and former Human Rights Watch researcher Steve Swerdlow was denied entry to Kyrgyzstan without explanation in May 2026. Human rights groups criticised the lack of transparency, due process and effective legal remedies in his and earlier similar cases.

In the sections below, these issues are discussed in more detail and links to additional information provided.

General developments

As covered in the previous update, in February 2026, President Japarov unexpectedly dismissed his close ally, head of the SCNS, Kamchybek Tashiev, ending a powerful tandem that had shaped politics in Kyrgyzstan since 2020. The dismissal came amid debate over possible early presidential elections linked to uncertainty about the length of Japarov’s current term. While the Supreme Court later ruled out early elections, members of what became known as the group of 75 – public figures perceived as Tashiev’s supporters who had called for early elections – faced criminal charges, with investigators deeming their appeal to be part of an attempt to seize power. Following a trial marked by limited transparency and reported restrictions on the work of journalists, Tashiev and seven co-defendants were convicted of plotting to seize power in July 2026 and handed four-year prison sentences. However, they were all released on probation.

In an interview in August 2026, Japarov claimed that he had planned to step down at the end of his current term and pave the way for Tashiev to succeed him, but that he had come to realise over time that the latter “was not ready” for this responsibility. Japarov confirmed that he will himself seek another term in the next regular presidential elections, due to be held in January 2027.

As Tashiev had overseen a widening campaign against government critics during his tenure, his departure sparked some hope for a change in the authorities’ approach to dissent. However, despite some limited positive developments reported in this and the previous update, the broader pattern of persecution of critics has persisted, including through politically motivated criminal charges. Ironically, Tashiev himself has now become the target of the same tactics.

In a special report on Tashiev’s rise and fall, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) noted that Kyrgyzstan “has in recent years plummeted on every metric of freedom and political openness” and that the SCNS, under Tashiev’s leadership, “was instrumental in making this happen”, relentlessly pursuing political opponents, journalists and activists. The project quoted Temur Umarov, a Central Asia specialist at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, as saying: “Even though Tashiev was the main personification of the repressive instruments, these instruments will remain even in his absence.”

When asked about the arrests of activists and journalists during the August 2026 interview, President Japarov insisted that those who spread “false information” and “damage the reputation” of others are held accountable in accordance with the law. He acknowledged that court rulings may be influenced by political considerations in some cases but suggested that these account for only a tiny fraction – “0.001 percent”, according to him – of all cases. In an earlier interview in June 2026 (see more below under Expression), he similarly defended the authorities’ efforts to crack down on allegedly false and slanderous information.

Expression

Media freedom rating retained

As covered in previous updates, the media climate in Kyrgyzstan has sharply deteriorated during President Japarov’s period in office. The country plunged markedly in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index: to 144th out of 180 countries. In the 2026 Index, released by Reporters without Borders (RSF) in May 2026, its rating remained similar: 146th, which is 64 places lower than in 2020, when Japarov first came to power.

In an interview with the state news agency Kabar in June 2026, President Japarov insisted that there is freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, he stressed that people must not spread “slander and lies”, make unfounded accusations against branches of government, or incite ethnic or regional divisions. He argued that freedom of expression had for decades often been understood as encompassing “rumours, speculation and empty talk”, but that recently adopted laws were now being enforced and those accustomed to making “loud statements and unfounded accusations” were gradually learning to operate within the law. Japarov said that those who criticise shortcomings on the basis of “facts and evidence” would always be given a “green light”, including when exposing corruption or embezzlement, but warned that authorities ‘’will not show leniency’’ to those who ‘’harm the state and its people’’.

While certain forms of expression, such as incitement to discrimination or violence, may be subject to restrictions in accordance with international standards, Japarov’s remarks suggest a narrow understanding of freedom of expression in which the authorities claim broad discretion to determine what constitutes permissible, fact-based criticism and what amounts to “lies”, “slander” or unfounded accusations. This narrow understanding has been reflected in practice during Japarov’s time in office, as media platforms, journalists, bloggers, activists and other critical voices have faced growing pressure and persecution for legitimate reporting, commentary and criticism.

Implementing regulations for media law adopted, blogger legislation being elaborated

On 10th April 2026, the government adopted new regulations to implement the new media law, which has been in force since August 2025.

As covered in the previous update, civil society representatives had criticised the draft regulations initially proposed for introducing provisions that went beyond those set out in the media law. The final version is more consistent with the law itself. However, concerns remain that the regulations, like the media law, require both traditional and online outlets to undergo registration and contain provisions that could result in arbitrary implementation. In particular, although registration may only be denied if applicants lack the right to found a media outlet or another outlet is already registered under the same name, media outlets may be closed down on broader, vaguely defined grounds, including the dissemination of information that is deemed to contain calls for the forcible change of the constitutional order or to incite ethnic, national or other discord. Outlets receiving more than three warnings for such violations within one year may be liquidated by court order. These provisions are particularly troubling given that similar, unsubstantiated charges have repeatedly been used to prosecute and penalise outspoken journalists, bloggers and activists.

In accordance with the new regulations, media outlets must undergo re-registration if they change their names or the composition of their founders and must inform the registration authorities within 30 days of other changes, such as changes to their address, phone number, website address, chief editor, or the passport details of founders or chief editors. Information about media outlets, their founders and chief editors will be included in a register to which anyone can request access. Failure to provide the required information may result in legal liability for founders or chief editors.

Separate legislation regulating the activities of bloggers, currently being elaborated by the Ministry of Culture, Information and Youth Policy, is expected to introduce a requirement for bloggers with a large following to register with the authorities. At the same time, under changes to tax legislation signed by the president in August 2026, bloggers, along with IT and AI experts, were exempted from paying taxes for five years – a move explained as aimed at supporting development in these areas.

Independent media outlet reports suspected act of retaliation

The following incident raised concerns against the backdrop of increasing pressure on independent media and journalists, covered in this and earlier updates:

On 27th July 2026, representatives of the Bishkek municipality dismantled the entrance structure leading to the office of independent news outlet 24.kg, which operates from rented premises. According to the outlet, officials initially failed to provide documentation explaining the grounds for the action, while one municipal representative reportedly told its staff in a private conversation that it was linked to 24.kg’s critical reporting about local authorities. The outlet expressed concern that the measure might therefore have amounted to retaliation for its journalistic work. The Bishkek municipality denied any such connection, saying that the structure had been erected without the required permits and that the inspection had been initiated following a complaint from a resident of the building. It stated that other unauthorised structures at the same location were also subject to removal. However, the owners of the affected premises said they had only been informed that the structures were considered unlawful in the evening of Friday 24th July, with demolition beginning the following working day, leaving them no meaningful opportunity to challenge the decision beforehand.

Persecution of journalists, bloggers and other critical voices

Ongoing criminal case against Temirov Live journalist

As covered in the previous update, in March 2026, the Supreme Court ordered a review of the case of Temirov Live journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy who was handed a six-year prison sentence in October 2024 on charges of allegedly calling for “disobedience” to authorities and riots. This decision was based on an opinion from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), which found Tazhibek’s detention unlawful and linked to her journalistic work. As the new proceedings began at a local Bishkek court later the same month, Tazhibek was released under a travel ban pending the outcome of the proceedings. Human rights defenders welcomed the review of her case and her release from custody as steps in the right direction but stressed that the charges against her must be quashed, in line with the WGAD’s calls. However, in June 2026, Bishkek City Court rejected an appeal filed by the journalist’s defence against the local court’s dismissal of a request to close the criminal case. As a result, the proceedings against her continue, with the hearings of the merits of the case set to start in late August 2026. Tazbikek’s health has seriously deteriorated in detention, necessitating treatment following her release.

Other journalists from Temirov Live and Kloop – both independent investigative platforms known for their reporting on corruption – have also faced prosecution, and their materials have been declared “extremist” by the court.

Musician-poet reports ill-treatment prior to release

As reported before, musician-poet Askat Zhetigen was sentenced to three years in prison in 2024 on charges of calling for the forceful seizure of power after he harshly criticised President Japarov and government policies on social media.

In a letter from prison, which was made public in mid-July 2026, Zhetigen highlighted alleged violations of his and other detainees’ rights at the facility in Chui region where he was serving his sentence. Zhetigen alleged that prison staff subject detainees to abusive treatment, including verbal abuse, beatings and other forms of ill-treatment, particularly when they seek to assert their rights. He also raised concerns about inadequate access to medical care, including in his own case. The state prison service dismissed Zhetigen’s allegations as untrue. It also accused him of repeatedly violating prison rules and encouraging other detainees to do the same.

However, representatives of the centre for the prevention of torture under the Ombudsperson’s office visited the prison and held individual discussions with Zhetigen and an imprisoned political activist about whose treatment the poet-musician had also raised concerns in his letter. The office stated that written complaints submitted by Zhetigen and the political activist, requesting investigations into the actions of prison staff and accountability for violations, had been forwarded to the General Prosecutor together with the findings of its monitoring visit.

As covered in the previous update, in March 2026, Zhetigen was placed in a punishment cell in apparent retaliation for reporting alleged corruption and rights violations in prison. After the case attracted wide public attention, he was released early from the punishment cell.

Zhetigen has also alleged that he was tortured in pre-trial detention prior to his conviction. While an internal investigation into these allegations was reportedly conducted at the time, prosecutors declined to open a criminal case.

Taking into account the time spent in pre-trial detention prior to his conviction, Zhetigen was eventually released on 19th August 2026 after serving out his sentence. When speaking to journalists following his release, Zhetigen reiterated his innocence and said that he had declined offers to request a pardon while in prison as that would have amounted to confessing to the charges initiated against him.

Activist remains behind bars over posts from fake account

As reported before, activist-blogger Kanykei Aranova was sentenced to 3.5 years’ imprisonment in 2024 for allegedly “inciting hatred” and calling for the violent seizure of power. The charges stemmed from Facebook posts, which she maintained had been published from a fake account – a claim corroborated by investigations conducted by the OCCRP and Temirov Live. She was initially fined on these charges, but on appeal the fine was replaced with a prison sentence, a ruling upheld by the Supreme Court. The activist’s petition for a deferment of the prison sentence on the grounds that she has a young child was dismissed.

In early August 2026, Bolot Temirov, the exiled founder of Temirov Live, reported that the Supreme Court had rejected a request to reconsider Aranova’s case. When asked about her case in an interview later that month, President Japarov said that he was not familiar with it but would look into it.

The president’s communications head threatens activists with criminal prosecution, social media users targeted in connection with discussions of land use and foreign investments

On 20th July 2026, Daiyrbek Orunbekov, head of the presidential administration’s information policy service, published a controversial Facebook post in which he threatened criminal prosecution and imprisonment against those whom he accused of using social media to spread “fake news” and “discredit” the government through claims concerning China, land use and foreign debt. He stated that the presidential administration and law enforcement agencies were monitoring accounts deemed to be seeking to “provoke” the public. His post featured several collages containing photographs and personal information of dozens of individuals, including human rights defenders, activists, journalists, lawyers and opposition figures, whom he grouped according to their perceived political affiliations or views. Some of those featured on what became known as “Orunbekov’s list’’ said they had never posted about China or related issues.

The post came amid heated public debate over the government’s decision to amend regulations on the use of state-owned land, allowing land to be granted for up to 50 years to individuals and companies, including foreign investors, for certain investment and construction projects. The changes prompted widespread concerns that they could facilitate the transfer of Kyrgyz land to foreign investors, particularly from China in the context of rapidly expanding Chinese involvement in Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure development. President Sadyr Japarov sought to reassure the public that such arrangements would only involve temporary use and would not transfer ownership of land to foreign investors.

Orunbekov’s post was severely criticised, with those featured on it and independent commentators describing it as containing pressure and direct threats and stressing that any alleged violations of the law should be addressed through legal procedures conducted in compliance with procedural guarantees. Additional concerns arose because photographs used in the post were not previously publicly available but appeared in individuals’ profiles on the state-run Tunduk digital services platform.

Well-known human rights lawyer Nurbek Toktakunov – one of those featured on Orunbekov’s list –addressed an open appeal to President Japarov, arguing that the official’s unsubstantiated accusations and warnings of criminal prosecution may be perceived as exceeding his official competence and interfering with the functions of law enforcement agencies and the courts. Toktakunov also argued that Orunbekov’s threatening and insulting rhetoric raised concerns about its consistency with ethical standards for public service, and that his reported use of photos from a state information resource may amount to the unlawful use of personal data. Toktakunov requested Japarov to ensure that Orunbekov’s actions were investigated and assessed in accordance with relevant legislation and standards. In a later response, received by Toktakunov on 13th August 2026, the presidential administration stated that the issues raised in the appeal had been “reviewed and taken into account” and that further action would be taken “strictly in accordance with legal requirements”, without specifying what, if any, concrete measures had been taken in response to Orunbekov’s post.

A few days later, on 18 August 2026, human rights defender Gulshair Abdirasulova – another one of those featured on Orunbekov’s list – reported learning that the Ministry of Interior had opened a preliminary investigation into the allegations that the official had unlawfully published personal information following her complaint to the authorities on this issue.

In a related development of concern, independent journalist Elaman Karymshakov reported being threatened by Orunbekov over a humorous post he had published in response to the official’s July post. According to Karymshakov, Orunbekov called him the same day and demanded that he delete the post, telling him, “I warned you, got it?” In his post, Karymshakov rhetorically asked whether anyone would publish a list of those who had become wealthy or secured high-level positions thanks to “fake news farms” without explicitly referring to Orunbekov’s post.

In the context of the discussions on the use of state-owned land, individuals who criticised the legislative changes on social media also faced repercussions. Activist Azamat Bayamanov was detained after publishing several video appeals opposing the long-term allocation of land to foreign investors, including an appeal to President Japarov that attracted widespread attention online. On 24th July 2026 he was reportedly forced into a car by unidentified men outside a mosque. The following day, the Pervomaisky District Court in Bishkek ordered him to be held in pre-trial detention for two months. He was charged with complicity in organising mass riots, an offence punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment. Prior to his detention he had already been summoned for questioning by the SCNS in connection with one of his videos.

Other social media users commenting critically on the land issue were reportedly summoned by law enforcement authorities for questioning or “explanatory conversations”. Among them was poet-musician Iliyac Chingizbek uulu, who reported being summoned on 23rd July after publishing a song critically commenting on the transfer of land to foreigners at different times in Kyrgyzstan’s history.

In a related development unfolding amid heightened scrutiny of online discussion concerning foreign investment and China’s role in Kyrgyzstan, on 12th June 2026, political activist Mavlyan Askarbekov was detained after criticising growing Chinese influence in Kyrgyzstan on social media. He was subsequently remanded in pre-trial detention on charges of inciting discord. Shortly before his detention, he had reported that security service officials were disseminating derogatory information about him and attempting to portray him as an “enemy of the people”. According to Askarbekov, this happened after he approached the prime minister concerning the involvement of Chinese nationals in small and medium-sized businesses in the country and proposed to hold a public debate on the issue. He insisted that he had merely exercised his right to freedom of expression to speak out on this issue. In mid-August 2026, the case against Askarbekov was handed over to court, with the first hearing held on 20th August.

Other cases involving prosecution over social media expression

During the reporting period, the pattern of prosecution of journalists, bloggers and social media users over critical social media content continued beyond the issues of the use of state land and foreign influence covered above. While several individuals were acquitted, released or received reduced sentences in this context, concerns remained about the use of criminal and other legal provisions against legitimate expression:

As reported by RFE/RL, in April 2026, a local court convicted the service’s retired journalist Bayan Jumagulova of inciting hatred in connection with her social media posts and fined her 100,000 Som (around 1000 EUR). However, in June 2026, Bishkek City Court overturned her conviction on appeal and acquitted her. While the acquittal was welcome, it remains troubling that Jumagulova was prosecuted in the first place, with the proceedings dragging on for more than a year and a half. During that time, Jumagulova was also subjected to a travel ban that prevented her from going to Germany – where she lived for many years prior to her criminal prosecution – for surgery related to an earlier kidney transplant.

In March 2026, an appeals court acquitted media designer Ernis Zheentaev of disseminating “extremist” materials, while upholding his conviction for calling for “disobedience” and riots in relation to social media posts critical of the authorities. The court reduced his sentence from six years’ imprisonment – previously issued by a local court – to four years’ probation. As a result, he was released after several months in detention. While this was a positive development, it remains of concern that his conviction was not fully overturned.

In another case, in July 2026, a Bishkek court similarly acquitted Altynai Arstanbekova - an active social media user who presents herself as an independent expert - of disseminating “extremist” materials. At the same time, it found her guilty of publicly calling for the violent seizure of power and fined her 100,000 Som (around 1,000 EUR). As a result, she was released from custody, where she had been held since March. Arstanbekova was charged over social media posts critical of Japarov’s government, which she was accused of publishing through a fake account. Following her detention, pro-government social media accounts alleged that she had been working for a “fake news farm” linked to former security chief Kamchybek Tashiev, who was dismissed and subsequently prosecuted after falling out with President Japarov (see more under General Developments above). However, these allegations have not been independently confirmed.

In March 2026, an appeals court upheld the conviction of social media user Azamat Maripov on charges related to mass riots and public calls for the violent seizure of power, but ruled the six-year prison sentence previously issued to him be changed to three years’ probation. Maripov, a former supporter of President Japarov and then-security chief Tashiev, had repeatedly used Facebook to criticise senior presidential administration official Kanybek Tumanbaev and accuse him of wrongdoing. This prompted concerns that Maripov’s prosecution was related to his exercise of his right to freedom of expression in this context.

Blogger Adilet Ali Myktybek (also known as Adilet Baltabay) was released from prison after being pardoned by the president in May 2026. Myktybek had been serving a five-year prison sentence imposed in 2023 on charges of calling for “disobedience” and riots after he expressed critical views on social media regarding government initiatives. While his release was a relief, the conviction underlying his five-year prison sentence remains in place.

In May 2026, a local court dismissed a case against journalist Gulnaz Abylkasymova, who had been charged with online defamation and insult – punishable under the Code of Offences – over an ironic Facebook post concerning a private donation of rubber boots to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The donor filed a complaint over the post, which used humour and sarcasm to criticise the authorities in relation to the donation without mentioning the donor by name, and requested that Abylkasymova be fined. However, the court terminated the proceedings after finding that Abylkasymova’s actions did not constitute an offence. While the outcome was welcome, the case nevertheless raises concern about the use of the provision on online defamation in relation to legitimate expression.

Misuse of social media complaints mechanism to suppress critical content

During the period covered by this update, cases involving the apparent misuse of social media complaints mechanisms to suppress free speech were also reported. In August 2026, a social media user who publishes satirical animated videos about President Japarov under the name “Satyr Jutarov” and environmental activist Samat Kushbekov, who frequently criticises the authorities, both reported facing repeated copyright complaints resulting in the blocking of accounts and the removal or restriction of dozens of posts on multiple social media platforms. They were both convinced that this constituted retaliation for their criticism of the authorities. Their cases reflect a broader regional pattern in which claims of alleged copyright and other platform violations are increasingly being misused across Central Asia to restrict access to critical content, as highlighted in a joint statement issued by IPHR and partners in May 2026.

Association

Restrictive NGO law remains in force, new reporting obligations introduced

The 2024 law on “foreign representatives”, which a UN study confirmed has had a serious chilling effect on the civil society sector, remains in force. As of early August 2026, as previously, only five organisations had registered under the law. Nevertheless, the law constitutes a persistent threat against CSOs and has resulted in widespread self-censorship.

New registration requirements affecting CSOs and other legal entities also entered into force during the reporting period.

In accordance with a government resolution adopted in April 2026, all legal entities – including CSOs – registered before 1st March 2026 were required to submit information on their beneficial owners (i.e. the individuals who de facto control their organisations) to the Ministry of Justice by 1st August 2026. Those failing to do so risk fines. Authorities said the requirement reflected international practice aimed at combating money laundering. Concerns arose that awareness of the requirement was limited ahead of the deadline, creating a risk that CSOs could face fines simply because they were unaware of their new reporting obligations.

The resolution also requires legal entities registered before 1997 but not included in the unified state register of legal entities to re-register or formally terminate their activities by 1st January 2027, with those failing to do so facing compulsory liquidation.

Study highlights obstacles to judicial protection of freedom of association

In June 2026, the Bir Duino-Kyrgyzstan Human Rights Movement presented a study examining legal challenges brought by civil society representatives in relation to legislation affecting freedom of association in recent years. Based on an analysis of 15 court decisions, the study found that CSOs had consistently sought to use judicial mechanisms to challenge government decisions and defend freedom of association, but frequently encountered obstacles to obtaining effective judicial review. According to the study, courts often focused on procedural issues rather than examining the substance of complaints, including concerns about vaguely worded provisions, excessive state interference and the proportionality of restrictions on CSOs. The study also highlighted the gradual expansion of state powers over CSOs through additional reporting requirements, registers, inspections and other forms of oversight, while finding that courts generally accepted such measures as permissible means of ensuring transparency. It concluded that, although access to the courts formally remained available, CSOs often struggled to secure meaningful consideration of the human rights concerns underlying their cases.

Prominent human rights defender intimidated and detained

On 15th June 2026, prominent human rights defender Aziza Abdurasulova was detained without explanation in the city of Mailuu-Suu in Jalal-Abad region in southern Kyrgyzstan. Law enforcement authorities later confirmed that she was being held at a regional police department and claimed that she was being questioned as a witness in a criminal case, without providing any further information. While in detention, Abdurasulova began feeling unwell and required urgent medical assistance. She was released only after several hours.

Abdurasulova’s detention came shortly after she published social media posts in support of Mavlyan Askarbekov, a political activist who was detained on charges of inciting discord in June 2026 after criticising growing Chinese influence in Kyrgyzstan (see more under Expression). In this context, she expressed concern about the pattern of imprisonment of activists, journalists and others critical of those in power, rhetorically asking: “Does everyone really need to be made into prisoners?” Following these posts, she reported receiving threats by phone and being pressured to delete the posts, which she refused to do.

Abdurasulova has also previously faced pressure because of her human rights work. In December 2024, she left Kyrgyzstan for security reasons after receiving a series of threats following a public address by President Japarov, in which he singled out Abdurasulova and Kylym Shamy, the organisation she founded, for criticism while accusing NGOs and media outlets of spreading “false” information and concealing information about their use of foreign grants. She returned to Kyrgyzstan several months later and has since reported further incidents of intimidation, including threats of criminal prosecution in spring 2026.

Foreign civil society representative denied entry

In May 2026, Steve Swerdlow – currently a professor at the University of Southern California and formerly a Central Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch – was denied entry to Kyrgyzstan without clear justification. In a joint comment, members of the Civic Solidarity Platform – to which IPHR belongs – stated that the lack of transparency, due process, and effective legal remedies in cases such as this raises serious concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with its international human rights obligations. In another recent incident, covered in the previous update, three representatives of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) were similarly denied entry to the country without explanation in December 2025.

Opposition activists on trial for allegedly preparing post-election riots

As covered in the previous update, shortly before the November 2025 parliamentary elections, a group of opposition figures was detained on charges of allegedly preparing riots in connection with the elections, prompting concerns about the use of criminal law to sideline political opponents. Among those targeted was Temirlan Sultanbekov, leader of the opposition Social Democrats party, who was previously prosecuted on charges widely deemed politically motivated in 2024. After close to eight months in pre-trial detention, Sultanbekov went on trial in June 2026 together with his co-defendants. The proceedings are held behind closed doors, contrary to the request of the defence, as a result of which journalists have been denied access. In addition to charges of preparing riots, Sultanbekov and two other defendants – Kadyrbek Atambayev and Kubanychbek Kadyrov – are also tried for attempting to seize power. Sultanbekov has categorially denied the charges and suggested that the secrecy of the trial is related to the lack of evidence supporting the charges. Atambayev – son of ex-president Almazbek Atambayev – similarly deemed the case fabricated and alleged being subjected to intimidation and ill-treatment in detention.

Peaceful assembly

Protest ban renewed

In June 2026, Pervomaisky District Court in Bishkek upheld a decision by local authorities to prohibit protests in central areas of Bishkek, including at Ala-Too Square and outside Parliament, the Supreme Court, government buildings and the Russian embassy, until 16th September 2026. As previously, protesters were instead instructed to gather at a specifically designated location – Gorky Park. Official events were excluded from the ban.

As reported before, protests were first banned in the centre of the capital in spring 2022, following a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises. It has since been repeatedly renewed.

The blanket ban on protests in central Bishkek constitutes an excessive restriction on the freedom of peaceful assembly protected by Kyrgyzstan’s constitution and international standards, and its implementation has prevented citizens from exercising this right near government buildings.

The blanket ban has also contributed to a decrease in protest activity, although peaceful gatherings have continued to take place in the capital. For example, during the reporting period, drivers of right-hand-drive vehicles held protests in April and July 2026 against restrictions on obtaining licences to operate as taxis and penalties for providing taxi services without a licence. The April protest took place at the designated protest site in Gorky Park, while the July protest was held at a park outside the central area covered by the blanket ban. Both gatherings were closely monitored by police.

Detention of social media user calling for protest on Ala-Too square

In July 2026, amid heated public debate about the use of state-owned land and foreign investments in Kyrgyzstan (see more under Expression), police detained a social media user who had called on people to attend a protest planned for 23rd July on Ala-Too Square. Police accused him of calling for participation in an “unlawful protest” as well as other illegal actions which they said could lead to public disorder. He was subsequently charged with calling for riots and remanded to custody for two months. His detention came as part of a wave of detentions of social media users commenting on issues of land use and foreign influence.

It is unclear from publicly available information whether the planned protest was considered unlawful because it was due to take place on Ala-Too Square, covered by the blanket ban on assemblies in central Bishkek, or on other grounds. Nor is it clear whether the user’s posts merely called on people to peacefully participate in the planned protest, or also to take other action in this context. While more information about the content of the posts and the grounds for the social media user’s detention would be necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the case, available information gives rise to concern that law enforcement authorities treated the planned protest as unlawful without any court having assessed the circumstances or whether restrictions on it were necessary and proportionate.

New restrictive draft law advances

As covered in the previous update, problematic draft amendments to the Law on Assemblies introduced by an MP were posted for public discussion in March 2026. During the reporting period, the draft legislation was formally submitted to Parliament for consideration. It will first be reviewed at committee level before being examined by the full legislature.

The proposed amendments would grant local authorities broad powers to restrict where protests may take place, without court approval. In particular, the amendments would allow them to establish “specially designated places” where assemblies are permitted and to determine the routes of demonstrations and marches. While the amendments have been argued to be necessary to ensure public order and safety and protect the rights of those who do not participate in assemblies, in practice they would make it easier for authorities to prevent demonstrations from taking place within the sight and sound of their intended audiences, in violation of international standards.

Human rights organisations have criticised the draft legislation, warning that it risks leading to systematic violations of the right to peaceful assembly.

In its assessment of the draft amendments, the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) pointed out that the current law on assemblies, adopted in 2012, protects the right of organisers and participants to freely determine the venue of assemblies, except in locations explicitly prohibited by law. If local authorities consider that an assembly at a particular location poses a genuine risk to public order, they may apply to a court to impose restrictions on the location or route; the power to do so lies exclusively with the courts. Under the proposed amendments, however, local authorities would be able to impose blanket restrictions on assembly locations at their own discretion, rather than having to seek court approval based on a concrete risk posed by a specific assembly. Although organisers would formally retain the right to challenge such decisions in court, this will not provide an effective remedy if judicial review does not take place before the planned assembly. Moreover, ICNL noted that, under the proposed provisions, protests would be deemed unlawful if held outside designated venues, even if they were entirely peaceful and caused no disruption.